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Over the past twenty years, the geographical bases of state legislative parties have 
shifted substantially. In statehouses across the country, legislators from densely-
populated districts with large racial minority populations have become a larger presence 
inside Democratic caucuses while legislators from exurban and sparsely-populated 
districts have become a larger presence inside Republican caucuses.  These changes have 
had important consequences for roll-call voting and policy outcomes inside legislatures, 
as new coalitional configurations formed by the intersection of party and geography have 
replaced older ones. In this dissertation, I examine the causes and consequences of these 
changes in a new way, one that more closely approximates a legislator’s relationship to 
her “geographical constituency” (to use Richard Fenno’s famous term). Unlike traditional 
studies of the social origins of legislative conflict, which have focused on how the 
constituency bases of legislative parties can be distinguished by reference to a small set 
of district-level demographic variables examined independently of each other, my 
approach views district demographic variables as the empirical manifestations of a wide 
variety of distinct, if latent, geographical contexts.  
My efforts to model the geographical constituency are centered upon a technique 
called Latent Profile Analysis (LPA), which estimates a latent categorical variable (in this 
case, legislative district categories indicative of distinct socioeconomic contexts) that 
 vii 
captures covariation among a set of observed continuous variables (in this case, district-
level demographic and geographical variables). The LPA analysis, which incorporates 
over 3,500 districts from seventeen chambers in the 1990s and 2000s, yields a nine-fold 
district categorization scheme that serves as the basis for subsequent inquiries of the 
dissertation. These inquiries examine how demographic and electoral change have 
interacted to influence trends in partisan representation of the district categories, how 
party and district category come together to explain patterns of roll-call ideology among 
state legislators, and how social cleavages over public policy within state electorates are 
translated into particular voting alignments involving the district categories. The 
dissertation speaks to a large literature in political science on the constituency-legislator 
relationship, as well to current debates about geographical sorting, legislative 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
On the evening of November 2, 2010, Republicans in Alabama rejoiced upon 
achieving a longstanding goal, the last and most elusive element of the GOP’s ascent to 
majority status in the Yellowhammer State – control of the Alabama Legislature. While 
Republicans had begun to make inroads in Alabama politics during the 1950s and 1960s, 
their gains had for several decades been almost entirely restricted to federal elections. As 
far as Alabama state government was concerned, the Republican Party remained a non-
factor all the way until the early 1990s, when a Republican won the Alabama 
governorship and the party finally succeeded in establishing a durable foothold in both 
state legislative houses. Over the course of the next two decades, Republicans would 
continue to make incremental gains in state legislative elections, such that by 2007 
Republican caucuses in the Legislature constituted genuinely consequential forces. Then, 
on the heels of the 2010 Republican landslide that swept the country, the dam finally 
burst and Republicans took control of the Alabama Legislature for the first time since 
1874.  
Scanning the political environment that emerged after the 2010 elections, 
longtime observers of Alabama politics noticed an interesting pattern: the new political 
landscape in the state capitol of Montgomery was not just one in which the sizes of the 
legislative party caucuses were reversed from what they had been just two decades 
earlier. It was also one in which the geographical bases of the state legislative parties had 
almost completely shifted. In the early 1990s, the Democratic Caucus in the Alabama 
House of Representatives was composed of legislators from a diverse array of 
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geographies, including the central cities and suburbs of Birmingham and Mobile, rural 
counties in northern Alabama and along the state’s coastal plain, and the “Black Belt” 
stretching across the south-central part of the state. For their part, Republicans had 
managed to establish an enclave for themselves in a ring of districts along the outer edges 
of the Birmingham area, but apart from a few additional districts scattered in isolated 
corners of the state, their caucus did not include members from elsewhere. By 2011, 
however, it was the Democratic caucus whose geographical provenance had been reduced 
to a fairly small set of enclaves. Outside the central cores of the state’s large cities and the 
Black Belt, the vast majority of state house districts were now represented by 
Republicans. 
The story of the Republican Party’s path to control of the Alabama Legislature is 
important in many ways, most obviously as an example of how the Republican 
realignment of the American South finally manifested itself within state governments 
after decades of strong resistance from Democratic elites. However, a much less obvious 
element of interest in the story is its similarity to the circumstances surrounding the 
Republican ascent to majority control of many non-Southern state legislatures in the 
2000s. Consider the case of Minnesota, a state about as un-Southern (in both a 
geographical as well as a cultural sense) as one can get. As in Alabama, Republicans in 
Minnesota swept into control of both houses of their state’s legislature in 2010 after an 
exile that had lasted generations.1 As in Alabama, the Republican triumph in state 
legislative elections in Minnesota was based in large part on the success of GOP 
                                                 




candidates in rural but historically Democratic parts of the state (most notably, the Iron 
Range district in northern Minnesota). And as in Alabama, the Republican takeover of 
the state legislature in Minnesota in 2010 paved the way for a highly partisan and 
acrimonious legislative session the following year.   
To be sure, the stories behind the Republican takeovers of the Alabama 
Legislature and the Minnesota Legislature in 2010 are far from identical. Substantial 
differences between the two cases exist in terms of the trend in the composition of the 
legislatures in the lead-up to the 2010 elections as well as in the prospects for the future 
of party conflict in each state in upcoming decades. Nonetheless, a bird’s eye view of 
recent developments in the two states does reveal striking similarities in the recent 
changes in party conflict that their legislatures have undergone. These similarities are 
indicative of a broader pattern, the central elements of which can be seen in 
developments occurring in states throughout the country. Over the past twenty years, the 
partisan orientations of state legislative bodies have changed substantially, generally 
(though not always) to the benefit of Republicans. These changes have tended to occur in 
tandem with a long-term shift in the geographical bases of state legislative party 
caucuses. They have also generally been followed by a marked change in the nature of 
political conflict inside statehouses, as new coalitional configurations formed by the 
intersection of party and geography have replaced older ones.  
This dissertation seeks to shed light on the developments highlighted in the above 
paragraphs. More specifically, it attempts to answer the following general questions: first, 
how did the geographical bases of state legislative parties change over the course of the 
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last decade of the 1900s and the first decade of the 2000s? Second, what socioeconomic 
and political factors explain these changes? Third, what have these changes meant for the 
coalitional dynamics at work inside state legislative chambers? And finally, what have 
they meant for the policymaking processes in these chambers? In answering each of these 
questions, I adopt a new approach to understanding the link between the social 
constituencies underpinning political parties and the nature of conflict inside legislative 
bodies. Studies examining the social foundations of legislative conflict have traditionally 
focused on how the constituency bases of legislative parties can be distinguished by 
reference to a small set of district-level demographic variables. In this study, I propose an 
alternative way of analyzing the role of “the geographical constituency” (to use Richard 
Fenno’s famous term) in legislative politics, one that views district-level demographic 
differences as the empirical manifestations of a wide variety of distinct, spatially-
bounded socioeconomic contexts that can be found in the contemporary U.S. It is these 
geographical contexts, not the demographic variables with which they are associated, that 
ultimately explain how socioeconomic differences across constituencies impact partisan 
politics within American legislatures.  
 This introductory chapter will be concerned will three tasks: describing the 
political developments that have motivated the inquiry at the heart of this dissertation, 
laying out the theoretical justification for the analytical approach that will guide the 





THE GEOGRAPHICAL SORTING OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE: A SUB-STATE 
PHENOMENON 
 
 Ever since the 2000 presidential election resulted in an electoral map showing a 
country sharply divided between “red states” and “blue states”, the geography of partisan 
conflict in the United States has been a major topic of interest among observers of 
American politics. With a few notable exceptions,2 however, political scientists did not 
begin to produce studies rigorously examining the nature of the geographical divide in 
the American electorate until relatively recently. Many of these recent studies have 
focused on the narrative expounded by journalist Bill Bishop in his well-known 2008 
work The Big Sort. In the book, Bishop argues that the American electorate has become 
more geographically polarized over the course of the last several decades as Americans 
have sorted themselves into politically homogeneous neighborhoods and communities. In 
telling his tale, Bishop points to a variety of widely-examined social trends which he 
suggests are contributing to a more balkanized society, some of which include the 
increased geographical concentration of specific economic sectors (Moretti 2012), the 
growing divergence in human capital levels across cities and metropolitan areas (Berry 
and Glaeser 2005; Florida 2002), and differences in settlement patterns between native-
born Americans and immigrants (Gimpel 1999; Frey 1996). 
Embedded in Bishop’s grand narrative are a series of smaller arguments upon 
which political scientists have focused. Here, I discuss two of these arguments, the first 
being the claim that the American electorate has become more geographically polarized 
                                                 
2 These exceptions include: Gimpel 1999; Gimpel and Shuknecht 2004; Ansolabehere, 
Rodden, and Snyder 2006. 
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and the second being the notion that the trend of geographical polarization, while often 
evident in maps partitioning the country into state or regional divisions, is primarily the 
result of processes occurring at a much smaller (or “microgeographical”) scale.3 While 
both of these questions have proven to be controversial, the bulk of the scholarly 
literature has provided qualified support for Bishop’s claims.4 For example, a substantial 
number of studies have demonstrated the growth of geographical polarization in 
presidential election results at the congressional district or county level (i.e., below the 
level of state or region) (Seabrook 2009; Wing and Walker 2010). Hopkins (2009) 
uncovers strong evidence of growing regional cleavages in presidential voting but, upon 
closer inspection, attributes them largely (though not entirely) to supra-regional 
differences between metropolitan and non-metropolitan voters. McKee and Teigen 
(2009), on the other hand, deploy sophisticated multivariate analyses to show that recent 
trends of geographical polarization can be independently attributed to the growing 
importance of microgeographical differences as well as to regional cleavages. They 
nonetheless emphasize that the growing geographical divide in American politics is 
                                                 
3 In a 1988 article, J. Clark Archer introduced the concepts of “macrogeographical 
cleavages”and “microgeographical cleavages,” with the former referring to political 
differences across large-scale regions (the Northeast, South, Midwest, etc.) and the latter 
referring to political differences across small-scale residential locations. Archer’s 
analyses showed that macrogeographical cleavages had consistently outweighed 
microgeographical cleavages in influencing presidential election results during the period 
he considered. However, since his findings are 25 years old, they are not particularly 
relevant to the contemporary debate about geographical polarization.  
 
4 To be sure, the scholars who have found evidence in favor of Bishop’s narrative have 
offered more nuanced descriptions of geographical polarization than does Bishop, 
reflecting the traditional differences between academic and journalistic accounts of a 




primarily related to sorting at the micro level, not sectionalism as it has been traditionally 
understood.  
Several studies have gained a fair amount of notoriety for challenging the thesis 
of geographical polarization (Klinkner 2004; McGhee and Krimm 2009; Abrams and 
Fiorina 2012). In the most notable of these, Abrams and Fiorina argue that Bishop’s 
county-level analyses of presidential election results (and, by extension, those of the 
many studies mentioned above) fail to prove that geographical polarization is occurring 
for two reasons. First, they contend that presidential election returns are an inappropriate 
data source with which to examine the extent of geographical political segregation 
because presidential elections always feature different candidates. This is of consequence, 
in their view, because contemporary major-party presidential nominees are much more 
ideologically distinct than they used to be, thereby making it easier for voters to select 
candidates that align with their personal political persuasions. Thus, they contend, it is 
entirely possible that the geographical distribution of political preferences in the United 
States has not changed at all, but that patterns of geographical polarization are 
increasingly evident in presidential election results because of the greater ideological 
coherence of party elites. Additionally, Abrams and Fiorina argue that the corpus of 
studies purporting to demonstrate geographical polarization have not examined data from 
below the county level. Given the fact that many Americans live in counties with 
populations in excess of one million that include a wide variety of neighborhoods and 
communities, inferring microgeographical polarization based on county-level data would 
seem to be a fallacious exercise.   
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While the concerns of Abrams and Fiorina are ostensibly quite valid, two new 
studies present evidence casting substantial doubt on their importance. Myers (2013) uses 
fine-grained data at the Voter Tabulation District (VTD) level to examine geographical 
patterns in partisan voting between 1996 and 2010 in Texas, the nation’s second largest 
state. Given that VTDs in Texas have an average population of around 3,000 residents, 
utilizing them as units of observation largely allays Abrams and Fiorina’s criticisms 
about inferring geographical polarization from county-level data. Moreover, in his study, 
Myers takes advantage of a unique feature of Texas politics – the abnormally high 
number of statewide downballot races that occur during both presidential and midterm 
elections – to construct a measure of VTD partisanship that is immune to the problems 
caused by a reliance on presidential election results. Consistent with Bishop’s thesis, 
Myers’ spatial econometric analyses point to a very strong increase in geographical 
polarization within the state of Texas during the time period under examination. Like 
Myers, Walker (2013) uses fine-grained data on election results in Minnesota to 
demonstrate an extensive increase in geographical polarization in the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area since the early 1990s. Importantly, despite the fact that they examine 
states belonging to very different historical regions, Myers and Walker point to similar 
trends concerning changes in the geographical bases of political parties. Both of their 
studies show increased clustering of Democratic strength in central cities and inner 
suburbs and increased clustering of Republican strength in outer suburban and exurban 
areas (Myers’ statewide data also shows an enormous growth in the clustering of 
Republican strength in rural areas).  
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GEOGRAPHICAL SORTING AND PARTY CONFLICT IN AMERICA’S LEGISLATIVE BODIES 
 
 The conclusions at which the bulk of the studies described above have arrived can 
be summarized as follows: one, over the past several decades, the American electorate 
has become increasingly geographically sorted; two, while geographical polarization in 
the United States has often found expression in state-level and regional patterns, it has 
occurred primarily (though not exclusively) as a result of highly localized, sub-state 
processes.  
 In spite of its status as a phenomenon of mass politics, the growth of geographical 
polarization in the American electorate has caught the attention of many scholars of 
American political institutions. Most notably, the phenomenon (described in a variety of 
ways) has become an important component of explanations of party polarization in the 
U.S. Congress (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; Mellow and Trubowitz 2005; 
Oppenheimer 2006; Theriault 2008). Scholars who have sought to establish a connection 
between geographical sorting in the American electorate and party polarization in the 
U.S. Congress have isolated a variety of mechanisms purported to lie behind the link. 
Some have argued that the geographical sorting of the American electorate has caused 
congressional districts to become more politically homogeneous, thereby leading to the 
nomination and election of more ideologically extreme candidates (Oppenheimer 2005; 
Theriault 2008). Others have argued that the geographical sorting of the American 
electorate has caused the social or regional bases of the congressional parties to become 
more distinct, thereby creating new opportunities for social conflicts within the electorate 
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to be translated into elite-level partisan conflict (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; 
Mellow and Trubowitz 2005; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).  
 The fairly substantial number of studies examining the link between geographical 
sorting and party conflict in Congress has not been matched by a literature of equal size 
examining whether such a link exists at the state legislative level. Quite to the contrary, 
and notwithstanding the fact that state legislative scholarship has witnessed a much-
deserved resurgence in the past decade, not a single published study has (to this author’s 
knowledge)  rigorously examined whether and how a similar connection might exist in 
the state legislatures. This is indeed strange given the fact that, as discussed above, the 
geographical sorting of the American electorate has chiefly been a phenomenon 
occurring within rather than across states. If different sub-state geographies are 
increasingly arrayed against each other at the national level, it is reasonable to believe 
that similar outcomes should be occurring at the state level.  
 Despite the dearth of scholarly literature examining how geographical sorting has 
affected legislative politics in the states, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that these 
changes have had an important effect on the conduct of state legislatures. For example, 
publications covering the politics of individual states have produced many articles 
discussing the political homogenization of particular sub-state regions and the 
consequences such trends have had for local representation in legislative chambers. 
Importantly, these articles have tended to emphasizes similar trends in states that, from a 
historical-regional perspective, would not usually be grouped together. For example, 
feature-length articles in political publications in Texas, Illinois, Missouri, and Virginia 
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have all bemoaned the disappearance of Blue Dog-like Democratic legislators from rural, 
historically Democratic areas. 5 Moreover, a fairly long list of publications targeted at 
political insiders as well as some national general-interest publications have run feature 
stories documenting the rise of party conflict in state legislatures.6 In short, it appears that 
something systematic is changing the geographical contours of legislative politics in the 
states, even if political scientists have generally not made substantial efforts to discover 
what it is.  
THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCY: LEGISLATOR PERCEPTIONS AND EXTANT 
MODELING APPROACHES 
 
 This study will concern itself with examining how shifts in the geographical bases 
of state legislative parties have influenced political conflict and policymaking inside state 
legislatures. Prior to engaging in such an inquiry, it is necessary to consider an important 
methodological (perhaps even an ontological) question: how should the role that 
geographical differences play in legislative politics be studied? Meaningfully assessing 
this question requires delving deeply into an examination of one of the central issues in 
the study of democratic politics, the constituency-legislator relationship. More 
specifically, it requires considering how best to model “the geographical constituency,” 
Richard Fenno’s term for denoting “what the [legislator] has in mind when conjuring up 
‘my district’” (Fenno 1978, 1). It is a legislator’s perception of her district, after all, that 
mediates between the empirical realities inside the physical space she represents and the 
                                                 
5 See Hamilton 2010, Hester 2011, McDermott 2011, and Brooks 2013. 
 




decisions that she makes as a representative. Thus, when bringing district-level variables 
into analyses of legislative outcomes, scholars need to consider precisely what such 
variables mean to the actors who create the outcomes – the legislators themselves.  
 As it turns out, there is a fairly wide gap between what researchers who have 
conducted in-depth interviews with legislators have concluded about the way legislators 
perceive their districts and the way most quantitative political science studies have sought 
to model the geographical constituency. It is worthwhile to compare what the qualitative 
research has to say about constituency perception with the assumptions behind many 
quantitative studies of legislative outcomes in order to assess how the harvest of 
legislative research might be improved. 
Legislator Perceptions of the Geographical Constituency 
While scholarship examining how legislators perceive their districts has been 
relatively scant, two classic studies stand out as being especially insightful on the topic: 
Richard Fenno’s Home Style (1978), which examines the way members of Congress 
interact with their constituents when they are traveling in their districts, and Malcolm 
Jewell’s Representation in State Legislatures (1982), which uses in-depth interviews in 
state capitols to examine the various dimensions of state legislative representation. 
Additionally, a more recent study by Michael Smith (2003) replicates Fenno’s research 
design of observing legislators as they travel through their districts; for his part, Smith 
follows state legislators in two neighboring states with the goal of making generalizations 
about the different kinds of representational roles that legislators adopt when they are 
13 
 
among their constituencies. Collectively, these three studies go a long way toward 
answering the question of how legislators understand their geographical constituency.  
In his book, Fenno coins the term “the geographical constituency” to refer to the 
most expansive of four ways in which members of Congress understand those whom they 
represent. Whereas the other three ways pertain to particular subgroups within a 
legislator’s district, the geographical constituency refers to the legislator’s perception of 
the district as a whole. Fenno finds striking commonalities across the congressmen he 
interviews in the way in which they describe their geographical constituencies. First, 
Fenno finds that members of Congress generally begin describing their districts by 
situating them in a particular place – “three layers of suburbs to the west of the city”, “the 
core of the city,” etc. (2). Few of the representatives Fenno interviews describe their 
districts without at some point providing some sense of the larger setting in which it is 
located. 
Second, the legislators that Fenno interviews consistently provide detailed 
descriptions of the demographic compositions of their districts before they discuss the 
districts’ political characteristics. Political dispositions therefore appear to be secondary 
to socioeconomic characteristics in the minds of legislators when they are describing their 
districts (or, at minimum, this is how legislators want others to think they perceive their 
districts). As Fenno puts it, “it was as if they wished first to sketch a prepolitical 
background against which they could paint in the political refinements” (3). 
Moreover, when describing their districts’ socioeconomic profiles, Fenno finds 
that legislators provide surprisingly intricate depictions, making reference to “political 
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science’s most familiar demographic…variables.” In contemplating their districts, 
therefore, legislators see complexity rather than uniformity, understanding their 
geographical constituencies as derived from “some special configuration” of a wide 
variety of socioeconomic attributes. While Fenno cautions that some members of 
Congress provide much richer, more variegated descriptions of their districts than others, 
he nonetheless asserts that no congressman “sees, within his district’s boundaries, an 
undifferentiated glob” (2-3).7 
Jewell’s study confirms that many of Fenno’s findings about congressional 
representation can also be applied to the state legislative setting, while also going beyond 
Fenno to discover some additional ways in which legislators perceive their geographical 
constituencies. Whereas for Fenno the space within a district’s boundaries constitutes the 
most expansive constituency that a congressman has, Jewell emphasizes that state 
legislators sometimes perceive their geographical constituencies as extending beyond 
their district’s borders. This is particularly the case among legislators from large 
metropolitan areas, many of whom understand their responsibilities to include tending to 
the interests of an entire city or set of suburbs of which their districts are only a small 
part. In large metropolitan areas, the interests of a single legislative district are often 
indistinguishable from the interests of the larger region in which it is situated; as a result, 
                                                 
7 Fenno warns his fellow political scientists that, while differences in the depth of district 
descriptions provided by legislators may be due to objective differences in district 
heterogeneity, they may also be related to the cognitive biases of legislators. To prove his 
point, Fenno recounts how two successive legislators from the same geographical 
constituency described their district in quite different manners. The story is meant as a 
source of caution for political scientists who seek to model the geographical constituency 
entirely via Census data.  
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legislators view collaborating with colleagues from adjacent districts to advance the 
interests of the larger region as an effective way of serving those who elected them. 
Moreover, in instances in which the boundaries of legislative districts do not coincide 
with any meaningful demographic demarcations, legislators are even less likely to think 
in terms of district interests and more likely to think in terms of city or regional interests. 
Jewell emphasizes, however, that legislators feel responsible for the larger cities or 
metropolitan areas encompassing their districts only when no major social conflict exists 
between the legally-bounded areas they represent and other parts of the regions in which 
their districts are located. A legislator representing a district based in the poverty-stricken 
sections of a large city, for example, is not likely to express responsibility for advancing 
the interests of the city’s upscale neighborhoods, even if the areas are nearby and in the 
same jurisdiction.  
Smith’s (2003) more recent work adds further depth to the findings of Fenno and 
Jewell by emphasizing the extent to which a legislator’s perceptions of his geographical 
constituency are shaped not just by knowledge of the empirical realities within his 
district, but also by knowledge of the regional setting in which the district is located and 
in many cases of the entire territory for which he is legislating (i.e., the entire state). 
Building on Jewell’s premise that metropolitan legislators perceive their geographical 
constituencies as extending beyond their district boundaries, Smith finds that 
metropolitan legislators must do “an enormous amount of boundary-crossing” – engaging 
in legislative work that transcends their district lines, such as speaking at local forums 
and community events with colleagues from neighboring districts. These sorts of 
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responsibilities, Smith argues, shift the cognitive focus of legislators from their district 
boundaries to the larger regions of which their districts are a part. Smith also presents 
evidence demonstrating that legislators from different types of communities (e.g., 
impoverished urban neighborhoods, remote small towns, etc.) are keenly aware of how 
their areas are situated within the greater context of their state’s political economy and 
adopt strategies commensurate with the needs of their regions in the state capital.  
When considered in unison, the findings of Fenno, Jewell, and Smith point to an 
important conclusion – legislators view their geographical constituencies from a 
profoundly place-based, contextual perspective.  Indeed, a surprising similarity exists 
between the various elements of legislators’ perceptions of their geographical 
constituencies as described by Fenno and Jewell and the frameworks developed by 
scholars who have sought to unpack the concept of place as it pertains to political life. 
For example, in his landmark work Place and Politics (1987), the political geographer 
John Agnew proposes an understanding of place that is based on the intersection of three 
dimensions: locale, location, and sense of place. In his use of the term locale, Agnew 
refers to the geographical setting in which social interactions occur and social relations 
are constructed. Fenno’s recounting of legislators’ detailed descriptions of the 
demographic makeup of their districts, and in particular the nature of interaction between 
different social groups, strongly suggests that legislators perceive their districts partly as 
locales. In his use of the term location, Agnew alludes to the notion that places represent 
the convergence of a wide variety of larger economic and geographical forces within a 
particular space. This dimension of place is closely related to Jewell’s descriptions of 
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legislators’ association of their districts with larger geographical regions subject to 
similar economic processes. Finally, Agnew anchors the concept of place in a third 
dimension – sense of place – which refers to the overall cognitive affect (or feeling) 
invoked by a geographically-defined setting. Broadly speaking, the insights of Fenno and 
Smith about legislators’ personal relationship with the areas they represent speak to the 
way in which legislator perception incorporates this component of the concept of place as 
well.  
Efforts to Model the Geographical Constituency 
 Having discussed in considerable detail legislators’ perceptions of their 
geographical constituencies, I next turn to examining how scholars of legislative politics 
have incorporated the geographical constituency into explanations of legislative 
outcomes and assessing the degree to which these efforts comport with what has been 
learned about the way legislators understand their constituencies. Efforts to model the 
geographical constituency can be broadly divided into two categories: studies that 
decompose the geographical constituency into an array of district-level demographic 
variables (e.g., percent black, percent urban, percent blue-collar, etc.) and studies that use 
survey data to develop district-level measures of public opinion. I focus primarily on the 
first category of studies because these have been the studies that have explicitly tried to 
account for the sociological aspects of constituency representation. Efforts to develop 
summary measures of public opinion in “the district,” while certainly valuable for 
answering some research questions, are more tangential to the theoretical thrust of this 
project and are therefore not discussed here.  
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 The use of district-level Census data to model the geographical constituency has a 
long and rich history within the field of legislative studies. Possibly the first 
comprehensive effort in this vein was Julius Turner’s landmark study Party and 
Constituency (1952), which examined correlations between constituency demographic 
characteristics and roll-call voting patterns in the House of Representatives, both within 
and across the congressional party caucuses. The publication of Turner’s study marked 
the beginning of a period lasting roughly twenty years in which scholarship examining 
the social origins of legislative conflict by use of Census data, primarily in the U.S. 
Congress but also in the state legislatures as well, was particularly plentiful (MacRae 
1952; MacRae 1958; Derge 1958; Dye 1961; Froman 1963; Flinn 1964; Shannon 1968; 
LeBlanc 1969). Legislative studies relying on district-level demographics became less 
common in the early 1970s, but they have nonetheless remained an important component 
of the legislative studies field. The richly historical studies of David Brady and his 
colleagues (Brady and Althoff 1974; Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Brady and Stewart 
1982; Brady 1988), as well as more recent scholarship examining the roots of 
contemporary partisan polarization in Congress (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; 
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2008), stand out as prime examples of the 
enduring importance of demographically-oriented studies of legislative politics. 
 The aforementioned studies (which include many seminal works) have 
contributed much to the accumulation of knowledge about American legislatures over the 
past half-century. In particular, their insights regarding the link between the constituency 
bases of political parties and the nature of party conflict inside legislative bodies have 
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formed the basis for widely-accepted theories about the role of parties in the legislative 
process (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995). In many cases, the demographic approach that these 
studies have utilized has been entirely appropriate for the research questions that they 
were designed to address. 
 Still, one can make a reasonable argument that the approach offered by these 
studies – stated simply, the use of a small set of demographic variables as indicators of 
demographic variation across districts – falls short of providing a comprehensive account 
of the way the geographical constituency shapes political conflict inside America’s 
legislative bodies. In order to understand why this is the case, it is useful to consider what 
the studies have in common. To begin with, nearly all of them focus on a handful of 
demographic variables, usually the variables most commonly associated with party 
conflict in American politics at the time period under examination. Thus, Turner’s study, 
which examines the time period from the 1920s through the 1950s, focuses on variables 
such as the percentage of resident who are foreign-born, the percentage who are black, 
and the percentage who live in rural areas. Studies examining the late 19
th
 century, on the 
other hand, have focused upon variables related to agrarianism and industrialization 
(Brady and Althoff 1974).  
But while a handful of demographic variables may be good proxies for the 
dominant political cleavages of a given era, they do not come close to encompassing all 
of the demographic factors that have an influence on legislative representation. Fenno’s 
congressmen, for example, make reference to a wide array of demographic factors 
operating within their districts, many more than are incorporated into most studies 
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examining the social origins of legislative conflict. Moreover, while scholars of the 
American political parties tend to focus upon race, educational attainment, and religious 
observance as being major markers of political conflict in the modern U.S., they have 
also pointed to age, urban/rural residence, marital status, household type, and others as 
being important secondary elements of the contemporary political divide. Few studies 
examining the link between demographics and legislative outcomes have sought to 
consider such a wide variety of factors.  
 More importantly, nearly all of the extant studies addressing the role of 
constituency characteristics on legislative outcomes have considered individual 
demographic variables independently of each other, or as competing influences. For 
example, Turner’s classic study devotes separate chapters to each district-level 
demographic variable, analyzing its individual tendency to cleave the congressional party 
caucuses, while setting other influences aside. Brady and Stewart (1982) examine the 
effect of the 1896 realignment upon the social constituencies of the congressional parties, 
focusing on differences in average values for a variety of district-level demographic 
variables. Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani (2003) engage in a similar analysis but focus 
on a different time period (the late 20
th
 century). In these examples and others, individual 
demographic variables are viewed as representing the influence of particular social 
cleavages (i.e., racial/ethnic cleavages, economic cleavages, etc.) upon party conflict in 
the U.S. Congress. Significant associations between individual district-level demographic 
variables and measures of partisan representation or roll-call voting are seen as indicating 
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the translation of a social conflict within the electorate into the partisan politics of a 
legislative body.  
The work of Fenno, Jewell, and Smith, however, alerts us to the fact that 
legislators often do not see themselves as representing social groups first and foremost. 
Instead, they tend to understand their districts as collections of communities. While these 
communities are obviously defined in large part by their resident social groups, 
legislators nearly always recognize (to at least a certain degree) the complex social graph 
embedded in the physical spaces they represent. From this perspective, analyzing the 
geographical constituency as a function of the sum total of district-level demographic 
attributes, even if a large number of such attributes could be included, does not really 
approximate how legislators understand their geographical constituencies.  
 Lastly, the exclusive use of district-level demographic variables tends not to 
capture an important element of legislator perceptions of the geographical constituency – 
the position of a district within a larger geographical location or setting. As the studies of 
Jewell or Smith show, aspatial demographic variables such as race or education form an 
incomplete picture of the way legislators understand their geographical constituencies, 
even if their interactions are taken into account. A fuller accounting of the geographical 
constituency needs to also incorporate intrinsically geographical variables, such as the 
extent of urbanization and metropolitanization, which can serve as proxies for the larger 




A NEW APPROACH TO BRINGING THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCY  INTO STATE 
LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 
 
 We have seen that, for over a half-century, scholars have in various forms 
modeled the geographical constituency as an important influence on legislative politics, 
but that the vast majority of these efforts have not done so in a way that approximates the 
place-based perspective with which legislators actually perceive their districts.  
 One obvious reason for why scholars have stayed away from developing a place-
based model of the geographical constituency is that incorporating the concept of “place” 
into a rigorous social scientific research design is a task of exceptional difficulty. To 
some degree, the very notion of the importance of place is antithetical to the social 
scientific enterprise, which in its extreme forms seeks to replace proper names with 
variables in the service of developing law-like propositions explaining social phenomena 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). Indeed, one prominent political scientist has made the 
claim that the whole point of social science is to show how place (or “context”) does not 
matter for the purposes of explaining social outcomes (King 1996).  
 The issue at hand comes into sharper relief when considered in light of the 
particular research challenge of this dissertation. The primary contention made has been 
that assessing the role of the geographical constituency by merely adding together the 
influences of a small number of demographic variables does not closely approximate the 
way legislators relate to their geographical constituencies, and that a more place-based 
manner of modeling the geographical constituency is necessary. But the upshot of a 
community-centered view of social geography is that all communities (and, by extension, 
legislative districts) are unique, which makes the broadly comparative research 
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framework to which this study aspires impossible to achieve. A catch-22 therefore 
emerges: conventional political science methods of modeling the geographical 
constituency are not commensurate with how legislators understand their districts, but 
examining the role of the geographical constituency in a way that hews more closely to 
legislator perceptions would seem to entail abandoning the social scientific enterprise. 
The famous trade-off between accuracy and parsimony that plagues many comparative 
social science endeavors once again arises.  
  The solution I offer in this dissertation attempts to move the study of the 
geographical constituency a few steps in the direction of greater accuracy while still 
retaining a strong degree of parsimony. Rather than decomposing the district into a set of 
demographic variables or creating summary measures of public opinion, my solution is to 
model the geographical context of the district itself. I do this by using a statistical 
technique – latent profile analysis – that taps into the different ways in which social and 
economic measures, as well as some intrinsically geographical variables, co-vary across 
legislative districts. The idea is to develop a quantitative means of categorizing districts 
on the basis of the contextual realities with which they are associated. Through 
examining how a wide variety of variables interact within the physical spaces we call 
districts, we can get much closer to how legislators understand their districts as  wholes, 
particularly as compared with other districts in the chambers in which they serve.  
 On this matter, there are several important points of clarification that bear 
mentioning. First, while the statistical model that will uncover the latent district 
categories will be based on a large amount of district-level demographic and geographical 
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data, there is no assumption that legislators are familiar with or knowledgeable about all 
of the observed variables on which the model is based. Quite to the contrary, this project 
is based on the assumption that legislators recognize their districts as the latent 
geographical contexts that emerge from the model rather than their empirical 
manifestations (i.e., the demographic variables). This assumption is justifiable in light of 
the findings of studies of decision-making among legislative elites, which suggest that 
legislators have cognitive limitations and use heuristics to simplify the decision-making 
process (Jones 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  
Put more concretely, it is highly unlikely that, when considering whether the 
interests of her geographical constituency align with a bill concerning, say, speed limits 
on state highways (an issue that frequently evokes urban/rural divides), a legislator will 
calculate how many standard deviations of difference exist between the percentage of 
rural residents in her district and the mean percentage of rural residents in all districts in a 
state, as a political scientist might do. Instead, she is more likely to use a cognitive 
shortcut and consider the bill at hand from the vantage point of the geographical context 
of her district (e.g., “I come from a deep rural district; this bill is in the interest of my 
constituency”; “I come from a middle-class suburban district; this bill is not in the 
interest of my constituency’). Or perhaps, she might look around the legislative chamber 
and consult with a legislator from an adjacent district, whom she knows has a 
geographical constituency similar to hers, and ask her colleague how he plans to vote on 
the bill.  
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These scenarios are obviously gross oversimplifications of how legislative 
decision-making works, but they help to clarify how the latent geographical contexts at 
the heart of this dissertation may serve as important cues for legislators. The ultimate 
point is that, while some legislators are surely far more knowledgeable about the specific 
demographic statistics of their districts than others (as Fenno shows), the vast bulk of 
legislators are likely to maintain basic notions about what kind of districts they represent 
and how their districts compare with those of their colleagues. These are the distinctions 
for which the latent district categories will serve as rough approximations. 
While this study’s approach has not (to the author’s knowledge) been applied to 
legislative studies before, it is important to acknowledge the fairly long tradition of 
taxonomic studies of political geography from which it is partially descended. Efforts to 
use quantitative clustering techniques to model geographical variation in the United 
States appear to have premiered, in small numbers, during the 1970s and 1980s (Luttberg 
1971; Morgan and England 1987). The chief goal of these early studies was to develop a 
rigorous way of grouping the fifty American states into distinct cultural categories, and to 
use the resulting categories to predict state-level political outcomes. Lieske (1993) greatly 
expanded upon these initial efforts by using similar clustering techniques to isolate 
“regional subcultures” at the county level. More recently, Mikelbank (2004) has sought to 
better understand the nature of U.S. suburbanization trends by developing a 
quantitatively-derived typology of suburban places, and Chinni and Gimpel (2010) have 
promoted a fascinating new typology of American counties in order to provide a more 
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nuanced interpretation of the geography of American presidential elections than is 
generally offered by the national media.8  
The taxonomic scheme that will be developed differs from those of the foregoing 
studies in a number of crucial ways. First, as was discussed above, the units of 
observation will be state legislative districts rather than counties or states. Second, unlike 
the foregoing studies, this study will incorporate units of observation from more than one 
time period into a single analysis. As will be made clear in Chapter Two, both of these 
differences have important consequences with respect to data collection and 
methodology. Lastly, it bears emphasis that the goal of the taxonomic scheme developed 
in this dissertation is not to describe “regional subcultures” or to otherwise explain the 
rich tapestry of the American social landscape, important and legitimate as such goals 
may be. It is, rather, to model the types of geographical constituencies that state 
legislators represent. That overarching purpose is crucial to understanding differences 
between my model and those of the above-mentioned scholars in terms of the 
independent variables upon which it is based and other aspects of the modeling technique 
that is used.  
Potential Criticisms 
The approach I present in this dissertation (i.e., the modeling of the geographical 
contexts of  legislative districts) may provoke a variety of criticisms. Here I make efforts 
to preemptively respond to three such criticisms that I anticipate. To begin with, some 
                                                 
8 It is quite possible that I am missing some worthy additional efforts at using quantitative 




might contend that it is a folly to model the geographical context of an artificial unit such 
as a legislative district. After all, legislative districts are not organic political communities 
nor are they longstanding jurisdictions; instead, they are temporary partitions, often 
created with political goals in mind, that in some instances cut across neighborhoods or 
other meaningful geographical demarcations. Some might therefore argue that it is too 
simplistic to attempt to associate any sort of contextual reality with them.  
While it is true that legislative districts are artificial entities and that redistricting 
schemes sometimes result in districts that have tenuous connections to underlying 
geographical realities, the importance of redistricting is easily overstated, particularly for 
state legislative politics. To begin with, redistricting for all levels of government in the 
U.S. is governed by a set of national criteria that are enforceable by federal courts; these 
criteria, which including roughly equal populations, contiguity, and compactness, 
constraint the ability of mapmakers to ignore on-the-ground geographical realities to 
some degree (McDonald 2004). More importantly, a large majority of states have 
established additional guidelines for the drawing of district lines; in most cases, state 
standards for state legislative redistricting are substantially more strict and extensive than 
are the standards for congressional line-drawing.9 Principles such as respect for existing 
political and geographical boundaries and protection of communities of interest are fairly 
commonplace in state legislative redistricting law (Levitt 2010; McDonald 2007) The 
                                                 
9 For a comprehensive list of guidelines states have established for both state legislative 
and congressional redistricting, see Levitt, Justin. 2010. A Citizen’s Guide to 
Redistricting. Brennan Center for Justice. 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/CitizensGuidetoRedis
tricting_2010.pdf (Accessed July 2, 2010).  
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existence of these guidelines substantially limits the ability of state legislative district 
line-drawers to run roughshod over the “natural” demarcations of a state’s geography.10  
Another redistricting-related criticism that might be made against this project 
would focus on the challenge that majority-minority districts pose for the notion that 
legislators view themselves as representing communities instead of social groups. In 
states that meet a variety of thresholds related to the size and political distinctiveness of 
racial and ethnic minority populations, Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
mandates the creation of districts in which racial and ethnic minorities are the majority of 
residents. Given that the primary determining factor in the creation of such districts is the 
presence of one particular social group, some might argue it is likely that legislators from 
such districts perceive their geographical constituencies in ways that are more 
intrinsically sociological than they are contextual or place-based.  
To some extent, this is a fair point. Indeed, a copious literature suggests that 
legislators from majority-minority districts place a high priority on the substantive 
representation of racial and ethnic minorities (Swain 1991; Tate 2003; Casellas 2012); 
thus, it could well be that intrinsically racial representation trumps place-based 
representation in the eyes of these legislators. Still, in most situations, these are unlikely 
to be mutually exclusive choices. Given high rates of racial and ethnic segregation in 
American society, localities tend to be fairly distinctive in terms of their racial and ethnic 
compositions. Moreover, Section 2 of the VRA requires that ethnic and racial minority 
                                                 
10 I do not mean to suggest that oddly-shaped, obviously gerrymandered districts do not 
exist in contemporary state legislative chambers (they clearly do), but a cursory glance at 
many state legislative district maps shows that such districts are far from being the 
majority in most chambers. 
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populations meet a certain threshold of geographical concentration in order to merit the 
creation of majority-minority districts. This suggests that majority-minority legislative 
districts are in most cases likely to encompass socioeconomically distinct places. In these 
situations, there is no consequential difference between representing a racial/ethnic group 
and representing a particular place in the state legislature.  
A final criticism of the approach presented in this project might be that it places 
too great of an emphasis on “the geographical constituency” as a force impacting 
legislative behavior. Indeed, Fenno – the creator of the concept – emphasizes that the 
“geographical constituency” is merely one way in which legislators perceive their 
constituencies. In fact, says Fenno, members of Congress are just as likely to perceive 
their constituencies as a variety of district sub-groups (supporters, strong supporters, and 
close confidantes) . Fenno thus cautions political scientists armed with district-level 
Census or survey data not to assume that legislators always have “the district” in mind 
when they consider their constituents. In a more recent work, Miler (2010) picks up on 
Fenno’s insights to criticize congressional researchers for focusing excessively on the 
interests of “the district.” Miler argues that cognitive limitations prevent  members of 
Congress from accurately seeing the district as a whole, and that members of Congress 
are far more likely to see subconstituencies – “collections of constituents identified by 
their synonymous interest in a given policy area” – than they are to see the interests of all 
whom they represent (21). 
Several points need to be mentioned here. First, it is important to emphasize that, 
with the exception of the districts of the California and Texas Senates, state legislative 
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districts are quite a bit smaller than congressional districts, so the kinds of cognitive 
biases in constituency perception that Miler discusses are somewhat less likely to be 
evident among most state legislators.11 Indeed, it is almost certain that most state 
legislators have a better grasp of their geographical constituencies than members of 
Congress do, given the smaller sizes of their districts. More importantly, however, it 
bears repeating that this study makes no claim about the accuracy with which legislators 
perceive all of the diverse groups within their geographical constituency. Rather, the 
claim is that legislators maintain a basic view of the nature of their geographical 
constituency in comparison to those of their colleagues. Geographical context is 
hypothesized to serve as a heuristic for legislators in much the same way that 
subconstituencies serve as heuristic references for members of Congress in Miler’s study.   
Finally, it may be useful at this point to qualify the aspirations of this project. The 
goal of this dissertation is not to develop an all-encompassing theory of the constituency-
legislator relationship, something that would be a truly vast undertaking. Instead, it is to 
develop a new approach to analyzing one component of that relationship – the 
geographical constituency – and to use that approach to examine important questions 
concerning how changes in American electoral geography have altered the course of state 
legislative politics over the past twenty years. While it may be true that the extant studies 
of representation have focused excessively on the geographical constituency, it is also 
true that such studies have never before tried to model the geographical constituency 
                                                 
11 Miler herself argues that the biases that emerge in congressional perception are largely 
a result of the large size of contemporary U.S. House districts (155-159). 
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comprehensively. This study attempts to do so; it is left to the readers to assess how 
successful the attempt has been.  
AN OVERVIEW OF WHAT FOLLOWS 
 To summarize what has been covered thus far: extant literature has shown that the 
American electorate has become more geographically sorted over the past several 
decades, a process that has occurred as a result of a variety of socioeconomic and 
political trends occurring across the country at the microgeographical level. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that changes in the American electorate may be having an impact on 
state legislative politics and policymaking, particularly through effecting shifts in the 
geographical bases of state legislative parties and altering traditional legislative 
coalitions. To investigate whether and how this has occurred, this study will adopt a new 
approach to analyzing the geographical constituency, one that seeks to more accurately 
model the way legislators perceive their districts. This approach is based on utilizing a 
technique that isolates latent geographical contexts on the basis of the covariations among 
a wide variety of district-level demographic and geographical variables.  
 Chapter Two picks up immediately where this introductory chapter leaves off and 
launches into a presentation of my efforts to model “the geographical constituency.” 
These efforts involve the marshaling of extensive district-level data for over 3500 
legislative districts from both the 1990s and 2000s for seventeen legislative chambers for 
the purposes of isolating the latent geographical categories that serve as the foundation of 
this study. In addition to explaining the modeling technique, I discuss various issues 
regarding data collection as well as analysis and interpretation of the technique’s results. 
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After explaining the methodology, I unveil the nine-fold district categorical solution that 
emerges.  Various aspects of the nine district categories, including their distinguishing 
characteristics, are discussed in great detail.  
 In Chapter Three, the categorization scheme that was unveiled in Chapter Two is 
used as the basis for a detailed exploration of the ways in which demographic trends have 
interacted with electoral changes to bear upon patterns of partisan representation in the 
American state legislatures. Whereas changes in the relative prevalence of the district 
categories between Censuses are viewed as outcomes of demographic trends, changes in 
the tendency of the various district categories to be represented by Republicans are 
viewed as outcomes of electoral change. The chapter shows how examining the ways in 
which demographic and electoral developments come together through the district 
categories provides a rich account of the course of party conflict in state legislatures (and, 
arguably, in the country as a whole). In particular, the chapter demonstrates that, while 
demographic changes (i.e., changes in the relative prevalence of district categories) have 
worked to the benefit of Democrats, electoral changes (i.e., changes in the political hue of 
the district categories) have worked to the benefit of Republicans. 
 Chapter Four shifts to a focus on outcomes inside legislatures. With the goal of 
examining the relationship between party, geography, and roll-call voting ideology, I 
collect and analyze extensive roll-call data from the seventeen legislative chambers under 
examination for two time periods: 1999-2000 and 2011-2012. My results reveal 
systematic ways in which state legislative chambers differ with respect to the independent 
impact of geography (operationalized as the district categories) as well as its interaction 
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with party in influencing roll-call voting patterns. Most notable are the results among 
Democratic Caucuses, within which legislators from the most urban district categories 
consistently occupy the liberal flanks while legislators from the most rural district 
categories consistently occupy the conservative flanks. I also examine how the interaction 
between party influence and geographical influence changed between the two time 
periods I analyze. I find very strong evidence that the sharply diminished presence of 
Democratic legislators from the most rural district categories in the latter period has 
caused a leftward shift in the ideological characteristics of many Democratic caucuses, 
thereby causing greater partisan polarization.  
 Chapter Five moves from a generic focus on roll-call voting outcomes to a more 
policy-based analysis of the same dependent variable. More specifically, I develop a 
series of hypotheses concerning various ways in which geographical cleavages related to 
substantive policy disputes manifest themselves as particular roll-call voting alignments 
involving legislators from each of the district categories. Testing my hypotheses on roll-
call voting data for politically consequential votes in three legislative chambers, I find 
some support for my hypotheses, but also some indications that a variety of additional 
factors need to be taken into account in order to gain a proper understanding of the 
relationship between policy content and geographical conflict in state legislatures.  
 In the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I summarize the core findings of 
each chapter of the dissertation, synthesize insights gleaned from separate chapters into a 
more coherent corpus of knowledge, and examine some important consequences that 
flow from the dissertation’s analyses. These consequences, I contend, are not simply 
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relevant for understanding the fundamentals of contemporary state legislative politics. 
Rather, I suggest there is reason to believe that the forces under examination in this 
dissertation (i.e., the sub-state geographical sorting of the American electorate and the 
partisan transformations of state legislatures) are increasingly shaping the course of 




Chapter Two: Modeling the Geographical Constituency Using Latent 
Profile Analysis 
 
 The primary purpose of Chapter Two is to lay the empirical foundation upon 
which the remainder of the project will rest. Stated simply, that foundation is a 
quantitatively-derived classification scheme that seeks to model the geographical 
constituencies that contemporary state legislators represent. The chapter has several 
specific purposes, the first of which is to explain the modeling technique I employ to 
uncover the classification scheme. In brief, I use a procedure called Latent Profile 
Analysis, which estimates a latent categorical variable that captures covariation among a 
large number of continuous observed variables. In addition to explaining the modeling 
technique, I discuss various issues regarding data collection as well as analysis and 
interpretation of the technique’s results. After explaining the methodology, I unveil the 
nine-fold categorical solution that emerged as a result of the Latent Profile Analysis. 
Various aspects of the nine district categories, including their distinguishing 
characteristics and variation in their presence across states, are discussed in great detail. I 
also discuss how the nine-class solution achieves the basic goal of modeling the 
geographical constituency in a manner that more closely approximates how legislators 
understand their districts in relation to those of their colleagues.  
INTRODUCING LATENT PROFILE ANALYSIS 
Statisticians have in recent decades developed sophisticated new methods for 
analyzing how observations are clustered on the basis of a large set of observed 
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characteristics. These methods help to overcome many of the problems associated with 
older clustering approaches. One of these techniques, which I employ to develop a 
typology for state legislative districts based on their demographic characteristics, is 
Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). LPA identifies an unobserved categorical variable that 
explains heterogeneity across observations in the relationships among a large number of 
continuous dependent variables. 
 From a modeling standpoint, LPA is a close analogue of factor analysis, since 
both procedures estimate an unobserved variable that is assumed to account for the 
relationships among observed variables (McCutcheon 1987). The principle empirical 
difference between LPA and factor analysis is that, in the latter, the latent variable is 
continuous, while in the former it is categorical.12 The research objectives of LPA, on the 
other hand, tend to be similar to those of traditional forms of cluster analysis (i.e., 
uncovering groups of observations on the basis of observable data), but unlike the 
traditional forms, LPA is a model-based approach to quantitative categorization. While 
the same model is used to estimate each latent category, the parameter values governing 
the relationships between the observed variables (in this case, district demographics) and 
the likelihood that observations belong to a given category differ. The latent variable that 
assigns observations to categories is, in turn, assumed to account for all associations in 
the outcomes for the dependent variables (Muthen 2001). Thus, after the latent 
categorical variable is introduced, there should be no remaining relationship between the 
                                                 
12 There is a more profound theoretical distinction between LPA and factor analysis, 
which is discussed in Appendix One.  
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values of the outcome variables among the observations (Muthen 2001; Vermunt and 
Magidson 2002; Marsh 2009).13  
 Because it is a model-based approach, LPA offers several advantages over 
conventional clustering techniques. In particular, LPA analyses provide  researchers with 
a variety of diagnostic statistics related to model fit and model usefulness, which (when 
combined with a substantive examination of the results) are useful in determining the 
most appropriate class solution (i.e., the number of categories that together constitute the 
best possible explanation of the covariation in the observed variables). Additionally, 
whereas traditional clustering techniques assign observations to categories on an “all-or 
nothing basis” (Pastor et al. 2007), LPA gives each observation a probability statistic 
related to the likelihood that it is a member of a given category. Finally, unlike older 
clustering techniques, LPA does not require that the observed variables be scaled for 
equivalence or that the distributions of outcome variables approximate normality 
(Vermunt and Magidson 2002).  
DATA AND METHODS 
 The observations used in this study are 3,504 districts of the lower houses of 
seventeen states. These include districts from two redistricting cycles: 1993-2002 and 
2003-2012. In all seventeen states that were included, the number of districts within the 
lower legislative chambers did not change throughout the period at hand; thus, exactly 
half of the districts (1,752) come from the earlier period and the other half come from the 
latter period. 
                                                 




 A variety of factors determined which states were included in the analysis, the 
first and foremost of which were data availability and reliability. The ability to extend 
this project to legislative chambers in all fifty states was restricted substantially by the 
fact that extensive demographic data for 1990s state legislative districts are not readily 
available.14 Consequently, demographic data for half of the observations included in this 
project needed to be calculated from data for smaller areal units. In order to conduct these 
calculations, I used a GIS method known as spatial joining to associate 1990s state 
legislative districts with 1990 demographic data for Census block groups that fall within 
their boundaries.15 In spatial joining, a map of fine-grained areal sub-units (in this case, 
Census block groups) is converted into a new map in which the areal units are 
represented by their centroids (i.e., their geographical midpoints). The centroid map is 
then overlaid by a map in which the same macro-geography is divided into much larger 
areal units (in this case, state legislative districts). The various demographic values 
pertaining to the smaller units are then associated to the larger units that encompass their 
centroids. Finally, the values for the smaller sub-units that are associated with a given 
larger sub-unit are summed together, yielding an estimate of the larger sub-unit’s 
demographic values. 
                                                 
14 District data for the 2000s are readily available, thanks to a U.S. Census project 
launched in 2006). They were accessed from the U.S. Census’s Factfinder website.  
15 Census block groups are the most fine-grained areal unit for which most Census data 
are available. Block group data from the 1990 Census were downloaded from the 




 My careful examination of this technique suggests that it produces very reliable 
estimates of district demographics for many but not all state legislative chambers. The 
key issue at hand is district population – where district populations are exceptionally 
small, the estimates are far more suspect. To explain further, I provide Figure 2.1 (next 
page), which includes a map of Census block group centroids overlaid by legislative 
district boundaries in north-central California (left) and north-central New Hampshire 
(right). As can be seen in the left side of the figure, California Assembly districts 
encompass hundreds of Census block group centroids, as would be expected in a 
legislative chamber in which districts have populations of over 400,000. The right side of 
the figure, however, demonstrates the opposite scenario. New Hampshire State House 
Districts, which in some cases have populations of less than 3,500, often encompass only 
a handful of Census block group centroids. Because each of these centroids corresponds 
to an areal unit that does not necessarily fall within one legislative district’s boundaries, 
demographic estimates that are calculated via a spatial joining of Census block group 










Figure 2.1: Spatial Joining of Census Block Groups to State Legislative Districts in 















While the New Hampshire State House (given the exceptionally small populations 
of some of its legislative districts) is the most extreme example of the aforementioned 
problem, my examination suggests the problem is consequential in other small-district 
chambers as well. To help ensure that the demographic data in my sample are reliably 
estimated, I eliminated from the sample all legislative chambers with district population 
sizes of less than 25,000. Most of these chambers were located either in New England, 
where the states are unusually small and the legislative chambers are unusually large, or 
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in the Great Plains and Mountain West, where the states tend to be very lightly-
populated.16 
 In addition to the difficulties involved with producing reliable demographic 
estimates for legislative districts with small populations, one other issue had the effect of 
substantially reducing the number of states that could be included in the analysis. That 
issue was the implementation of multiple maps of legislative district boundaries in many 
states during both the 1990s and 2000s. As is well-known, congressional and state 
legislative redistricting schemes are frequently the subject of court fights, especially in 
jurisdictions that were until recently covered by Section 5 of the federal Voting Rights 
Act. When these court challenges are successful, new district maps are drawn to replace 
the old maps in the middle of a redistricting cycle. Moreover, in some states, legislatures 
have the ability to alter district lines in the middle of a decade without a court mandate, 
and in the first decade of the 2000s, a number of them did so (Levitt and McDonald 
2007).17  
For a variety of reasons, the presence of multiple district maps within a single 
decade presents significant methodological challenges for this project. To begin with, 
redrawn districts will have demographic characteristics that are likely to be at least 
somewhat different from the original districts (indeed, altering the racial and ethnic 
                                                 
16 See Appendix Two for a more detailed explanation of my examination of the spatial 
joining procedure, as well as evidence that the 1990s demographic estimates for the 
seventeen chambers that were included in my sample are reliable.  
 
17 The mid-decade redrawing of congressional district lines in Texas in 2004 is likely the 
most famous example of such behavior. Less well-known, however, is the fact that at 
least five other states redrew their congressional or state legislative district lines absent 
court mandate during the 2000s.  
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characteristics of districts is precisely the mandate that most courts give to legislatures 
when they order that new district lines be drawn). While it is doubtful that rerunning the 
LPA with data from new district lines would greatly impact the model being estimated or 
result in a different set of latent categories, it is quite possible that the most likely latent 
class membership of some redrawn districts would change. The extent to which the latter 
would occur is impossible to determine because, in most states in which mid-decade 
redistricting frequently occurs, demographic data for old district lines are not available 
(and neither are GIS shapefiles that can allow for the estimation of such data).  
So as to bypass the problems potentially caused by including chambers that 
utilized multiple district maps in a single decade, I extensively researched the history of 
redistricting for each state legislative chamber that was a viable candidate for inclusion in 
this study.18 Most chambers for which multiple district maps were used during either the 
1990s or 2000s were removed from the analysis. Two exceptions were the Alabama 
House and Minnesota House. In both of these chambers, one district map was used from 
1994 until 2002, rather than from 1992 until 2002. Because these maps were developed 
using 1990 Census data and remained in effect for the bulk of the 1990s redistricting 
period, I concluded it was legitimate to include these two chambers in the LPA while 
removing observations for these two chambers from all pre-1994 data points in 
subsequent analyses.  
                                                 
18 Sources of information included summaries of 1990s redistricting cases in all fifty 
states compiled by the MN Legislative Coordinating Commission 
(http://www.gis.leg.mn/OpenLayers/redistricting/1990/case/index.php), summaries of 
2000 redistricting cases in all fifty states compiled by redistricting scholar Justin Levitt 
(http://redistricting.lls.edu), and most importantly, conversations with knowledgeable 
authorities in each of the states I examined.  
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 Table 2.1 (next page) presents data on the seventeen state legislative chambers 
that were included in the LPA. As can be seen, the sample of state legislative chambers 
includes chambers from three states on the eastern seaboard (New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania), five states in the industrial Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Wisconsin), three states in the portion of the Midwest to the west of the Mississippi 
River (Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri), four states in the far West (California, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Washington), and two states in the South (Alabama and Virginia). Two 
regions (New England and the Intermountain West) are absent from the sample because 
states in these regions tend to have legislative districts of exceptionally small populations, 
thereby rendering their inclusion in the study problematic for reasons explained earlier. 
Additionally, Southern states are underrepresented in the sample because they are 
frequent sites of court fights over redistricting and are therefore more likely to have 












Table 2.1: Relevant Data on Lower State Legislative Chambers Included in Latent 
Profile Analysis 
 
Chamber Number of Districts 
Alabama House 105 
California Assembly 80 
Illinois House 118 
Indiana House 100 
Iowa House 100 
Michigan House 110 
Minnesota House 134 
Missouri House 163 
Nevada Assembly 42 
New Jersey Assembly 40 
New York Assembly 150 
Ohio House 99 
Oregon House 60 
Pennsylvania House 203 
Virginia House 100 
Washington House 49 
Wisconsin Assembly 99 
 
Demographic Variables 
 District-level data on twelve variables were included in the analysis. All but one 
of these variables was calculated from individual-level demographic data taken directly 
from the U.S. Census; the lone remaining variable is an index constructed from aggregate 
data from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  
The twelve variables included in the analysis all met three basic criteria. First, 
each of the variables corresponded (or was at least related) to an important social 
cleavage in contemporary American politics. Second, demographic data to measure each 
of the variables were either available, or could be tabulated, at the state legislative district 
level. Unfortunately, a number of important demographic variables (most notably, all of 
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the ones pertaining to religious adherence and observance) could not be included because 
no data existed for them that could be linked to legislative district boundaries.  
Finally, all of the included variables were calculated from data that were deemed 
to be sufficiently comparable across the 1990s and 2000s districts in the sample. Because 
the U.S. Census frequently changes its schemes for classifying important demographic 
attributes, care needs to be taken to ensure comparability when combining data from 
more than one Census period into a single analysis. To this end, all of the data used to 
calculate demographic variables were carefully researched, up to and including contact 
with knowledgeable Census officials. In one case (urban-rural populations), 1990 and 
2000 data were initially incomparable but specific ArcGIS techniques (based upon 
recommendations from Census Bureau officials) were used to adjust 1990 data so that 
they would better comport with 2000 data.19 Where data were incomparable and no 
adjustment technique could be employed, the variables to be calculated based upon those 
data were not included in the analysis. For this reason, important variables related to 
industry and occupational sectors are absent from the LPA.  
The following is a list of the eleven demographic variables compiled from 
individual-level Census data that were included in the LPA: 
 The percentage of district residents who are black/African American (BLACK) 
 The percentage of district residents who are Hispanic (HISPANIC) 
 The percentage of district residents living in urban areas (URBAN) 
                                                 
19 See Appendix Two for a more detailed explanation of the techniques that were used.  
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 The percentage of district residents at least 25 years of age who have attained a 
Bachelor’s degree or above. (BA) 
 The percentage of district residents under the age of 18 (UNDER18) 
 The percentage of district residents 65 years of age and over (OVER65) 
 The percentage of district residents living in family households (FAM) 
 The percentage of district residents, 15 years of age and over, who are married (MAR) 
 The percentage of district residents, 5 years of age and over, who speak only English at 
home (ENG) 
 The percentage of employed district residents, 16 years of age and over, who are private-
sector salaried employees (PRIVSEC) 
 The percentage of employed district residents ,16 years of age and over, who are self-
employed (SELFEMP) 
In addition to these variables, one final variable – an index measuring the extent 
of metropolitanization (METRO) of a legislative district – was included. Unlike the other 
eleven variables, METRO is calculated not from individual-level Census data but instead 
from the OMB’s 2003 Urban-Rural Continuum Codes, which classify counties according 
to their integration with metropolitan areas. Legislative districts were related to county 
populations via ArcGIS, and a truncated version of the OMB Codes was constructed for 
districts based on these relationships. Appendix Two provides further details of how 
METRO was calculated on the basis of the OMB codes.  
While METRO is ostensibly similar to URBAN, the two variables are actually 
quite distinct with respect to what they measure. URBAN is calculated from the U.S. 
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Census’s urban-rural categorization, which is based upon a micro-level distinction that 
emphasizes “rural separation” (Isserman 2005). More specifically, the Census uses an 
extremely intricate set of criteria based upon population thresholds and density measures 
to associate Census block groups with “urban clusters” or “urbanized areas” (two Census 
concepts whose specific meanings need not detain us here). All Census block groups that 
cannot be associated with urban clusters or urbanized areas are considered rural by 
default. Conversely, the METRO measure is calculated from the OMB’s county-level 
categorization, which is based upon macro-level distinctions that emphasizes “rural 
integration” (Isserman 2005). Population thresholds and density measures are used to 
identify counties that are “nuclei” of metropolitan areas. These counties are then linked to 
neighboring counties via data on transportation and employment patterns; the resulting 
linkages are what the OMB calls Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). Thus, many 
places in the contemporary U.S. are considered rural on the basis of the Census’ 
categorization scheme but, because they lie within CBSAs, are also viewed as parts of 
metropolitan areas. Conversely, other places are considered urban based on the Census 
categorization scheme but do not fall within the boundaries of CBSAs. Including both 
METRO and URBAN is therefore necessary to gain a comprehensive picture of the 
geographical setting of state legislative districts.  
Analysis 
The LPA analysis was conducted in MPlusTM  version 6. Because many of the 
twelve demographic variables used in the study have distributions that are non-normal 
and cannot be easily transformed to approximate normality, I conducted the LPA using a 
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maximum likelihood estimator with standard errors that are robust to non-normality, 
which is highly recommended under such circumstances (Muthen and Muthen 2012). All 
3,504 state legislative districts from the 1990s and 2000s were pooled into a single 
analysis. 
 As mentioned previously, LPA is based upon the conditional independence 
assumption (i.e., the assumption that the latent categorical variable accounts for all of the 
association between the outcome variables) (Muthen 2001). Before running an LPA 
analysis, researchers must consider the conceptual validity of this assumption with 
respect to their data and take steps to override it if they determine that that it is not 
tenable. In considering my data, I concluded that each of the twelve outcome variables I 
am using represent concepts that are fairly distinct from each other. Furthermore, in 
examining a correlation matrix for all of the demographic variables, I found that the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient exceeded .75 for only one pair of variables:  HISP and 
ENG (-.892). Despite their high level of negative correlation, however, HISP and ENG 
appear to be conceptually quite different. Whereas HISP measures Hispanic percentages, 
ENG measures percentages of English-only household. Given that there are a wide 
variety of language minority groups in the United States besides Hispanics, the 
importance of maintaining a strict distinction between HISP and ENG would appear to be 
vital. I therefore decided to run a modeling framework incorporating the conditional 
assumption that all of the outcome variables (including HISPANIC and ENG) are 
independent of each other after the latent categorical variable has been taken into 
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account. The modeling framework that I employ is displayed visually in Figure 2.2 
(below).  





























One element that is conspicuously absent from the modeling framework is an 
effort to weight the observations in the sample on the basis of the chambers to which they 
belong. As Table 2.1 showed, some chambers have many more districts than others, and 
are therefore more represented in the sample. Some might therefore suggest that a 




















chamber to the sample, or to adjust the relative contribution of each chamber to the 
sample in accordance with its state’s population.  
While this suggestion is not without merits, I have decided not to act on it for 
several reasons. To begin with, a comparison of weighted and unweighted LPA results 
suggests that weighting the observations would not affect the resulting LPA solution very 
much.20 More importantly, it is necessary to reiterate that the ultimate purpose of the LPA 
is to model the geographical entity that is the legislative district, not the states to which 
legislative districts belong or the geographical tapestry of the entire country. With this 
particular goal in mind, it makes little sense to weight up districts from certain states and 
weight down districts from others. The overrepresentation of certain chambers in the 
sample is simply a byproduct of the fact that some states have much larger legislatures 
than others. This is a basic reality of legislative life in the states, and I have decided that 
altering it through weighting is neither necessary nor desirable for the purposes of this 
project.  
Selecting the Right Number of Latent Categories 
 
 A crucial aspect of all LPA analyses is selecting the final model (i.e., the most 
appropriate number of latent categories). As discussed above, LPA analyses provide 
researchers with a number of diagnostic statistics, which they can combine with a 
substantive examination of the model results to determine which class solution is optimal. 
There are no strict guidelines for making a determination about which solution is the 
                                                 




correct one. Instead, the diagnostic statistics, as well as a substantive consideration of the 
categories that emerge, serve as pieces of evidence whose usefulness vary depending on 
individual research circumstances. It is ultimately the researcher’s job to use these pieces 
of evidence (and adjudicate among them if they happen to point toward different 
conclusions) to make the best judgment possible about the appropriate number of classes.  
 In this study, I make use of six diagnostic statistics that have become 
commonplace in LPA studies. The first of these are the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) and sample-size adjusted BIC, two examples of a larger set of diagnostics known 
as information criteria (ICs). ICs measure model fit by combining the log-likelihoods of 
the fitted models with a penalty term for greater numbers of parameters. While several 
ICs have been proposed and implemented, the BIC and its adjusted counterpart have been 
shown to be the best performers in simulation studies of LPA and similar techniques 
(Yang 2006; Nylund et al. 2007; Wu 2009). In general, lower values for BIC and adjusted 
BIC indicate better model fit. 
 Another set of diagnostic statistics come from likelihood ratio tests that are used 
to assess the significance of differences between two nested models. Three such tests are 
the Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin (VLMR) Test, the adjusted VLMR Test, and the Bootstrap 
Likelihood Ratio Test (BLMR). The VLMR and adjusted VLMR tests use an 
approximation of the Chi-Square distribution to compare the models (Lo, Mendell, and 
Rubin 2001; Herman et al. 2007; Nylund et al. 2007), while BLMR uses bootstrapping to 
estimate the distribution of the statistic used to compare the models (Nylund et al. 2007). 
All three tests examine the null hypothesis that a model of n categories does not evince an 
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improvement in fit over a model of n-1 categories. A low p-value indicates rejection of 
the null hypothesis and support for the inclusion of at least n categories, while a high p-
value indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and that a solution of n-1 
categories is sufficient to explain the data.21 Recent studies have suggested that the 
BLMR may be a better indicator of model fit than the VLMR and adjusted VLMR 
(Nylund et al. 2007; Wu 2009), but VLMR and its adjusted counterpart are widely used 
and are therefore included as well.  
 A final diagnostic statistic that I use is the entropy statistic. Unlike the ICs and 
likelihood ratio tests, entropy is not a measure of model fit but rather a measure of model 
usefulness. It assesses the overall probability that the LPA has classified each of the 
observations in the sample into its correct category. Entropy values range from 0 to 1, 
with values closer to 1 indicating a higher classification utility. While useful in assessing 
classification strength, it should not be used to assess model fit in the absence of other 
metrics (Herman et al. 2007). 
In accordance with proper LPA methods, I ran many different models, each of 
which posited a latent variable with a different number of categories. Table 2.2 (next 
page) shows results for each of the six diagnostic statistics for the seven-class to thirteen 
class solutions. As can be seen, the statistics do not jointly provide a clear indication of 
which class solution should be selected. Indeed, most of the statistics appear to suggest 
                                                 
21 While the fact that these tests assess the statistical significance of higher-order 
solutions makes them valuable, it is important to bear in mind that they are only useful 
for comparing nested models. If a researcher believes that the true class solution is not 




that solutions of even more than 13 categories might be appropriate. For example, the 
BIC and adjusted BIC values experience a relatively continuous decrease as the class 
solutions of the models become larger, indicating that more complex solutions 
continuously offer better fit. While the magnitude of the decrease in the BIC and adjusted 
BIC values does appear to shrink as the models become more complex, it does not 
completely taper off. Similarly, the BLMR tests yield highly significant p-values through 
the 13-class solution, indicating that each class solution is statistically a better fit than the 
one before it. Finally, each of the models registers exceptionally high entropy values, 
suggesting that the classification system that emerges from the LPA is consistently strong 
across the models. The difference between the entropy values are minor and not 
particular important.  























7 281331.89 281636.29 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.938 
8 279361.81 279704.99 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.936 
9 279014.64 278607.92 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.932 
10 278188.46 277740.32 0.6221 0.6234 0.000 0.935 
11 276415.68 276875.24 0.1582 0.1592 0.000 0.927 
12 276652.76 276122.12 0.7384 0.7393 0.000 0.927 
13 275879.18 275307.24 0.6439 0.6448 0.000 0.930 
 
 Unlike the other diagnostics, the VLMR and adjusted VLMR point to the nine-
category solution as the most optimal. These tests produce extremely small p-values for 
all class solutions through the nine-class model. With the 10-class model, however, the p-
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values jumps to .6221 and .6234 and do not return to levels generally accepted as 
indicating statistical significance (p<.05) in more complex solutions. Thus, these tests 
provide some important evidence that the nine-class solution should be selected.  
 The fact that the diagnostic statistics do not clearly indicate a preferred class 
solution, and that most in fact point to the need for highly complex solutions, suggests 
that these statistics may be of limited utility for the purpose of this study. This is not an 
unheard-of conclusion among studies utilizing LPA. Indeed, in their LPA-based analysis, 
Marsh et al. (2009) also find that the results of the diagnostics are not particularly 
consistent and thus caution other researchers that model selection “cannot be based on a 
mechanical application of recommendations about fit indexes” (215). In many cases, they 
contend, admittedly subjective evaluations of the class solutions in terms of the nature of 
categories and interpretability may be more useful than measures of model fit, which 
should only be secondarily considered.  
 My substantive examination of the different class solutions suggests that the BIC, 
adjusted BIC, BLMR, and entropy values are the results of complexities in my data that, 
while significant from a statistical perspective, are not indicative of inherently different 
geographical contexts. Indeed, the BLMR continues to yield highly significant p-values 
through a twenty-class solution, by which point the distinctions among many of the 
categories are extremely fine-grained and substantively meaningless. Instead, examining 
the solutions leads me to conclude that the most appropriate class solution is the nine-
class solution, which matches nicely with the results of the VLMR and adjusted VLMR 
tests. Up until the nine-class solution, the addition of an extra category results in the 
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isolation of a fairly distinct geographical context, one that would be fairly recognizable to 
most students of American political geography (as will be shown in the next section of 
the chapter). Beginning with the ten-class solution, however, the newly-added categories 
appear to be of little substantive import. 
Thus, based primarily upon my evaluation of the interpretability of the various 
class solutions and secondarily upon the results of the VLMR and adjusted VLMR tests, 
my decision is to use the nine-class solution as the basis for this study. While this 
decision is not clear-cut and I cannot dismiss the possibility that the nine-class solution 
may obscure substantively important intra-category differences of which I am not aware, 
the nine-class solution appears to be the most sensible when substantive, statistical, and 
practical considerations are considered in unison.22  
THE NINE CATEGORIES OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS 
 After choosing the most appropriate model, it is up to the researcher to provide 
substantive interpretation to the different classes that emerge. In this quest, the researcher 
is aided by a number of tools that MPlusTM provides, including a detailed model 
quantitatively estimating the relationship between each latent class and the outcome 
variables, estimated probabilities that a given observation belongs to a given class, and 
weighted averages of each of the outcome variables for the respective latent classes. 
                                                 
22 The nine-class solution is further justified by robustness tests ensuring that the same 
nine district categories emerge when a nine-class model is estimated with samples 
composed only of districts from the 1990s or 2000s. See Appendix Three for a discussion 
of the results of these tests.  
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Table 2.3 (next page) provides a list of each of the latent classes of legislative 
districts, along with the averages of the outcome variables (weighted by the estimated 

































Black 65.5 4.7 28.1 12.0 66.4 37.0 90.2 14.8 68.7 3.8 95.5 91.3 
Urban 
Hispanic 16.5 59.3 31.2 7.9 73.5 44.5 37.0 11.2 75.7 4.7 98.7 97.0 
Urban 
Ethnic 
Matrix 11.3 21.6 24.9 12.4 66.4 50.7 64.1 22.7 72.8 5.8 98.0 93.4 
 
Yuppie 8.9 6.5 14.8 11.3 42.3 36.6 83.2 48.4 62.4 6.6 96.9 80.8 
Middle-
Class 
Suburbs 8.1 3.3 23.5 14.9 65.2 52.3 91.8 19.2 73.3 5.0 93.9 76.1 
Outer 
Suburbs 4.1 3.0 27.9 9.2 76.4 62.4 93.2 24.6 75.1 5.4 82.1 90.2 
Upscale 
Suburbs 5.2 4.0 23.7 12.8 69.2 59.0 87.2 43.2 70.5 6.6 96.5 92.3 
Small City  
& Country 4.0 1.9 25.7 14.1 72.6 60.3 95.5 14.4 70.6 7.9 43.2 28.5 
Deep  
Rural 0.6 1.4 26.2 17.7 71.3 62.7 95.8 12.9 62.9 14.8 26.8 8.2 
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Here, I turn to discussing each of the types of districts in brief: 
 Urban Black Districts – These districts are most readily identified by the high 
percentage of African-American residents and urban residents within them. They are 
particularly prominent in cities with large black communities such as Chicago, Detroit, 
and St. Louis.  They also stand out in the high percentage of their residents who are 
children, the low percentage of their residents who are married, and the relatively low 
percentage of their residents who speak a language other than English at home (especially 
when compared with other urban district categories). 
 Urban Hispanic Districts – This class of districts includes districts encompassing 
Hispanic sections of the country’s largest cities. They tend to exhibit extremely high 
percentages of Hispanic residents, high percentages of residents who speak a language 
other than English, high percentages of residents under 18 years of age, and high 
percentages of family households. 
 Urban Ethnic Matrix Districts-- Districts in this category are urban and very 
socioeconomically heterogeneous. They tend to encompass the country’s most 
multiethnic neighborhoods and communities, but occasionally are mere agglomerations 
of diverse but internally homogeneous neighborhoods. In addition to including numerous 
districts in the country’s largest cities, this category also includes inner suburban districts 
in highly multiethnic states such as California. A look at the statistics reveals that these 
districts include large percentages of both blacks and Hispanics, as well as large 
percentages of well-educated professionals. The economic landscape of these districts is 
also exceptionally diverse.  
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 Yuppie Districts -- Perhaps the most distinctive category of the nine, yuppie districts are 
found in two ostensibly different locales – upscale central neighborhoods within the 
country’s large cities, and college towns. Yuppie districts are exemplified by extremely 
high levels of educational attainment, low percentages of family households, and low 
percentages of residents under the age of 18.  
 Middle-Class Suburban Districts – This category includes districts reminiscent of the 
burgeoning American suburbs of the post-World War Two period. They tend to be found 
along the inner ring of large metropolitan areas or in the central neighborhoods of smaller 
cities. Districts in this category are largely urban and primarily (though not 
overwhelmingly) white. They are middle-of-the-road with respect to most of the 
economic and social variables that were included in the analysis.  
 Outer Suburban Districts – These districts tend to be found on the outer reaches of 
large metropolitan areas. Because they are primarily located in the metropolitan fringes, 
outer suburban districts tend to have higher average scores on the metropolitanization 
index but also lower percentages of urban residents than do middle-class suburban 
districts. Not solely distinguishable from middle-class suburban districts on the basis of 
their location, outer suburban districts also evince higher percentages of family 
households and people with college degrees than their more densely-populated 
counterparts.  
 Upscale Suburban Districts – This category of districts encompasses many of the 
country’s most posh communities, including West Los Angeles, Chicago’s North Shore, 
Westchester County, New York, Morris County, New Jersey, and others. Like yuppie 
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districts, upscale suburban districts exhibit high levels of educational attainment. 
However, they are distinguished from yuppie districts in exhibiting higher percentages of 
family households and residents under the age of 18. 
 Small City and Country Districts – Easily the most common district category, small 
city and country districts tend to encompass a small central city and surrounding, mostly 
rural territory. As such, they exhibit very low percentages of urban residents and low 
values on the metropolitanization index. Small city and country districts share many of 
the same characteristics as outer suburban districts, but are less urban and well-educated 
as well as older.   
 Deep Rural Districts  -- The districts in this category are, in many respects, vestiges of 
America’s largely agrarian past. They are overwhelmingly white and rural, but are also 
distinctive in a number of additional ways. For example, of the nine categories, deep rural 
districts have the highest percentages of residents over the age of 65, the lowest 
percentages of residents who speak a language other than English at home, and the 
highest percentage of self-employed residents.   
So as to give readers a better sense of the locations of the different district 
categories, I present a series of maps of 2003-2012 Missouri legislative districts in Figure 
2.3 (next page), color-coded according to their most likely class membership. Blown-up 
maps of the St. Louis and Kansas City metropolitan areas are presented on the right-hand 
and left-hand sides of the statewide map, respectively. Missouri is featured because it is a 
highly segregated state in which the political geography is demarcated especially clearly, 
though similar maps could, of course, be easily created for each of the additional sixteen 
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states under examination. One of the nine district categories (urban Hispanic) is not found 























Figure 2.3: Map of Missouri State House Districts, 2003-2012, Color-Coded 


































The maps clearly demonstrate that district classes are located in very different 
geographies. Urban black districts are overwhelmingly concentrated in the north side of 
the City of St. Louis as well as in central Kansas City. One urban ethnic matrix district 
can be found in central Kansas City as well. Yuppie districts encompass the affluent 
central neighborhoods of St. Louis and Kansas City; a single yuppie district can also be 
found in the center of the state, where Columbia (home of the state’s flagship university) 
is located. Middle-class suburban districts are found directly to the west and east of the 
central cities of St. Louis and Kansas City; they tend to be surrounded by outer suburban 
districts. Upscale suburban district are primarily found directly east of the City of St. 
Louis. Small city and country districts are found along a strip ranging from the southeast 
corner of the state (known as its “boot heel”) to the outer reaches of the St. Louis 
metropolitan area, as well as along another strip stretching across the midsection of the 
state from the St. Louis to Kansas City areas. Deep rural districts compose much of the 
rest of the state. 
VARIATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF DISTRICT CATEGORIES ACROSS CHAMBERS 
  
 The relative presence of district categories varies rather substantially across the 
seventeen chambers included in this study, as should be expected given the diverse 
demographic and geographical characteristics of the states to which they belong. Figure 
2.4 (next page) presents the percentages of each of the nine district types within the lower 
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houses of the nine states under examination during the 2003-2012 years.23 In examining 
the figure closely, it becomes clear that the overall demographic profile of a state is the 
most important (but not the only) factor explaining variation in the presence of district 
categories within a legislative chamber. 
 
Figure 2.4: Proportions of Legislative District Latent Categories within State 














                                                 
23 Importantly, the distribution of district classes not only varies across individual states; 
it also varies across time. The effects of demographic changes and redistricting plans will 
manifest themselves in a different distribution of categories within chambers every ten 
years. Changes will be larger in states whose demographic profiles are rapidly shifting. 
Variations in the distribution of district categories between the two Census periods will 
be discussed extensively in Chapter Three.  
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In observing Figure 2.4, one can detect various groups of chambers whose 
distributions of district categories bear some resemblance. For example, the distributions 
of the Illinois House and New York Assembly look quite similar, in that both chambers 
exhibit relatively even percentages of all the district categories, with the important 
exceptions of deep rural districts (which account for less than 1% of the districts in both 
states). The exceptional diversity and relatively even distribution of district categories in 
the Illinois House and New York Assembly makes sense when one considers the qualities 
shared by the states associated with these two chambers. Illinois and New York are both 
defined by a large, socioeconomically diverse metropolitan area, but numerous small 
cities and rural communities can also be found within their boundaries.  
 The industrial Midwestern states of Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and (to a 
lesser degree) Pennsylvania also resemble each other with respect to the distributions of 
district categories in their lower legislative chambers. The Ohio House provides the 
clearest example of the distributional pattern inherent in each of these states. Only five 
district categories are present in the Ohio House: urban black districts, middle-class 
suburban districts, outer suburban districts, upscale suburban districts, and small city and 
country districts.24 While urban black districts predominate within Ohio’s central cities 
and small city and country districts predominate outside its metropolitan areas, a more 
interesting pattern emerges within the state’s suburban areas. In observing the distribution 
                                                 
24 The lack of urban ethnic matrix districts or yuppie districts in the Ohio House does not 
mean that multiethnic neighborhoods or neighborhoods full of young, well-educated 
singles cannot be found in Ohio. While such neighborhoods are surely present in cities 
such as Cleveland and Columbus, they are not big enough to yield districts associated 
with these latent categories, particularly given that Ohio House districts are have rather 
large populations (see Table 2.1).  
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of the Ohio House’s suburban district categories, one can see a stair-step pattern from left 
to right: middle-class suburban districts are the most common, outer suburban districts 
are fairly common, and upscale suburban districts are present but not ubiquitous. The 
same basic pattern exists, albeit in somewhat attenuated form, in the chambers of each of 
the other industrial Midwestern states. 
 Surprisingly, the Oregon House and Minnesota House also bear a certain 
resemblance in their distribution of district categories. Both chambers have above-
average percentages of yuppie districts, upscale suburban districts, and deep rural 
districts as well as few or no urban black and urban Hispanic districts. These results make 
sense when one considers that both Oregon and Minnesota have relatively low 
percentages of racial and ethnic minority populations, relatively high percentages of well-
educated populations, and fairly large rural populations to boot.  
 Three of the remaining chambers in the sample – the California Assembly, 
Nevada Assembly, and New Jersey Assembly – exhibit distributions that have a 
strikingly high percentage of urban ethnic matrix districts. Not coincidentally, the states 
to which these three chambers belong all have very high rates of racial and ethnic 
diversity. In California in particular, Hispanic communities are dispersed throughout the 
state;25 as a result, districts in places like Fresno, Bakersfield, or the outer reaches of the 
San Diego metropolitan area, which would likely be categorized as middle-class or outer 
suburban suburban districts absent a large Hispanic population, are lumped into the urban 
ethnic matrix category instead.  
                                                 
25 To be sure, Hispanic communities are far larger in some places than others.  
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 Aside from overall racial/ethnic composition and the extent of geographical 
dispersion of racial/ethnic communities, another factor likely at play in creating a large 
number of urban ethnic matrix districts in California and New Jersey is district size. 
California’s 38 million residents are divided into only eighty state assembly districts, thus 
making each 2003-2012 district the home of nearly 440,000 residents; similarly, New 
Jersey’s nine million residents are divided into only 40 assembly districts, thereby 
creating 2003-2012 districts with a total population of around 216,000. Within districts of 
such a size, many racially and economically homogeneous communities exist that would 
likely be categorized differently if they constituted their own districts. The fact that 
legislative districts in California and New Jersey are so aggregated, and that both states 
are so diverse to begin with, goes a long way toward explaining why the proportions of 
ethnic matrix districts in the California and New Jersey Assemblies are so high. 
VARIATIONS IN INTRA-CATEGORY HOMOGENEITY AND INTER-CATEGORY 
SEGREGATION 
 
 While the nine categories that emerged from the latent profile analysis were 
derived on the basis of the covariations between each pair of the twelve included outcome 
variables, the categories tend to be more strongly associated with values for some of the 
outcome variables than with others. To some degree, the extent to which the values of the 
demographic variables are segregated across categories is related to their initial 
dispersion. That is, if a variable has more dispersed values, distinct sets of those values 
are more easily isolated into different categories of observations.  To get a sense of how 
the dispersion inherent in each of the demographic variables relates to the extent to which 
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the variables are useful in distinguishing among the latent categories, I present two 
barplots in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 (below and next page). Figure 2.5 shows each 
demographic variable’s standard deviation value (since all of the variables are scaled 
from 0 to 100, their standard deviations are roughly comparable).  As can be seen, the 
geographical variables (URBAN, METRO) exhibit the most dispersion in values, 
followed by the racial variables (BLACK, HISP) and the variables related to family 
structure and education (FAM, MAR, ENG, BA). The variables related to age structure 
(UNDER18, OVER65) and economic sector (PRIVSEC, SELFEMP) exhibit the least 
amount of dispersion. 




































Figure 2.6, on the other hand, displays the value of the F-statistic for one-way 
ANOVA tests comparing means for the demographic variables among observations 
within each of the latent categories. The F-statistics indicate the extent to which 
observations within each of the categories exhibit distinct sets of values for the respective 
variables. A comparison of Figures 2.5 and 2.6 suggests that the initial spread of the 
variables and the segregation of their values across latent categories are related, but not 
perfectly so. Whereas the geographically-based variables (URBAN and METRO) evince 
the greatest dispersion, it is the values of the racial variables (BLACK and HISP) that are 
most segregated across the district classes. ENG is another variable whose segregation of 
values across district classes is higher than might be expected.    
 To get a better sense of which observed variables are more useful for 
distinguishing between latent categories and which ones are less so, as well as the ways 
in which the latent categories themselves vary in their internal coherence and external 
heterogeneity, I present boxplots of the values of observed variables for 2003-2012 
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districts in each latent category in Figure 2.7 (next page). Boxplots include a rectangular 
center representing the interquartile range of a given variable, “whiskers” representing 
more dispersed values, and dots representing outlier values. Each plot in figure 3 includes 
boxplots for the values of a single demographic variable. The tick marks below each 
boxplot indicates the latent category to which it corresponds (a legend linking the latent 






















 The first point to make is that, to varying degrees, each demographic variable can 
be used to isolate a handful of district categories that are distinct from the rest. For 
example, with respect to BLACK, urban black districts are clearly distinct from the other 
eight categories in terms of their high percentages of African-American residents. For 
HISP, the two distinctive categories are urban Hispanic and urban ethnic matrix. For 
UNDER18, they are yuppie and urban Hispanic. For OVER65, they are deep rural and 
middle-class suburbs, etc.  
Additionally, when taken as a whole, the figure shows major differences across 
categories in the interquartile ranges for the racial (BLACK, HISP) and geographical 
(URBAN, METRO) variables, substantial interquartile range differences across 
categories for the variables related to family structure and education (FAM, ENG, BA), 
and smaller interquartile range differences across categories for the variables related to 
age and economic sector (UNDER18, OVER65, PRIVSEC, SELFEMP). These 
differences are strongly related to the overall dispersion of each of the demographic 
variables, as discussed above. It should be noted, however, that a certain degree of 
difference in the interquartile ranges across categories exists in all of the demographic 
variables that were included. 
 At the same time, the figure demonstrates that some of the demographic variables 
exhibit more widely dispersed values and/or higher numbers of outlier observations 
within categories. This is especially the case among the two geographical variables, 
URBAN and METRO. The large dispersion of values for these two variables, particularly 
among the two low-density district categories (small city and country and deep rural), is a 
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result of several things. First, because the other seven categories are composed of 
populations that are almost exclusively urban and located in metropolitan areas, the low-
density categories inevitably take up the remaining, wide range of values for URBAN 
and METRO. Second, as described above, METRO is a scale based on aggregate data 
that, while important in its own right, does not correlate strongly with most of the other 
demographic variables. As a result, its role in the LCA is more peripheral. Indeed, there 
are many examples of districts that fit the archetype of “urban ethnic matrix” or “urban 
Hispanic” in most respects, but have fairly low values for METRO. These districts tend 
to be centered in small cities in western states like California, Nevada, and Washington. 
The populations of these districts are primarily urban and ethnically diverse (with large 
percentages of white and Hispanic residents), but they lie outside large metropolitan 
areas. It is these sorts of districts that account for the long whiskers and large numbers of 
outliers for the urban Hispanic and urban ethnic matrix categories in the METRO figure.  
 A different sort of pattern emerges with respect to the racial variables (BLACK 
and HISP). While the interquartile ranges of each of these variables are not particularly 
large across any of the categories, many of the categories display a large number of 
outlying values for them. The outer suburban and small city and country categories are 
particularly noteworthy in exhibiting many outlying observations for the BLACK 
variable. These observations closely resemble outer suburban or small city and country 
districts in most respects, but unlike most other districts in these categories, they contain 
high percentages of African Americans. As it turns out, nearly all of these outliers are 
districts located in Alabama and Virginia, the two Southern states in the sample. The 
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South is unique among American regions in containing large populations of African 
Americans living outside major metropolitan areas. Were additional Southern legislative 
chambers to have been included in the sample, it is almost certain that a latent category 
signifying low-density districts with large African-American populations would have 
emerged in the lower-order solutions of the LPA. Because additional Southern legislative 
chambers are not present in the sample, however, rural districts with large black 
populations compose such a small percentage of the sample that they do not emerge as a 
distinct category even among solutions that are far more complex than the nine-class 
solution upon which I settled. 
 Variables related to age, family structure, and economic sector evince little 
dispersion within nearly all district categories. Educational attainment, on the other hand, 
displays somewhat greater heterogeneity in some cases. Not surprisingly, those district 
categories that are defined to some degree by high socioeconomic standing (e.g. yuppie 
and upscale suburban district) evince less heterogeneity on the educational attainment 
variable.  
THE NINE DISTRICT CATEGORIES AS CONTEXTUAL HEURISTICS 
 The nine-category solution that emerged from the LPA represents my efforts to 
better approximate legislator perceptions of the geographical constituency, a key goal of 
this study as discussed in Chapter One. There are a number of reasons for why the nine 
district categories better account for how legislators understand their whole districts than 
do conventional political science techniques, such as the use of individual district-level 
Census variables. First, the categories clearly situate legislative districts within particular 
75 
 
geographical locations, including densely-populated urban zones, inner-ring suburbs, the 
outer fringes of metropolitan areas, small cities and micropolitan areas, and rural areas. 
As discussed in Chapter One, district spatial setting constitutes one of the primary points 
of reference for legislators when they are asked to describe their constituencies. Second, 
the categories incorporate basic representations of the particular socioeconomic milieus 
that exist within legislative districts, another key element of legislator perceptions. 
Diverse interactions among racial, social, and economic variables are reflected in the 
differences among categories such as black, yuppie, and urban ethnic matrix, or middle-
class suburban and upscale suburban, despite the fact that these sets of categories are 
often found in the same general locations.   
 Of course, a considerable distance remains between the nine-class solution and 
the “true” understandings that legislators have of their geographical constituencies. This 
is the case for a number of reasons, but most crucially, because it is impossible to arrive 
at the reality of legislator perceptions based purely upon demographic and geographical 
data, given the complex cognitive biases that affect all legislators. Nevertheless, when the 
evidence presented in the introductory chapter is considered, there is much reason to 
believe that the nine-fold categorization scheme comes closer than extant approaches to 
accounting for how legislators perceive their districts, particularly in relation to those 
represented by their colleagues. This is because the categorization scheme simplifies 
much demographic data into a set of spatial contexts that, based on the findings of Fenno, 
Jewell, and Smith, are likely to be recognizable to most legislators as they consider how 
the communities they represent compare with the overall geographical profiles of their 
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states. These categories thus serve as valuable proxies for the heuristics that legislators 
use when they make important decisions such as how loyal they should be to their party 
leaders, which of their colleagues they should form alliances with, what sorts of issues 
they should promote, and others.  
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this chapter has been to present the quantitative categorization that 
will form the basis of much of the rest of the dissertation. The nine district categories that 
were introduced in this chapter will serve as the primary vehicles of analysis in each of 
the remaining empirical chapters of the dissertation. In Chapter Three, I will use the 
categorical scheme to consider complex questions regarding the interplay between 
demographic and electoral trends in influencing changes in partisan representation within 
the seventeen state legislative chambers. In Chapters Four and Five, the focus will shift 
from partisan outcomes to legislative outcomes. The nine district categories will serve as 
independent variables in the examination of questions regarding legislative polarization 




Chapter Three: The Changing Geographical Foundations of State 
Legislative Parties, 1993-2012  
 
In Chapter Two, I described the basic aspects of the quantitative typology of state 
legislative districts that is at the center of this dissertation, including the statistical model 
used to develop the typology, the descriptions of the district categories, and how the 
categories vary in terms of their internal coherence with respect to important 
demographic variables. In Chapter Three, I take the nine-category solution upon which I 
settled as the basis for a detailed exploration of the ways in which demographic and 
electoral trends have interacted to impact the social foundations of state legislative parties 
over the nineteen-year period between 1993 and 2012. Because the topic at hand is highly 
multifaceted, I proceed by examining a series of individual questions that can be thought 
of as its constituent elements. These questions are as follows: 1) how has demographic 
change altered the distribution of the nine district classes between 1993 and 2011?; 2) 
how have the political alignments of different categories of legislative districts changed 
over the past several decades?; 3) to what extent do the political alignments of the district 
categories over the 1993-2011 period vary by region?; 4) how have demographic changes 
and electoral changes come together  in the form of the district categories to influence 
trends in party control of state legislative chambers? 
When considered collectively, the answers to these four questions suggest that the 
two major forces bearing upon the social foundations of contemporary state legislative 
politics – changes in the relative prevalence of the district categories and changes in the 
categories’ electoral characteristics – have been moving in opposite directions. While the 
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former have largely worked to the benefit of Democrats (since the district categories that 
have grown in prevalence usually elect Democrats), the latter have worked to the benefit 
of Republicans (since the district categories that have changed their political orientations 
have moved in the Republicans’ direction). For a variety of reasons, however, the 
influence of electoral changes over the past twenty years has been much more substantial 
than that of demographic changes. This observation goes a long way in explaining 
Republican ascendance in state legislatures across the country. 
 Prior to presenting the empirical results of this chapter, I explore what has already 
been written about the respective roles played by demographic trends and electoral 
changes in altering the constituency bases of state legislative parties across time. I then 
show how these two processes can be jointly studied through the district categorization 
scheme advanced in this work. Because it provides a unique vantage point through which 
to examine a complex array of social and political trends, the district categorization 
scheme helps to reveal some fundamental realities obscured by a focus on smaller 
patterns.  
THE CONSTITUENCY BASES OF STATE LEGISLATIVE PARTIES: TWO CAUSES OF 
CHANGE 
 No one with a basic understanding of American politics would dispute the notion 
that the sorts of constituencies represented by Republicans differ from the sorts of 
constituencies represented by Democrats in America’s legislative bodies. It is, for 
example, a truism of American politics that Republicans in the contemporary U.S. tend to 
represent constituencies that are whiter, wealthier, and more sparsely-populated than 
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Democrats. Nor would anyone with some level of knowledge dispute the notion that over 
time, as American society and politics evolve, so do the constituency bases of legislative 
parties. As discussed briefly in the introduction, scholars have pointed to longitudinal 
changes in the constituency bases of congressional parties as key factors influencing the 
development of America’s national legislature (Stonecash, Brewer, and Marini 2003; 
Brady and Althoff 1974; Brady and Stewart 1982). It seems likely that similar processes 
affect the course of legislative politics in the states. An important first step in determining 
the impact of changes in the constituency bases of state legislative parties is to get a sense 
of how those changes have come about.  
 Among the possible factors that might influence how the social foundations of 
state legislative parties differ, two stand out as of utmost importance. The first of these 
factors involves transformations in the overall demographic and geographical profiles of 
states. Political scientists have long observed that changes in the demographic 
composition of the American electorate have large consequences for the nature of 
American politics over time.  One of the most important ways in which demographic 
changes influence national politics is by altering the social ingredients that national 
parties have at their disposal as they seek to assemble majority coalitions (Petrocik 1987; 
Andersen 1979). Several notable works of scholarship have shed further light on this 
process by examining it at the state level, showing how large-scale demographic changes 
affect the social profiles of individual state electorates in highly diverse ways (Gimpel 
1999; Gimpel and Shuknecht 2004). Moreover, when changes in the demographic 
composition of sub-state electorates occur in a geographically uneven manner, they 
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enhance the possibility that the legislative district boundaries into which states are 
partitioned will encompass areas that are more sociologically distinct from each other 
than they were before.  
Political demographers have devoted much attention to exploring the 
demographic trends that have altered American politics (and, by extension, the politics of 
individual states) during the time period covered in this study. In particular, they have 
pointed to the growth of particular populations, most notably Hispanics (Frey 2008; Judis 
and Teixeira 2002; DeSipio 1996), college-educated professionals (Abramowitz and 
Teixeira 2008), and childless adults (Smith 2008), and the decline of other populations, 
including the white working class (Teixeira and Rogers 2000; Abramowitz and Teixeira 
2008) and married adults (Smith 2008), as developments of large consequence. 
Importantly, each of these developments has predominately occurred across state 
boundaries, rather than neatly overlapping with them. Moreover, most of these changes 
have tended to be concentrated in particular areas rather than being dispersed evenly 
across space, the effect of which has generally been to make legislative districts more 
rather than less uneven in their constituency characteristics. Similar to the work of 
political demographers, population geographers have pointed to important, explicitly 
spatial trends affecting American communities and jurisdictions, many of which have had 
major ramifications for party politics in America. These include the infilling of urban 
cores by recent immigrants and the concomitant outflow of native-born Americans from 
these areas (Frey 1996), the densification and urbanization of inner-ring suburbs 
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surrounding large cities (Orfield 1997, 2003; Lang, Sanchez, and Berube 2008), the 
emergence of “exurban” communities along the outer fringes of cities, and others.    
 In addition to changes in the demographic characteristics of the American 
population, the other major factor influencing the social bases of legislative parties 
involves changes in the political characteristics of social groups within the American 
electorate. The process by which social groups alter their collective voting behavior in 
American politics has been the focal point of a large and detailed literature within 
political science. The specific controversies in which scholars writing in this area have 
been engulfed need not detain us here. Instead, it should suffice to say that, their 
disagreements aside, most scholars have come to accept that gradual, long-term changes 
in the partisan affiliations of social groups – akin to what V.O. Key called “secular 
realignment” – are the primary mechanism by which partisan change in contemporary 
American politics occurs (Brewer and Stonecash 2008; Burnham 2010; Mayhew 2002). 
As the partisan alignments of individual social groups change gradually, so do the overall 
social-group profiles of the political parties. The notion that shifts in the political 
preferences of social groups usually occur gradually comports well with this study’s 
focus on cumulative effects across a period of time lasting roughly two decades.  
 Because changes in the social composition of the electorate and changes in the 
party alignments of social groups tend to occur at a more-or-less continuous rate, it is 
difficult to empirically disentangle the effect of one from that of the other. Thus, much 
recent scholarship on the growing importance of the Latino vote has emphasized both 
their emerging status as a social group that is politically up-for-grabs, as well as their 
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rapid growth within the United States.  Analyses examining recent changes in  voting 
patterns among working-class whites (Bartels 2006; Abramowitz and Teixeira 2008; 
Frank 2004), college-educated professionals (Brewer and Stonecash 2008), suburbanites 
(Lang, Sanchez, and Berube 2008; Gainsborough 2001; Oliver 2001), rural voters 
(Gimpel and Karnes 2006), among others, have also sought to emphasize the importance 
of demographic trends alongside electoral ones. Despite the difficulties in distinguishing 
their effects, however, it is clear that demographic growth and partisan change are 
distinct processes affecting the social foundations of legislative parties. 
USING THE DISTRICT CATEGORIES TO UNDERSTAND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN 
POPULATION CHANGE AND ELECTORAL CHANGE  
 
 In considering all of the different ways in which demographic and electoral 
changes can influence the social bases of legislative parties, we are faced with a 
bewildering assortment of possible individual influences, not to mention a far larger 
assortment of interactive ones. Comprehensively describing how all of these influences 
work together to shape changes in legislative constituencies would therefore ostensibly 
seem to be a truly daunting task, even if the focus were on only one legislative institution. 
Perhaps this is one reason for why extant studies that have sought to examine changing 
constituency bases have almost always focused on no more than a handful of 
demographic variables. 
 The district categorization scheme, on the other hand, provides an opportunity to 
simplify the incredibly complex demographic and electoral realities alluded to earlier by 
situating them within nine geographical contexts. Stated differently, we can understand 
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how the manifold demographic and electoral trends in American society converge to 
influence the constituency bases of state legislative parties by viewing them as acting 
through the nine district categories. Doing so allows us to consider the respective 
influences of demographic trends, electoral trends, and their interactions in fairly eye-
opening ways. Demographic changes can be viewed as manifesting themselves in 
changes in the relative presence of district categories between Census periods. Recall that 
the sample of legislative districts includes an equal number of districts from the same 
seventeen chambers for the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, when states experience growth in the 
sizes of particular social groups or a change in the geographical distribution of their 
populations, these developments will express themselves through changes in the 
distribution of district categories within their legislative chambers. Likewise, when 
particular social groups or communities adjust their voting patterns, these changes will 
manifest themselves in particular district categories becoming more or less likely to be 
represented by one of the two political parties.  
 To be sure, the approach to understanding the roles of demographic and electoral 
change described here is not a perfect solution to the challenges of accounting for 
demographic and electoral trends. For one thing, because the U.S. Census only collects 
detailed demographic data once every ten years, it is impossible to measure continuous 
change in the relative prevalence of district categories. Instead, it is only possible to 
evaluate the presence of the respective classes of districts once every ten years, after 
decennial Censuses are conducted and redistricting plans subsequently emerge.  
Additionally, demographic changes in district population do not track perfectly with 
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changes in the composition of district electorates, so it would be misleading to attribute 
changes in the electoral characteristics of district categories to changes in the electoral 
characteristics of any particular demographic or social group. These issues 
notwithstanding, the approach nonetheless provides a uniquely comprehensive way to 
examine changes in the kinds of geographical constituencies represented by Democrats 
and Republicans.  
 Before launching into the empirical findings, it is important to reiterate how the 
conceptual move at the heart of this dissertation will influence the way the results of this 
chapter are reported. In keeping with the focus on the nine geographical contexts rather 
than the demographic variables that are their empirical manifestations, the explanations 
of this chapter’s findings will emphasize legislative parties’ geographical bases (i.e., the 
geographical contexts upon which they rely as they attempt to secure legislative 
majorities) rather than their social or demographic bases. While social groups and 
demographic variables will be referenced in order to provide valuable explanation to the 
trends that are found, an effort will be made to emphasize that the findings of this chapter 
(and this dissertation) ultimately pertain to the geographical contexts at hand, not to the 
demographic variables that are associated with them.  
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND THE PRESENCE OF DISTRICT CATEGORIES 
Here, I examine the ways in which demographic changes have impacted the 
presence of the nine district categories among the observations in the dataset between the 
1990s and the 2000s. In Figure 3.1 (next page), I present data comparing the most likely 
categorical memberships of the 1,752 districts in my sample from the 1990s to the most 
85 
 
likely categorical memberships of the 1,752 districts in my sample from the 2000s. As 
can be seen, district categories whose numbers increase substantially between 1990 and 
2000 include urban ethnic matrix districts, urban Hispanic districts, and upscale suburban 
districts; district classes whose number decrease substantially include middle-class 
suburban, outer suburban, and deep rural districts. 
Figure 3.1: Most Likely Categorical Memberships of Legislative Districts from the 




Several important socioeconomic changes and population movements can quickly 
be recognized to be at work in the shifts in the prevalence of the district categories. For 
example, scholars have written about the impact of demographic shifts upon the character 
of many inner-ring suburbs throughout the country in recent decades. As these 
communities have simultaneously become more racially diverse and densely-populated, 
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they have come to more closely resemble their metropolitan area’s central urban core 
(Hanlon et al. 2006; Orfield 2002). This pattern almost certainly lies behind the dramatic 
increase in urban ethnic matrix districts and the concomitant decrease in middle-class 
suburban districts. In a similar vein, the rapid growth of Hispanic populations within 
longstanding Hispanic urban neighborhoods largely explains the increased presence of 
urban Hispanic districts. Another well-known trend affecting metropolitan areas 
throughout the country has been the growth and increased geographical clustering of 
well-educated professionals (Moretti 2012; Berry and Glaesar 2005). This phenomenon is 
likely at work in the transformation of areas constituting middle-class suburban and 
outer-suburban districts in the 1990s into areas constituting upscale suburban districts in 
the 2000s.  
Of all the district categories, the one that experiences the most significant decline 
between the 1990s and the 2000s (in terms of sheer numbers but especially in terms of 
relative prevalence) is that of deep rural districts. This trend is, of course, directly related 
to the longstanding and ongoing decline in the percentage of Americans living in rural 
areas. In many cases, the boundaries of what had been deep rural districts in the 1990s 
were expanded to include small portions of metropolitan areas in the 2000s so that these 
districts could achieve population parity with other districts in their states. The end result 
was that many areas constituting deep rural districts in the 1990s became areas 
constituting small city and country districts in the 2000s, thereby accounting for the 
modest increase in prevalence of small city and country districts between the two 
decades. Still, when their numbers are combined and compared to those of other 
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categories across the two time periods, deep rural and small city and country districts are 
clearly net losers and would show an even greater decrease if the results of the 2010 
Census were factored into the analysis. It is abundantly clear that the image of America 
as a country whose population is spread out across small cities and towns dotting an 
expansive landscape is largely antiquated and obsolete.  
To enhance readers’ understanding of the demographic trends discussed above, I 
present maps of Illinois State House Districts in the 1990s and 2000s on the next page. 
These maps are instructive because, when considered side-by-side, they indicate precisely 
where changes in district category membership have occurred and illuminate the 
processes that contribute to these changes. A close examination of the zoomed-in maps of 
the Chicago area (where the bulk of the state’s population is found) reveals that the 
number of urban ethnic matrix districts in the Illinois House skyrocketed between the 
1990s and 2000s in large part because districts belonging to this category have 
increasingly emerged outside the city limits of Chicago. As Chicago Hispanics have 
increasingly laid down roots in the city’s suburbs, they have effectively transformed 
many legislative districts in these areas into urban ethnic matrix districts. Within the city 
limits, on the other hand, the number of urban Hispanic districts has expanded as well. 
Finally, examining the vast bulk of land area in Illinois outside Chicagoland reveals that 
all of the deep rural districts in the 1990s transformed into small city and country districts 
in the 2000s, as was discussed in the previous paragraph. In the 2000s, not a single deep 
rural district remains in the Illinois House. 
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CHANGES IN THE PARTISAN REPRESENTATION OF DISTRICT CATEGORIES 
 
Thus far, I have discussed how the prevalence of the nine district categories 
changed between 1990s and 2000s, linking these changes to various demographic shifts 
in American society during this time period. I now turn to the electoral dimension and 
inquire, what are the political characteristics of the nine district categories, and how have 
these changed since 1993? 
 Figure 3.3 (next page) shows the percentage of districts within each category 
represented by Republicans between 1993 and 2012.26 As can be seen, the district 
categories vary dramatically in their tendencies to be represented by one party or the 
other. But while the overall political orientation of some of these categories has gone 
mostly unchanged over the past twenty years, other categories have undergone a dramatic 
political transformation. A proper accounting of this chart needs to consider what has 





                                                 
26 Because their 1990s redistricting plans were not implemented until 1994, the Alabama 
House and Minnesota House are not included in Figure 3.3. In the New Jersey House and 
Washington House, two legislators are elected from each individual district. Each of 
these districts is given the same weight as districts from all other chambers in the figure. 
In cases where both legislators representing a district are Republicans, the district is 
counted as being represented by one Republican legislator. In cases where one of the two 
legislators representing a district in these chambers is a Republican, the district is counted 
as being represented by one-half of a Republican legislator.  
90 
 





















Throughout the period of time at hand, the four district categories least likely to 
be represented by Republicans have been three of the four urban district categories: urban 
black,  urban Hispanic, and yuppie. As the figure shows, the political orientations of 
districts belonging to these categories have largely gone unchanged, with a modest uptick 
in Republican representation among all three categories following the 1994 elections 
reversing itself by the late 1990s. Indeed, by the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 
century, a smaller percentage of districts within each of these categories is represented by 
Republicans than was the case in 1993.  
 Districts belonging to the fourth urban district category – urban ethnic matrix 
districts – consistently display a higher likelihood of being represented by Republicans. 
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In the 1990s, most urban ethnic matrix districts sending Republicans to statehouses were 
located in California, either in the medium-sized cities of the Central Valley or within the 
vast swathe of densely-populated territory stretching east from the City of Los Angeles 
(locally known as the “Inland Empire”). During the 2000s, the number of urban ethnic 
matrix districts grew substantially and so did the number of such districts represented by 
Republicans. New Republican-leaning urban ethnic matrix districts could be found in 
sections of the Chicago, New York, and Seattle metropolitan areas. The overall 
percentage of such districts represented by Republicans did not increase, however; in 
fact, the trendline for Republican representation of urban ethnic matrix districts in Figure 
3.3 is remarkably flat.  
 In comparison with the urban district categories, the suburban and low-density 
district categories exhibit much greater rates of overall change in their electoral 
characteristics over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. For two of these district categories 
– upscale suburban districts and middle-class suburban districts – the overall change 
between 1993 and 2011 is substantial though probably not large enough to be considered 
transformative. With respect to upscale suburban districts, the trendline in Republican 
representation is flat throughout the 1990s but jumps slightly in 2003 – an increase likely 
due to the combination of the effects of redistricting and the political climate of the 2002 
elections. Between 2003 and 2009, however, upscale suburban districts experience a 
large and continuous drop in Republican representation, a pattern that can be explained as 
the outcome of growing Democratic support among well-educated, affluent whites during 
the latter years of the George W. Bush presidency (see, e.g., Brewer and Stonecash 
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2008). Republicans nonetheless manage to recover in some upscale suburban districts 
during the 2010 elections, and consequently the overall net gain for Democrats in 
representation of this category between 1993 and 2011 is only 9%. Middle-class 
suburban districts, on the other hand, display a modest net gain in Republican 
representation between 1993 and 2011. This gain occurs almost entirely at the beginning 
and end of this study’s time frame (i.e., as a result of the 1994 and 2010 elections); levels 
of Republican representation of middle-class suburban districts are fairly steady in the 
interim.  
 By far the largest increases in Republican representation between 1993 and 2011 
occur among the three remaining district classes – outer suburban, small city and country, 
and deep rural districts. At the inception of this study’s time frame, outer suburban 
districts are well ahead of any other district category in terms of Republican 
representation. They manage to stay on top throughout the 1990s and 2000s, their rates of 
Republican representation rising from 74% in 1993 to 88% in 2011. Small city and 
country districts and deep rural districts, on the other hand, transition from being slightly 
more likely to be represented by Republicans in 1993 (54% and 61%, respectively) to 
being solidly Republican by 2011 (83% and 78%, respectively). The 29% increase in 
Republican representation among small city and country districts is especially 
noteworthy, both because of the sheer size of the increase as well as because of the 
numerical importance of this district category. Whereas in the early 1990s small city and 
country districts were evenly divided between the parties in terms of partisan 
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representation, by the early 2010s they have become the bedrocks of Republican state 
legislative caucuses while being practically non-existent within Democratic caucuses. 
A close examination of Figure 3.3 reveals that much of the increase in Republican 
representation for the small city and country and deep rural categories occurred as a result 
of the 1994 and 2010 elections, both of which were watershed years for the Republican 
Party at the federal and state level. Not all of the increase in Republican representation of 
districts within these three categories can be attributed to these two elections, however. In 
particular, the figure shows that these categories experienced increases in GOP 
representation during the late 1990s and early 2000s as well.   
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN TRENDS OF PARTISAN REPRESENTATION  
 To reiterate, the crux of the findings of the previous section is that, while most of 
the nine district categories experienced either no significant change or fairly modest 
change in partisan representation between 1993 and 2011, two categories in particular – 
small city and country districts and deep rural districts – experienced a large-scale 
increase in Republican representation. A logical question to ask next is whether these 
overall trends mask significant regional differences. For example, Myers (2013) provides 
strong evidence that the partisan realignment of the American South that began in the 
1950s and 1960s did not end in the 1990s, as some have suggested, but instead continued 
apace in new locales (primarily rural areas and small cities rather than the suburbs of 
large metropolitan areas, which had already become heavily Republican). One 
possibility, then, is that the large-scale changes in partisan representation among small 
city and country districts that were documented in the previous section are not reflective 
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of national patterns, but are instead the result of partisan changes that occurred 
exclusively in the American South. While this possibility initially seems unlikely, since 
only two of the seventeen chambers in the analysis are from Southern states, it cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. It is also possible that the small overall declines in Republican 
representation among middle-class suburban and upscale suburban districts obscure 
regional differences between the country’s coastal regions and its inner regions in 
representation of these two categories.   
 The notion that patterns of partisan representation among the respective district 
categories might differ across the country’s regions is to some degree in tension with an 
important premise of this dissertation, viz. that microgeographical, sub-state cleavages are 
affecting the country in roughly the same way across regions. To the extent this is true, 
we should see a convergence across regions in levels of Republican representation for 
each of the district categories. Conversely, a divergence across regions in levels of 
Republican representation for each of the district categories would constitute evidence of 
an interaction between microgeographical (i.e., sub-state) cleavages and 
macrogeographical (i.e., supra-state) cleavages in the emerging geography of state 
legislative representation. 
 To examine regional differences in patterns of partisan representation of the 
district categories, I separated the seventeen legislative chambers in my analysis into five 
groups on the basis of the states to which they belong. Table 3.1 (next page) displays 
information about each of the regional groups, including the chambers constituting them 
and the total number of districts in each group. It is important to point out that the regions 
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are not even in terms of their overall contribution to the sample of districts. Due to the 
number of chambers within them and the number of districts per chamber, some regions 
contribute far more districts than others.  
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics on Regional Groups 
 
Region Chambers Number of Districts 
Mid-Atlantic New Jersey Assembly 
New York Assembly 
Pennsylvania House 
786 (393 for each decade) 




854 (427 for each decade) 




992 (496 for each decade) 
South Alabama House 
Virginia House 
410 (205 for each decade) 




462 (231 for each decade) 
  
 Figure  3.4 (next page) shows how partisan representation of the four largest 
district categories (middle-class suburban districts, outer suburban districts, upscale 
suburban districts, and small city and country districts) has varied across the regions 
during four time points (1995, 2001, 2007, and 2011).27 It shows evidence in favor of 
regional divergence in some cases and regional convergence in others. As will be 
explained, however, the strongest evidence is that in favor of regional convergence. 
                                                 
27 Figures for the other five categories are not included because at least one region lacks a 
sufficiently large sample of districts belonging to these categories.  
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Figure 3.4: Regional Breakdowns of Percentages of District Categories Represented 
















The best examples of regional divergence can be seen in the figures for the 
middle-class suburban and upscale suburban district categories. In 1995, the percentage 
of middle-class suburban districts that are represented by Republicans ranges from 26% 
in the Central region to 40% in the West Coast region. Between 1995 and 2011, the 
percentage of such districts represented by Republicans dips somewhat in three of the 
five regions (Rust Belt, Central, and West Coast) but rises dramatically in the South. 
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With respect to upscale suburban districts, four of the five regional categories display a 
net decline in Republican representation between 1995 and 2011 (the percentage of 
upscale suburban districts in the mid-Atlantic region that are represented by Republicans 
is largely constant throughout the time period), but the decline in the West Coast is far 
larger than in the other three regions.  
 Caution is warranted, however, in inferring too much about regional divergence 
from the figures for middle-class suburban and upscale suburban districts. In both cases, 
results for the aberrant regions (i.e., the South for middle-class suburban districts, the 
West Coast for upscale suburban districts) are based on small sample sizes. There are 
only 18 middle-class suburban districts from the two Southern state legislative chambers 
for the 1990s and 23 such districts for the 2000s. Consequently, the large increase in the 
percentage of Southern middle-class suburban districts represented by Republicans is the 
result of a swing of only about eight districts between 1995 and 2011. Similarly, there are 
only 21 upscale suburban districts for the West Coast chambers in the 1990s and 27 in the 
2000s; thus, the change in percentage is due to a swing in relatively few districts. Still, 
while the results suggesting regional divergence for the middle-class suburban and 
upscale suburban categories are not conclusive, they are certainly noteworthy.  
Because the small city and country category exhibits large sample sizes for all 
five of the regions,28 more conclusive inferences about regional trajectories can be drawn 
based on the results for small city and country districts than can be made for middle-class 
                                                 
28 The smallest sample size is for the West Coast chambers, for which there are 41 small 
city and country districts in the 1990s; the largest is for the rust belt chambers, for which 
there are 131 small city and country districts in the 1990s.  
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suburban or upscale suburban districts.  And unlike the middle-class suburban and 
upscale suburban categories, the small city and country category displays an 
unmistakable trend of regional convergence. All five regions experience an increase in 
Republican representation of small city and country districts between 1995 and 2011. The 
increase is, of course, especially pronounced in the South, which is situated far below the 
other four categories in terms of Republican representation rates in 1995. By 2011, 
however, all five regions have risen to a level of Republican representation of small city 
and country districts that is strikingly similar (between 78% and 80% for four of the 
categories; 87% for the rust belt).  
 Finally, the trend among outer suburban districts does not clearly show either 
regional divergence or regional convergence. In 1995, outer suburban districts 
demonstrate rates of Republican representation of between 75% and 90% in each of the 
five regions. Between 1995 and 2011, Republican representation rates in this category 
rise fairly evenly in four of the five district categories, such that by 2011 Republican 
representation rates in these four categories are between 87% and 96%. The West Coast, 
on the other hand, experiences a small net decline of 6% in Republican representation 
rates for outer suburban districts.  
 On the whole, there is more evidence for regional divergence than regional 
convergence is Figure 3.4, but the evidence that exists in favor of regional convergence 
that exists is far stronger. It is also important to point out that Figure 3.4 uses 1995 as its 
starting point instead of 1993. This was done so that the Alabama House could be 
included in the figures so as to yield a larger sample of Southern state legislative districts. 
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If the figure could have been stretched back to 1993 (before the 1994 elections), it is 
almost certain that it would have displayed higher rates of regional convergence, 
particularly for outer suburban districts and small city and country districts. This is 
because the percentages of Southern districts within these categories that were 
represented by Republicans before the 1994 elections are likely to have been exceedingly 
low. 
CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL BUILDING-BLOCKS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE PARTIES 
 The question addressed here is, from a purely political standpoint, the most 
important that this chapter seeks to address: how have changes in the geographical 
building-blocks of state legislative parties influenced patterns of party control in state 
legislatures over the past twenty years? Stated differently, when demographic changes 
influencing the distribution of district categories come together with electoral changes 
influencing the tendency of districts within each category to elect Democrats or 
Republicans, what is the overall effect on who is in charge in statehouses? 
 Prior to examining this question in depth, it is helpful to provide some context 
concerning the struggle for control of state legislative chambers over the past several 
decades. While trends in party control of state legislatures have historically been far more 
unstable than those of the U.S. Congress (particularly over the course of the last several 
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election cycles),29 a bird’s eye view of party conflict in state legislatures reveals a clear 
long-term trend in favor of the GOP. Throughout the 1980s, Democrats controlled well 
over 60 of the 98 partisan state legislative chambers. But during the 1990s and early 
2000s, Republicans made steady gains (though Democrats rolled many of them back in 
the late 2000s). After the Republican triumph in the 2010 election, however, Republicans 
controlled 58 of the 98 chambers, the highest number in the three-decade period. While 
much of this overall gain can be attributed to Republican ascendance in Southern state 
legislative chambers, Republicans have also made notable and fairly durable gains in the 
Great Plains and Industrial Midwest.  
 By this point, readers will hopefully have some guesses about the geographically-
based processes that might lie behind the ascendance of Republicans in numerous state 
legislative chambers across the country. Based on the results of previous sections of this 
chapter, it seems likely that the rise of Republicans in many state legislatures is related to 
the growing dominance of Republicans in the representation of outer suburban, small city 
and country, and deep rural districts. Still, in order to flesh out the precise connection 
between changes in the relative prevalence of the district categories, changes in electoral 
characteristics of these categories, and the struggle for control of legislative chambers 
throughout the country, it is necessary to disaggregate the data presented in earlier 
sections into individual chambers. Here, I focus upon six chambers in my dataset that 
                                                 
29 To be sure, the degree of volatility in state legislative party control has varied greatly 
across states. In some states, one party has exercised a long and durable hold on one or 
both legislative chambers, while in others (especially but not exclusively Southern states) 
party control has shifted frequently. In the aggregate, however, measures of state 
legislative party control (i.e., the percentage of chambers controlled by Republicans) have 
shifted more rapidly than has the partisan composition of the U.S. Congress.  
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have experienced fairly durable changes in party control over the course of the past 
twenty years: the Alabama House, Missouri House, New Jersey Assembly, Ohio House, 
Virginia House, and Wisconsin Assembly. In the case of five of these six chambers, 
Democrats were firmly ensconced as the majority party in the early 1990s but have since 
yielded control to Republicans. In one chamber (the New Jersey Assembly), the opposite 
occurred: a long-lasting Republican majority gave way to Democratic control.  
Figure 3.5 (p. 103) includes three sets of two columns for each of the six 
chambers. The sets of columns correspond to a particular time point (1993, 2003, and 
2011);30 the columns signify the total number of districts in the chamber that were 
represented by the respective parties during that time point. The columns are sub-divided 
into segments indicating the categorical membership of the districts represented by 
legislators from each party. Through comparing these three sets of columns against each 
other for each chamber, we can get a sense of how the partisan characteristics of districts 
belonging to each category within each state have changed across elections, how the 
prevalence of the categories has changed across decades, and how these changes have 
interacted to bring a new party to majority status. It is important to bear in mind that 2003 
followed a decennial Census and redistricting cycle; therefore, changes that occur 
between 1993 and 2003 can be attributed to changes in the overall class composition of 
the sample of districts as well as changes in the tendencies of district classes to elect 
representatives from a given party. Because the 2011 table is based upon the exact same 
                                                 
30 For the Alabama House, 1995 is used as the first time point instead of 1993.  
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districts as 2003, changes between 2003 and 2011 are almost entirely attributable to 











 Of all six chambers, the one that exhibits the clearest changes is the Alabama 
House. Alabama’s rather stable geographical profile has meant that the distribution of 
district categories within the Alabama House changed little between the 1990s and 2000s. 
Consequently, the major changes that the Alabama House has undergone have largely 
been electoral rather than demographic. These electoral changes can essentially be 
explained via reference to one district category: small city and country districts. Over the 
course of the 1990s and 2000s, small city and country districts (which make up nearly 
50% of all districts in the Alabama House) shifted substantially from being 
overwhelmingly represented by Democrats to being overwhelmingly represented by 
Republicans, while all other district categories remained largely stable in their electoral 
characteristics.31 Thus, Republican ascendance in small city and country districts largely 
explains how the GOP was able to take control of the Alabama House for the first time 
since Reconstruction in 2010. GOP success among small city and country districts in 
Alabama has had one other important consequence. By 2010, the party caucuses in the 
newly-competitive Alabama House were both dominated by legislators representing 
districts from a single geographical category: small city and country districts in the case 
of Republicans, urban black districts in the case of Democrats. At the beginning of the 
second decade of the 21
st
 century, party politics in the Alabama House of Representatives 
has taken on a strong racial-geographical character. 
 As it turns out, however, GOP ascendance in small city and country districts 
during the 1990s and 2000s was a pivotal component of partisan transformation in many 
                                                 
31  Upscale suburban, outer suburban, and -- to a lesser degree -- middle-class suburban 
districts in Alabama had already realigned to the Republican column by the early 1990s).   
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state legislative chambers besides the Alabama House of Representatives. Indeed, an 
examination of the charts in Figure 6 reveals that the same basic trend that unfolded in 
the Alabama House occurred (albeit in varying degrees) in each of the other chambers 
that switched to durable Republican control. Much as in the Alabama House, GOP 
success in small city and country districts explains nearly all of the Republicans’ 
increased seat share in the Ohio House. This is despite the fact that the percentage of 
small city and country districts in the Ohio House decreased between the 1990s and the 
2000s and the fact that Democrats have increased their level of representation in upscale 
suburban districts, which have grown in prevalence in the state.  
 Trends in the Missouri House, Wisconsin Assembly, and Virginia House are more 
complicated than in the Alabama House and Ohio House because of the greater diversity 
of district categories and the complex interactions between demographic and electoral 
change. In the 1990s, both the Missouri House and Wisconsin Assembly had a large 
percentage of deep rural districts that were represented almost evenly between the two 
parties. By the late 2000s, however, these districts had transformed into small city and 
country districts, the bulk of which were now represented exclusively by Republicans. 
Additionally, Republicans substantially increased their seat share among outer suburban 
districts in Missouri and among middle-class suburban districts in Wisconsin. In the 
Virginia House, on the other hand, demographic change between 1990 and 2000 
redounded in a slightly greater prevalence of urban black, urban ethnic matrix, and 
yuppie districts during the 2000s; these categories overwhelmingly elect Democrats. But 
Republican ascendance in small city and country, outer suburban, and middle-class 
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suburban districts greatly outweighed the growth of Democratic-leaning categories, thus 
largely explaining the GOP’s newfound strength in this chamber.  
 The peculiar case of the New Jersey Assembly bears special mention. As noted 
above, it is one example of a legislative chamber that has over the last two decades 
shifted to durable Democratic control. In examining the results in Figure 6 for the New 
Jersey Assembly, one quickly notices the dramatic change in the prevalence of certain 
district categories between 1993 and 2003. In particular, the prevalence of urban ethnic 
matrix districts and (to a lesser degree) upscale suburban districts has increased while the 
prevalence of middle-class suburban and (to a lesser degree) urban black districts has 
declined. These patterns make sense in light of New Jersey’s status as a state exhibiting 
high rates of out-migration among low and middle-income Americans and high rates of 
in-migration among upper-income Americans and immigrants (Young, Varner, and 
Massey 2008). As can be seen, these demographic trends have worked largely to the 
benefit of Democrats. Middle-class suburban districts that had elected Republicans in the 
1990s became urban ethnic matrix districts that elected Democrats in the 2000s, while 
both parties benefited from the increase in upscale suburban districts in the state. 
 When considered in unison, the results for these six state legislative chambers tell 
us much about why trends in party control of state legislatures have unfolded as they 
have. In essence, the story is that electoral changes (primarily among outer suburban, 
small city and country, and deep rural districts) have benefited Republican state 
legislative caucuses while demographic changes (i.e., the increased prevalence of urban 
Hispanic, urban ethnic matrix, and upscale suburban districts) have generally benefited 
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Democratic caucuses. But the impact of the former has been much more substantial than 
the impact of the latter.  
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter uses the microgeographical approach that is at the heart of this 
dissertation to explain changes in the geographical contours of state legislative politics 
over the past twenty years. An effort has been made to show how the complex 
demographic and electoral patterns influencing trends in party representation in the states 
can be better understood by situating them within the nine-fold categorization scheme 
developed in Chapter Two.  Through examining changes in the distribution of district 
categories across decades and in the tendency of different district categories to elect 
Republicans and Democrats across election periods, we can get a much more detailed 
sense of the ways in which the constituency bases of state legislative parties have been 
altered over the past twenty years.  
 The results of the chapter suggest that demographic trends have benefited 
Democrats while electoral trends have benefited Republicans over the time period at 
hand. On the one hand, the rapid growth of ethnic and racial minorities has resulted in the 
increased prominence of district categories with large percentages of ethnic and racial 
minority groups (i.e., urban Hispanic and urban ethnic matrix districts). Because both of 
these categories of districts are far more likely to elect Democrats than Republicans, the 
growing racial diversity of the United States has been crucial in maintaining the 
numerical strength of many Democratic state legislative caucuses.  
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 On the other hand, Democrats have suffered enormous losses in two categories of 
low-density districts: small city and country districts and deep rural districts. 
Collectively, these district categories declined significantly in numbers between the 
1990s and 2000s. Despite their combined numerical decline, the large increases in the 
percentages of these district categories sending Republicans to statehouses have resulted 
in substantial growth in the number of Republican representatives from these districts 
between 1993 and 2011.  Conversely, the twin factors of numerical decline and secular 
realignment in favor of Republicans has meant that the number of Democratic legislators 
from these districts has shrunk to exceedingly low levels. 
 The joint effect of growth in the number of minority-rich urban districts and 
partisan change in favor of Republicans in low-density white districts is very much in line 
with claims that the American party bases are becoming more geographically segregated. 
Indeed, both trends serve to make legislators representing densely-populated districts 
more prevalent among Democratic caucuses and legislators representing sparsely-
populated districts more prevalent among Republican caucuses. Figure 3.3 unmistakably 
suggests that the high-density and low-density district categories are diverging as far as 
partisan representation is concerned.   
 But while the highly urban and highly rural district categories have moved in the 
direction of greater political uniformity, two of the three suburban district categories have 
become more politically heterogeneous over the last two decades. Middle-class suburban 
districts continue to be primarily represented by Democrats, but over the past twenty 
years, they have become moderately more likely to be represented by Republicans. A far 
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larger move toward heterogeneity has occurred among upscale suburban districts. 
Primarily represented by Republicans in the early 1990s, upscale suburban districts have 
shifted so substantially that, some two decades later, they are the most marginal of all 
district categories in terms of partisan representation. The partisan changes that middle-
class suburban and upscale suburban districts have undergone seem to indicate that the 
divergent demographic and geographical trends impacting American politics are meeting 
at the suburbs. In an age of political balkanization, therefore, suburban legislative 
districts may be the closest approximation to the political melting pots that dominated 




Chapter Four: The Influence of Party and Geography on the Ideological 
Distributions of State Legislative Chambers 
 
 In this chapter of my dissertation, I shift from exploring external dynamics 
affecting state legislatures to examining their internal workings. Whereas earlier chapters 
focused upon presenting the district categorization scheme and using the resulting 
categories to develop a narrative explaining how the partisan compositions of state 
legislatures have changed across time, this chapter focuses on outcomes inside 
legislatures, in particular differences in roll-call voting ideology.32 The central question at 
hand is: how do party affiliation and geographical constituency (expressed as the district 
categories) interact to influence the placement of state legislators in ideological space? 
Because patterns of legislative conflict are not static, I also investigate a related 
secondary question: how has the influence of the geographical constituency upon roll-call 
ideology changed between the late 1990s and more recent times? To analyze these 
questions, I collect and analyze extensive roll-call data from the seventeen state 
legislative chambers under examination for two time periods – 1999-2000 and 2011-
2012.  
 Despite the complexity of roll-call voting patterns that exist within contemporary 
American statehouses, my results can be distilled into a fairly simple set of observations. 
To begin with, commensurate with other recent studies examining the forces influencing 
                                                 
32 I will frequently use the terms “roll-call voting ideology” or “roll-call ideology” to 
refer to the within-chamber placement of legislators along the liberal-conservative 
dimension on the basis of roll-call voting data. Roll-call voting ideology is distinct from 
personal ideology, which refers to a legislator’s personal views on public policy and is 
best measured through surveys.   
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roll-call voting decisions in state legislatures (Shor and McCarty 2011; Jenkins 2008), I 
find that party is the most important influence upon the structure of roll-call voting in 
every state legislative chamber I examine. To say that party is the most important 
influence is not to say that it is the only influence, however. In fact, state legislative 
chambers vary widely in the extent to which their parties are polarized, and in chambers 
exhibiting relatively low levels of party polarization, the role of geography is very 
palpable. This is especially the case among Democratic caucuses, almost all of which 
exhibit strong intra-party geographical differences in roll-call voting patterns.  
 Second, striking similarities across legislative chambers exist in the distinct 
coalitional configurations formed by the interplay between legislators’ party affiliations 
and the geographical categories of the districts they represent. To a degree not previously 
recognized, the political dynamics that emerge as a result of the competing pressures of 
party and geography play out in very similar ways in many statehouses. Interestingly, 
however, legislative chambers that exhibit the most similar coalitional patterns are often 
not found in states that are contiguous or even located in the same region. The best 
predictor of the nature of the geographical patterns of roll-call voting within a state 
legislative chamber is not the state’s macrogeographical location but rather the 
microgeographical differences that exist within it. This point will be reinforced at various 
points throughout the chapter.  
 Finally, a comparison of results for 1999-2000 with results for 2011-2012 reveals 
higher levels of partisan polarization in the latter period in most state legislative 
chambers. Thus, this study suggests that, much as in the U.S. Congress, partisan 
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polarization in the American state legislatures has been growing. Examining changes in 
the geographical structure underpinning party conflict inside the chambers in my sample, 
I uncover strong evidence suggesting that the increase in partisan polarization inside state 
legislatures is at least in part a result of the increased tendency of districts in the same 
category to be represented by only one political party. As shown in Chapter Three, during 
the 1990s several district categories (most notably, small city and country and deep rural 
districts) were nearly evenly represented between Democrats and Republicans, but by the 
1990s these categories had joined most of the others in being overwhelming represented 
by legislators from one party or the other (in this case, the Republicans). In this chapter, I 
show that the Democratic legislators from small city and country and deep rural districts 
that were so prevalent in the 1990s were almost always the most conservative legislators 
within their caucuses. Over the course of the late 1990s and 2000s, many of these 
legislators either voluntary retired, were defeated for reelection, or were forced out by 
term limits. In the process, Democratic legislators occupying the center of the ideological 
distributions in many state legislative chambers were replaced by Republican legislators 
at the far-right end of the ideological spectrum. This dynamic has had the simultaneous 
effect of making Democratic state legislative caucuses more ideologically homogeneous 
while pushing Republican state legislative caucuses to the right. The final outcome has 
been greater partisan polarization.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I lay out the methods used to estimate 
ideal points for state legislators in seventeen states and during two different eras. I then 
proceed to present my results in both thematic and chronological order. Focusing first on 
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1999-2000, I show how states in this period vary in the extent to which their legislative 
parties are polarized, and link these variations to intraparty differences among legislators 
from different geographical categories. I then move to the more recent period and point to 
evidence suggesting that state legislative parties have consistently diverged over the past 
10-15 years. Examining a number of states in-depth, I demonstrate that the ideological 
divergence of state legislative parties has in part occurred as a result of the sorting of the 
parties’ geographical bases.  
DATA AND METHODS 
 This chapter makes use of 32 roll-call datasets. Seventeen datasets (for each of the 
17 legislative chambers in the analysis) are from 1999-2000 and were retrieved from the 
website of the Representation in America’s Legislatures (RAL) project, overseen by 
Indiana University political scientist Gerald Wright. RAL data have been extensively 
edited, and only include roll-calls for an entire legislative body (as opposed to committee 
votes, etc.) in which at least 5% of votes cast were minority votes. 
 The other fifteen datasets are from 2011-2012 and were downloaded from the 
website of the Open States Project (www.openstates.org), an exciting new venture of the 
Sunlight Foundation that seeks to put much state government data online in easily 
downloadable formats. 33 Data from the Open States project are fairly raw and thus 
needed to be substantially re-shaped and edited so that they could be used for roll-call 
                                                 
33 The fifteen datasets include 2010-2012 data for all of the original seventeen chambers 
except the Missouri House and the Oregon House. In the case of the Missouri House, 
data were not downloaded because the Open States Project has not yet begun to collect 
data for that particular chamber. In the case of the Oregon House, 2011-2012 data were 
downloaded but they could not be properly edited so as to be used for roll-call analysis.  
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analysis. For all chambers, committee votes were removed (when necessary) so that only 
roll-call votes for an entire legislative body were included; additionally, all near-
unanimous votes (i.e., votes in which more than 95% of the chamber was in agreement) 
were removed as well. In this way, the structures of the Open States datasets were made 
to be identical to those of the RAL datasets. Finally, in preparation for the ideal point 
estimation procedure, all “yes” roll-call votes in the datasets were recoded to 1, all “no” 
roll-call votes in the datasets were recoded to 0, and all other roll-call voting decisions 
were recoded as missing values.   
 Table 4.1 (next page) provides some basic information about each of the roll-call 
datasets that were used in the analyses of this chapter. Because the datasets include 
legislators who fill vacancies in the middle of a legislative session, the number of 
legislators in each dataset is often slightly higher than the overall size of the chamber to 
which it corresponds. As can be seen, substantial variation exists across chambers in the 
number of roll-call votes that are cast within a legislative session, a fact that is likely 
related to the frequency with which the chambers meet. For example, whereas the highly 
professionalized California Assembly meets annually and throughout the year, the 
Nevada Assembly meets only once every two years and for a maximum of 120 days. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that many more roll-call votes are cast over a two-year period in 
the California Assembly than are cast in the lower chamber of California’s neighbor to 





Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics on Chapter Four Roll-Call Datasets 
 
*  Because their legislative sessions begin in even-numbered years, data for the NJ House and VA House come from 
2010-2011 rather than 2011-2012.  
** A substantial amount of roll-call data was missing from the 2011-2012 Open State dataset for the Virginia House. 
The total number of roll-call votes including missing data is 1232.  
 
   After data editing was completed, one-dimensional spatial models for each of the 
32 datasets were estimated. Spatial model estimation was conducted using the Bayesian 
MCMC item-response procedure developed by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004), 
results from which correlate extremely strongly with those from the more well-known 
NOMINATE procedure developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997).34 Ideal points were 
constrained to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, so that within-
chamber values tend to range from 2 - 3 standard deviations below the mean (an ideal 
                                                 
34 Simon Jackman’s pscl package in R was used to estimate the models. 
 1999-2000 data 2011-2012 data 








AL House 105 356 106 416 
CA Assembly 80 2215 80 1544 
IA House 103 284 100 129 
IL House 121 425 130 614 
IN House 101 474 101 552 
MI House 110 1129 112 755 
MN House 135 807 135 1105 
MO House 168 785 N/A N/A 
NJ Assembly* 84 182 84 266 
NV Assembly 42 138 42 162 
NY Assembly 150 316 159 569 
OH House 107 232 112 312 
OR House 60 748 N/A N/A 
PA House 204 530 208 662 
VA House 108 1301 104 642** 
WA House 100 146 101 545 
WI Assembly 100 435 101 535 
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point value of -2 or -3) to 2 - 3 standard deviations above the mean (an ideal point value 
of +2 or +3). Of course, the specific range of ideal points varies by chamber.  
Unidimensional models were estimated so as to simplify the analyses conducted 
in this chapter, and because the most extensive study of state legislative voting ever 
conducted concludes that “a single dimension explains the vast bulk of the voting in state 
legislatures” (Shor and McCarty 2011, 533; see also Wright and Schaffner 2002). 
Importantly, however, Jochim and Jones (2013) provide strong evidence to suggest that 
the appearance of overwhelming unidimensionality in roll-call voting in the U.S. 
Congress masks strong differences in dimensionality across issue areas. Given that most 
(though not all) state legislatures have tended to be somewhat less polarized by party than 
the U.S. Congress (Shor and McCarty 2011), it is likely that differences in the 
dimensionality of roll-call voting exist across policy areas in the states as well. This issue 
will be considered in some detail in Chapter Five. The purpose of this chapter, however, 
is to analyze legislator ideology as the product of all roll-call decisions that a legislator 
makes, across policy areas. Thus, based on the findings of earlier studies, unidimensional 
spatial models appear to be appropriate. 
After the models were estimated, ideal point values were examined and 
sometimes realigned to comport with the political science custom of having positive first-
dimension ideal point values indicate a more conservative ideology and negative first-
dimension ideal point values indicate a more liberal ideology. In every single chamber 
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examined, the median Democrat and median Republican were far apart from each other, 
thus making identification of the models easy to accomplish.35   
ROLL-CALL IDEOLOGY IN 1999-2000: THE EFFECT OF PARTY 
 Table 4.2 (next page) presents three relevant statistics measuring differences in 
the extent of party polarization within the seventeen legislative chambers during the 
1999-2000 period: the distance between the median ideal point values of the party 
caucuses, the distance between the mean ideal point values of the party caucuses, and the 
Second Moment Separation (SMS) between the party caucuses.36 When considered 
collectively, these three statistics encompass much of what is generally meant by the term 
“legislative polarization.”37 In considering the results in the table, recall that all of the 
ideal point models were constrained to yield a within-chamber mean of 0 and a within-
                                                 
35 Just how far apart they were from each other did vary substantially, as detailed in the 
next section of the paper. 
 
36 SMS is calculated by averaging “how many standard deviations the average 
Republican is from the average Democrat and how many standard deviations the average 
Democrat is from the average Republican” (Theriault 2008, 20).    
 
37 The distance-of-medians statistic is a useful tool for assessing party polarization in 
state legislatures because it measures the difference in the central ideological tendencies 
of legislative parties without regard to the values of extreme observations. Since many 
state legislative party caucuses include a small subset of legislators who are ideologically 
far apart from the vast majority of their co-partisans, the distance between party medians 
can in some circumstances be a more accurate representation of the “true” nature of party 
conflict within a chamber than other measures. The distance-of-means statistic, on the 
other hand, considers the ideological distance between party caucuses in a way that takes 
into account all observations equally. It has been the most common method of measuring 
polarization in studies of the U.S. Congress (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). 
Finally, because it is a statistic that incorporates both interparty distance as well as party 
cohesiveness, SMS can be thought of as a more comprehensive measure of polarization 
than either the distance-of-medians or distance-of-means statistics. 
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chamber standard deviation of 1, and that within-chamber values tend to range from -3 to 
3.  
Table 4.2: Statistics Comparing Ideological Distance Between Democrats and 
Republicans in State Legislative Chambers, 1999-2000 
 






AL House 1.70 1.68 2.85 
CA Assembly 1.90 1.88 6.05 
IA House 1.91 1.92 7.39 
IL House 1.71 1.71 3.65 
IN House 1.91 1.91 6.83 
MI House 1.92 1.87 6.36 
MN House 1.88 1.90 6.37 
MO House 1.82 1.89 5.65 
NJ Assembly 1.80 1.89 5.50 
NV Assembly 1.25 1.69 2.92 
NY Assembly 1.58 1.72 5.79 
OH House 1.86 1.92 5.92 
OR House 1.87 1.82 4.28 
PA House 1.68 1.85 5.01 
VA House 1.83 1.83 4.55 
WA House 1.65 1.79 4.13 
WI Assembly 1.93 1.92 7.04 
 
 The first point to make about the results shown in Table 4.2 is that they point to 
the primacy of party in structuring roll-call voting patterns across all seventeen chambers 
included in this study. In no chamber is the distance between the party means less than 
1.68, meaning that the difference between the average Democrat and average Republican 
in the seventeen chambers is always well above one standard deviation of the entire 
distribution of ideal point scores within a chamber. Party is therefore clearly a chief 
explanatory factor behind roll-call voting patterns in contemporary state legislatures. 
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 But the results found in the table also reveal substantial variation with respect to 
just how much of an impact party has on roll-call ideology in the seventeen chambers. 
While the three statistics each provide a slightly different perspective on this matter, they 
tend to point in a similar direction. For example, two state legislative chambers (the Iowa 
House and Wisconsin Assembly) register values that are among the highest across all 
three measures. They are closely followed by the California Assembly, Indiana House, 
Michigan House, and Minnesota House, which are in turn followed by the Missouri 
House, New Jersey Assembly, and Ohio House. At the other end of the spectrum are the 
Alabama House, Illinois House, and Nevada Assembly, all of which register some of the 
lowest values across all three of the measures. Thus, the three statistics collectively give a 
pretty good sense of which chambers are the most polarized and which are the least.  
 The remaining state legislative chambers – those that are intermediate in the 
extent of party polarization – register values for each of the three statistics that are not so 
easily reconcilable and therefore require greater explanation. The Oregon House and 
Virginia House, for example, exhibit large distance-of-medians and distance-of-means 
values but relatively low SMS values. It therefore appears that the central ideological 
tendencies of the legislative parties in these two chambers are far apart but that the 
spreads of within-party values in both chambers are nonetheless quite large. The New 
York Assembly, Pennsylvania House, and Washington House, on the other hand, exhibit 
distance-of-medians values that are considerably lower than their distance-of-means 
values. This disparity is likely caused by the presence of a relatively small contingent of 
ideologically extreme legislators in one or both party caucuses in these chambers. The 
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presence of these legislators has the effect of pushing the mean ideal point value for one 
party caucus in the ideologically extreme direction while leaving the median ideal point 
value unaffected. 
 Figure 4.1 (next page) provides a visual representation of the different patterns of 
party conflict in the seventeen chambers by presenting boxplots showing the distribution 
of ideal point scores for Democrats and Republicans within each chamber for the 1999-
2000 time period. To reiterate, values were aligned for all states so that higher values 
indicate greater conservatism and lower values indicate greater liberalism. Boxplots for 
Democrats are colored blue, while boxplots for Republicans are colored red. The 
boxplots include a rectangular center representing the interquartile range of ideal points, 
inside of which lies a thick line representing the median ideal point value. Outside of the 
rectangular center, one can find “whiskers” representing more dispersed values. 
Importantly, since the ideal point values for each chamber were estimated separately (i.e., 
the chambers have not been placed in the same ideological space), the figure is not meant 
to be used for the purposes of comparing median values for Democrats or Republicans 
across chambers. Instead, its worth lies in comparing states with respect to differences 








Figure 4.1: Distributions of Ideal Point Scores for Democrats and Republicans 











 Examining the figure sheds greater light on many of the trends that were 
discussed in reference to Table 4.2. For example, the boxplots for chambers such as the 
California Assembly, Iowa House, and Wisconsin Assembly all reveal party caucuses 
whose central locations are far apart from each other, and whose value ranges are fairly 
narrow and do not come close to overlapping. In other chambers (such as the Oregon 
House and Virginia house), the central locations of the party caucuses are far apart while 
the within-party values are quite dispersed. In still other chambers (such as the Alabama 
House and the Illinois House), the value ranges for the party caucuses overlap, meaning 
that the most conservative Democrat is more conservative than the most liberal 
Republican. And in the Nevada Assembly, the value ranges of the parties do not overlap 
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but their central locations are nonetheless far closer to each other than in all of the other 
chambers. 
 Thus, on the basis of the results displayed in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1, the relative 
degree of partisan polarization among the seventeen chambers is fairly clear. What 
explains the relative degree of partisan polarization in each of the chambers is less clear, 
however. While some regional variation appears to exist, other factors are clearly also at 
play. For example, one striking commonality is that all of the legislative chambers in the 
upper Midwestern states (the Iowa House, Michigan House, Minnesota House, and 
Wisconsin Assembly) are very polarized. But the Illinois House, located in close 
proximity to each of these chambers, is far less so. Similarly, the California Assembly in 
Sacramento is quite polarized but the Nevada Assembly, located approximately 130 miles 
away in Carson City, is relatively unpolarized. That the Alabama House is not 
particularly polarized should come as no surprise – conservative Democrats were 
common in many Southern state legislative chambers until recently, and the ideological 
gap between legislative parties in Southern legislative chambers was thus much smaller 
than elsewhere.38 But the polarization levels of another southern chamber, the Virginia 
House, are more in line with those of chambers like the Oregon House than they are with 
the Alabama House. Hence, while regional differences can be detected, they are not at the 
core of what is influencing party conflict inside state legislatures.  
                                                 
38 The extent to which Southern state legislatures have since conformed to patterns of 




ROLL-CALL IDEOLOGY IN 1999-2000: BRINGING IN GEOGRAPHY 
 Results from the previous section suggest that, while party may explain the bulk 
of ideological positioning in the legislative chambers under examination in 1999-2000, it 
does not explain all of it. Indeed, the visual patterns evident in Figure 4.1 suggest that a 
significant amount of ideological heterogeneity exists within party caucuses, particularly 
the Democratic caucuses of chambers like the Alabama House, Illinois House, New York 
Assembly, and Washington House. The question that this section of the chapter addresses 
is the extent to which the geographical categories introduced in Chapter Two can explain 
ideological heterogeneity inside legislative party caucuses. 
 Figure 4.2 (next page) plots the mean ideal point scores for party-geography 
groups (i.e., each geographical category within a party caucus for which there are at least 
three legislators) for all seventeen legislative chambers for 1999-2000. Legislative 
chambers are presented alphabetically, with mean ideal point values for Democratic 
legislators from particular geographical categories plotted on the left and mean ideal 
point values for Republican legislators from particular geographical categories plotted on 
the right. Each plotted point is colored according to the geographical category it 
represents and is supplemented by a vertical error bar indicating the standard deviation of 
the mean ideal point value. Mean values for geographical categories with less than three 
legislators for a given party caucus are not included in the figure.
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 The figure generally lends strong support to the contention that, in many 
chambers where party conflict is relatively weak (such as the Alabama House, Illinois 
House, and New York Assembly), geographical conflict explains a significant amount of 
the remaining variation in legislator roll-call ideology. Importantly, however, one can 
also find more subtle evidence of the importance of geographical conflict in some of the 
more polarized chambers. Prior to examining individual chambers in depth, it is useful to 
consider some commonalities that can be found among just about all of the chambers. 
 First and foremost, one obvious and consistent pattern is that the geographical 
categories are far more useful for the purpose of explaining ideological heterogeneity 
inside Democratic caucuses than they are for explaining heterogeneity inside Republican 
caucuses. Indeed, among most Republican caucuses, the mean ideal point values for 
legislators representing different categories of districts are strikingly similar (two 
exceptions to this trend are the Illinois House and, to a lesser degree, the Pennsylvania 
House). In most cases, the standard deviations for the values of Republican group are 
very small, suggesting that most Republican caucuses are extraordinarily cohesive and 
there is simply not much variation inside of them to explain. But in a few cases (most 
notably, the Alabama House and Washington House), the standard deviations of the mean 
values for the categories are fairly large, suggesting that there is some variation in roll-
call ideology among Republicans in these particular chambers but that geography does 
not provide much leverage in explaining it.  
 With respect to geographical differences among Democrats, there are several 
unusually consistent patterns. The first is that legislators from urban black districts and 
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yuppie districts almost always occupy the most liberal position in Democratic caucuses. 
In chambers where a mean value for yuppie districts does not appear (i.e., there are less 
than three yuppie districts represented by Democrats), Democratic legislators from urban 
black districts evince mean values that are far more liberal than those of Democratic 
legislators representing districts from any other category. This is the case in chambers as 
distinct as the Alabama House, Indiana House, and New Jersey Assembly. Likewise, in 
chambers where a mean value for urban black districts does not appear (such as the Iowa 
House, Oregon House, and Washington House), legislators from yuppie districts evince 
mean values that are considerably more liberal than those of Democratic legislators from 
other categories.  In chambers exhibiting values for Democratic legislators from both 
urban black districts and yuppie districts, legislators from these two categories tend to be 
in close ideological proximity to each other, though the former usually evince mean 
values that are slightly more liberal. Finally, in one chamber in the sample – the Nevada 
Assembly – there are not a sufficient number of Democratic legislators from either urban 
black districts or yuppie districts to warrant the inclusion of the corresponding data points 
in the figure. Instead, the figure shows that, in the Nevada Assembly, Democrats from 
urban ethnic matrix districts are easily the most liberal members of their caucus.  
 Whereas legislators from urban black and yuppie districts consistently occupy the 
liberal end of the ideological spectrum within Democratic caucuses, legislators from 
outer suburban, small city and country, and deep rural districts nearly always occupy the 
conservative end. In chambers where Democratic legislators from deep rural districts can 
be found in sufficient numbers, they are almost always the most conservative members of 
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their caucuses (one exception is the Wisconsin Assembly, where outer suburban 
legislators are more conservative than deep rural legislators). In chambers without 
Democratic legislators from deep rural districts, legislators from outer suburban and 
small city and country districts are in close ideological proximity, though more often than 
not it is the latter who exhibit the most conservative mean ideal point values.  
 While the similarity across chambers in the ideological positions of Democratic 
legislators from the same geographical categories is certainly striking, it would be a 
mistake to assume that such parallels imply that the nature of political conflict inside 
Democratic caucuses is the same everywhere. Though it is helpful in teasing out the 
relationships discussed above, Figure 4.2 is an incomplete representation of the substance 
of intra-caucus conflict within chambers because it does not account for the relative size 
of the party-geography groups within each chamber. Considering the relative size of 
legislator party-geography groups alongside their mean ideal point values can help us to 
get a better sense of how coalitional configurations that appear to be similar in Figure 4.2 
are actually quite different from each other. 
 Table 4.3 (next page) presents the mean ideal point values for relevant 
geographical groups of sufficient size within the Democratic caucuses of the Alabama 
House, Indiana House, and Michigan House. While Figure 4.2 suggests that these three 
chambers exhibit similar patterns of ideological positioning within their Democratic 
caucuses (i.e., legislators from urban black districts are more liberal than Democratic 
legislators from other district categories), Table 4.3 reveals important differences in the 
nature of conflict inside these caucuses.  
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Table 4.3: Influential Geographical Groups within the Democratic Caucuses of the 
Alabama, Indiana, and Michigan Houses, 1999-2000 
 
 Category 




Alabama House    
 Urban Black -1.17 38% 
 Middle-Class suburbs -0.28 4% 
 Small City and 
Country -0.22 54% 
Indiana House    
 Urban Black -1.31 13% 
 Middle-Class suburbs -0.89 40% 
 Outer Suburbs -0.94 8% 
 Small City and 
Country -0.76 36% 
Michigan House    
 Urban Black -1.37 29% 
 Middle-Class suburbs -0.88 40% 
 Outer Suburbs -0.72 10% 
 Small City and 
Country -0.52 13% 
 
 In the Alabama House, legislators from urban black districts and small city and 
country districts constitute the overwhelming majority of the Democratic caucus, but 
these two groups are exceptionally far apart in terms of mean ideology. The divisions 
between these large groups of Democratic legislators suggest that the Democratic Caucus 
in the Alabama House (at least in 1999-2000) is really best described as two separate 
cohorts. In the Indiana House, on the other hand, the percentage of Democratic legislators 
who represent urban black districts is far lower than it is the Alabama House (13% 
instead of 38%), and the ideological distance between legislators from urban black 
districts and legislators from other categories is not as vast. Thus, in the Indiana House, 
Democratic legislators from urban black districts are neither so distinct nor so important, 
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and can be thought of as merely the most liberal component of their party caucus. Finally, 
from both a compositional and ideological perspective, the Michigan House is 
intermediate between the Alabama House and the Indiana House. Legislators from urban 
black districts make up a larger proportion of the Democratic caucus in the Michigan 
House than in the Indiana House but a smaller proportion than they do in the Alabama 
House. Ideologically, legislators from urban black districts stand further apart from much 
of the rest of the Democratic caucus in the Michigan House than they do in the Indiana 
House but less so than they do in the Alabama House.  
CHANGES SINCE 1999-2000: GROWTH IN PARTISAN POLARIZATION 
 Results from previous sections point to substantial differences in the extent to 
which state legislative chambers at the turn of the 20
th
 century exhibited high levels of 
partisan polarization, as well as in the leverage provided by the geographical framework 
at the center of this study in explaining within-party differences in legislator ideology 
during this same time period. In this section, I turn to examining how the patterns of 
legislative conflict described in earlier sections have changed over the course of the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century. It is fairly well-established that these ten years witnessed the 
continued partisan polarization of the U.S. Congress (Haidt and Hetherington 2012) as 
well as the continued sorting-out of the electoral bases of the national political parties 
(Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013). It is far less well-known, however, how these national 
trends have affected state politics. 
 Table 4.4 (next page) provides the same three statistics measuring party 
polarization that were presented earlier in Table 4.2, but this time for two time periods: 
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1999-2000 and 2011-2012. Data for both time points are included for fifteen of the 
seventeen chambers examined in this study.39 Comparing the results from these two time 
periods gives some sense of the overall trajectory of partisan conflict in these chambers. 
While it is possible that the changes suggested by the results of Table 4.4 are artifacts of 
comparing just two time points, results that consistently point in one direction across 
chambers do provide strong evidence of a broad underlying trend.  
 
Table 4.4: Statistics Comparing Ideological Distance Between Democrats and 
Republicans in State Legislative Chambers, 1999-2000 and 2011-2012 
 
 
Distance between Party 
Medians 
 Difference between 
Party Means 
 Second Moment 
Separation  
 1999-2000 2011-2012 1999-2000 2011-2012 1999-2000 2011-2012 
AL 1.70 2.05 1.68 1.90 2.85 5.07 
CA 1.90 2.03 1.88 1.98 6.05 6.19 
IA 1.91 1.87 1.92 1.93 7.39 6.56 
IL 1.71 1.63 1.71 1.70 3.65 3.44 
IN 1.91 1.90 1.91 1.95 6.83 6.99 
MI 1.92 1.92 1.87 1.96 6.36 9.32 
MN 1.88 1.91 1.90 1.93 6.37 7.34 
NJ 1.80 1.89 1.89 1.98 5.50 9.30 
NV 1.25 1.86 1.69 1.94 2.92 7.85 
NY 1.58 1.84 1.72 1.79 5.79 4.09 
OH 1.86 1.89 1.92 1.95 5.92 6.86 
PA 1.68 1.88 1.85 1.93 5.01 7.26 
VA 1.83 1.90 1.83 1.90 4.55 5.45 
WA 1.65 1.79 1.79 1.85 4.13 5.02 
WI 1.93 1.92 1.92 1.94 7.04 7.58 
 
  
                                                 
39 Data for two chambers (the Missouri House and the Oregon House) are not included 




 The results of the table show many interesting trends for individual chambers, but 
the most important point is that party polarization in most chambers is clearly higher in 
2011-2012 than it is in 1999-2000. For 1999-2000, the ranges of values for each of the 
statistics were 1.25 to 1.92 for distance-of-medians, 1.68 to 1.92 for distance-of-means, 
and 2.85 to 7.39 for the Second Moment Separation (SMS); for 2011-2012, the ranges 
were 1.63 to 2.05 for distance-of-medians, 1.70 to 1.98 for distance-of-means, and 3.44 to 
9.32 for SMS. Distance-of-medians values were greater in 2011-2012 in 11 of 15 
chambers, distance-of-means values were greater in 14 of 15 chambers, and SMS values 
were greater in 12 of 15 chambers.  
 The most noteworthy changes occur in two of the three least polarized chambers 
in 1999-2000, the Alabama House and Nevada Assembly. In both of these chambers, the 
increases in all three statistics between the two time periods are truly impressive. Indeed, 
in 2011-2012, the distance-of-medians value for the Alabama House is the highest of any 
chamber in that time period! Its SMS value remains on the low end of the spectrum, 
however, suggesting that while the median Democrat and Republican in the Alabama 
House are now very far apart, much heterogeneity continues to exist within the chamber’s 
party caucuses. As for the Nevada Assembly, its polarization scores in 2011-2012 
consistently place it in the upper rung of all the chambers. Especially impressive is its 
2011-2012 SMS score, which is exceeded only by two chambers among the fifteen. The 
circumstances surrounding the transformation of partisan politics in the Alabama House 
and Nevada Assembly between 1999-2000 and 2011-2012 (and, in particular, the role 
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played by geography in these transformations)  will be discussed in the next section of 
the chapter.  
 Besides the Alabama House and Nevada Assembly, several other chambers show 
striking changes as well. The Michigan House and New Jersey Assembly, both of which 
exhibit fairly high polarization levels in 1999-2000, are quite a bit more polarized in 
2011-2012. These two chambers are the only ones whose SMS values exceeds 9.00 at 
either the time period under examination, meaning a case could be made that they are the 
most polarized chamber-time dyads in the entire sample. Another chamber experiencing a 
substantial increase in polarization is the Pennsylvania House; in 1999-2000 it shows 
some signs of polarization, but in 2011-2012 it is by all standards thoroughly polarized. 
Other chambers experience more modest increases in polarization than the 
aforementioned chambers. The California Assembly, Indiana House, Minnesota House, 
and Ohio House, for example, are all quite polarized in 1999-2000 and are more so in 
2011-2012, though the change is not overwhelming.  
 Despite the clear increase in polarization levels in most chambers, there remain 
several chambers that are not particularly polarized in 2011-2012. The Washington 
House and Virginia House are by all standards more polarized in 2011-2012 than in 
1999-2000, but their scores remain below the levels at which the more polarized 
chambers were located in 1999-2000. By far the two biggest laggards in polarization are 
the New York Assembly and Illinois House, however. The New York Assembly evinces 
an interesting paradox – higher distance-of-medians and distance-of-means scores but a 
substantial lower SMS score. This suggests that the central tendencies of the parties in the 
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New York Assembly have diverged while within-party ideological variation has 
increased. But the most confounding chamber of all is the Illinois House, for which all 
three polarization measures are lower rather than higher in 2011-2012! Recall that the 
Illinois House was one of the three least polarized chambers in 1999-2000. In 2011-2012, 
however, the Illinois House is undisputedly the least polarized chamber in the sample. 
THE INTERSECTION OF PARTY, GEOGRAPHY, AND TIME: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE 
EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS  
 
 In previous sections of this chapter, we learned that state legislative chambers 
exhibiting high levels of intra-party geographical cleavage in 1999-2000 also tended to 
evince relatively low levels of party polarization. We also learned that levels of party 
polarization were substantially higher in 2011-2012 than they were in 1999-2000 in most 
of the chambers under examination in this study. And earlier, in Chapter Three, we 
learned that between these two time periods, two of the nine district categories (small city 
and country districts and deep rural districts) experienced a particularly dramatic electoral 
realignment in favor of the GOP. To reiterate, in 1999, 64% and 72% of them were 
represented by Republicans, but by 2011 these percentages had risen to 83% and 78%, 
respectively.  
 When all of these insights are jointly considered, a reasonable hypothesis 
emerges: state legislative chambers became more polarized over the course of the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century in part because of the sorting of the geographical bases of their 
party caucuses. In other words, as Democratic legislators from small city and country and 
deep rural districts became increasingly scarce inside statehouses across the country, 
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Democratic legislative caucuses lost many of their most conservative members. 
Simultaneously, Republican legislative caucuses saw their ranks swell as numerous new 
(and often very conservative) legislators from these two district categories entered their 
ranks. These twin processes (ultimately caused by the same instigator) had the joint effect 
of dramatically increasing the partisan divide in statehouses across the country. 
 Thoroughly assessing the merits of this hypothesis would entail directly 
comparing the individual ideal points of Democratic legislators from small city and 
country districts who leave a given chamber to the ideal points of the Republican 
legislators who replace them. Such a comparison would require the estimation of ideal 
point models that include legislators from all legislative sessions for an individual 
chamber between 1999-2000 and 2011-2012, a massive undertaking for which I have 
neither the time or resources.40 While I am unable to test my hypothesis in such a 
rigorous way, I can nonetheless use the data I have collected and the ideal point models 
that I have estimated to make some preliminary conjectures about its validity. Doing so 
involves comparing the relative positions as well as the relative sizes of different 
                                                 
40 Estimating such a model would require gathering roll-call data for all legislative 
sessions between 1999-2000 and 2011-2012 for each of the chambers, and then using this 
massive amount of data to place all legislators who served within each chamber during 
this time period on the same ideological scale (in a manner similar to the way in which 
DW-Nominate places U.S. House members from different Congresses on the same 
ideological scale). Shor and McCarty (2011) marshal a huge amount of state legislative 
roll-call data in a remarkable effort to place all state legislators and members of Congress 
between 1993 and 2011 on the same ideological space. However, the fulcrum of their 
analyses is legislator responses to National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) surveys, not 
roll-call data. Roll-call data only come into play in their models as a way of imputing 
NPAT scores for legislators who did not take NPAT surveys. Consequently, their ideal 




geographical groups during the 1999-2000 and 2011-2012 sessions of each of the 
chambers under examination.  
 Figure 4.3 (next page) plots geographical groups within Democratic caucuses 
according to their deviation from the mean Democratic ideal point value in their chamber 
for the 1999-2000 and 2011-2012 sessions.41 Once again, all chambers are included 
except the Missouri House and the Oregon House, for which 2011-2012 ideal points 
could not be estimated.  The unit of measurement for the y-axis in Figure 4.3 is the 
standard deviation from the Democratic mean; thus, groups that are plotted near the 0-
value of the y-axis have a mean ideal point value that is close to that of the entire 
Democratic caucus, groups that are plotted near the 1-value of the y-axis have a mean 
ideal point value that is close to one standard deviation above the mean value of the entire 
Democratic caucus, etc. The geographical groups are plotted as circles whose sizes vary 
according to their overall numerical contribution to the Democratic caucus – the larger 
the circle, the larger the percentage of Democratic legislators who represent a district 
from that category. Plots are ordered alphabetically according to chamber and 






                                                 
41 In concert with Figure 4.2 and to simplify the results displayed on the plots, 
geographical groups that include less than three legislators are not included in the plots.  
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Figure 4.3: Deviation from Mean Democratic Ideal Point Score among Geographical Groups in Democratic Caucuses, 1999-





 While Figure 4.3 may at first seem a bit frenetic, it reveals much about why some 
chambers have experienced a substantial increase in polarization between 1999-2000 and 
2011-2012. One of these chambers is the Alabama House, which (as per the previous 
section) experienced a particularly dramatic rise in polarization. Examining the first two 
plots in Figure 4.3 (those that correspond to the Democratic caucus of the Alabama 
House in 1999-2000 and 2011-2012), one can get a good sense of one of the processes 
that have contributed to the divergence of the parties in this chamber. As can be seen, in 
1999-2000 the Democratic caucus of the Alabama House is largely composed of 
legislators from two geographical categories – small city and country districts and urban 
black districts (legislators from a third category – middle-class suburban districts – make 
up a much smaller share of the caucus). These two categories are at opposite ends of the 
mean Democratic ideal point value (the 0-value on the y-axis), with legislators from 
urban black districts on the more liberal side and legislators from small city and country 
districts on the more conservative side.  
 By 2011-2012, however, the geographical composition of the Democratic caucus 
of the Alabama House has changed considerably. Due to the electoral demise of many 
Democratic legislators from small city and country districts, the percentage of 
Democratic legislators from this category declined dramatically and legislators from 
urban black districts became a much larger share of the chamber’s Democratic caucus. 
Because they compose a larger share of the caucus in 2011-2012 than they do in 1999-
2000, legislators from urban black districts are closer to their caucus’s mean ideal point 
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value in 2011-2012 than they are in 1999-2000. Meanwhile, the relatively few 
Democratic legislators from small city and country districts that remain in the Alabama 
House in 2011-2012 are much further from their caucus’s mean ideal point value than 
they are in 1999-2000. 
 Another chamber that exhibits much larger polarization levels in 2011-2012 than 
in 1999-2000 is the Michigan House. An examination of differences in the two plots for 
the Michigan House reveals a similar dynamic, albeit one that comports with Michigan’s 
overall geographical profile instead of Alabama’s. As can be seen, in 1999-2000 the 
Democratic caucus of the Michigan House is composed of large percentages of 
legislators from urban black districts and middle-class suburban districts and somewhat 
smaller percentages of legislators from outer suburban and small city and country 
districts. Legislators from urban black districts are considerably more liberal than the 
Democratic mean, legislators from outer suburban and small city and country districts are 
considerably more conservative, and legislators from middle-class suburban districts are 
collectively a bit on the conservative side but quite close to the mean. By 2011-2012, 
however, the presence of Democratic legislators from outer suburban and small city and 
country districts within the Democratic caucus has become so small that these two groups 
are not present in the plot. Because of the decline of these groups of legislators, the 
Democratic caucus in the Michigan House appears to have shifted to the left, with 
legislators from middle-class suburban districts now composing the caucus’s 
139 
 
conservative flank and legislators from urban black districts much closer to the caucus’s 
mean ideal point value than they are in 1999-2000.  
 Indeed, while each chamber’s story is unique, one can see similar changes in 
other chambers that have polarized considerably, including the Minnesota House, Ohio 
House, and Pennsylvania House. In each of these chambers, the percentage of 
Democratic legislators from small city and country and deep rural districts declines 
between 1999-2000 and 2011-2012, while the percentage of Democratic legislators from 
more urban district categories (urban black districts in the case of the Ohio and 
Pennsylvania Houses; urban ethnic matrix and yuppie districts in the case of the 
Minnesota House) increases. Not coincidentally, legislators from these more urban 
district categories also come to occupy a position within the ideological spectrum of their 
caucuses that is closer to its center. One can surmise that this is because the caucuses 
have shifted somewhat to the left as a result of the attrition of their most conservative 
voices.  
 Up until this point, the chambers that have been discussed have been those of 
relatively slow-growing states whose geographical profiles are not rapidly changing.  The 
transformations that have occurred in the chambers of more fast-growing states are far 
more convoluted and difficult to analyze because demographic change has to be 
considered alongside electoral change in accounting for differences in the relative 
prevalence of district categories within Democratic caucuses. The Nevada Assembly, for 
example, is a chamber that saw a huge increase in polarization between 1999-2000 and 
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2011-2012. It is also a chamber located in what has until recently been an exceptionally 
fast-growing state. Figure 4.3 shows that, in 1999-2000, the bulk of the Democratic 
caucus in the Nevada Assembly is constituted of legislators from middle-class suburban 
and outer suburban districts, both of which register a mean ideological position that is 
roughly on par with that of their caucus. Far smaller groups of Democratic legislators 
also exist from urban ethnic matrix and small city and country districts; the former are 
ideologically far more liberal than the caucus as a whole, while the latter are far more 
conservative. 
 Moving to 2011-2012, one can see that the geographical makeup of the 
Democratic caucus of the Nevada Assembly has changed enormously. Legislators from 
outer suburban and small city and country districts do not appear in the plot, while 
legislators from middle-class suburban districts occupy a very small circle in it. The bulk 
of Democratic legislators in the Nevada Assembly in 2011-2012 are from urban ethnic 
matrix districts, which naturally are near the middle of the caucus’s ideological 
distribution. What has happened here? Stated succinctly, it appears that demographic 
changes and electoral changes have interacted. A huge influx of Hispanics into the Las 
Vegas area during the 1990s effectively turned numerous middle-class suburban districts 
into urban ethnic matrix districts, while outer suburban districts on the Las Vegas 
metropolitan fringe and small city and country districts in northern Nevada are now 
electing Republicans instead of Democrats. The overall effect has been that the 
percentages of legislators from middle-class suburban, outer suburban, and small city and 
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country districts within the Nevada Assembly’s Democratic caucus have all declined 
while the percentage of legislators from urban ethnic matrix districts has risen 
substantially. While more difficult to disentangle, this story is nonetheless consistent with 
the hypothesis that was advanced earlier because the end result has been that the 
Democratic caucus in the Nevada Assembly has a more homogeneous geographical base, 
one that is more liberal and produces more liberal legislators.  
 In sum, Figure 4.3 reveals one important causal mechanism behind the growth of 
polarization in state legislatures – geographical sorting.42 This conclusion is to some 
degree at odds with the claims of Shor and McCarty (2011). According to them, while the 
tendencies of Democrats and Republicans to represent districts with different political 
characteristics is partially responsible for the polarization of state legislatures, the much 
larger contributing factor has been what they call “intradistrict divergence,” meaning the 
“difference between how Democrats and Republicans would represent the same district” 
(546). It is important to bear in mind, however, that Shor and McCarty model the 
geographical constituency in a completely different way than I do, and that their 
polarization scores for state legislators are only partly derived from roll-call votes.   
 Nonetheless, there is no question that geographical sorting, while an important 
component in any explanation of state legislative polarization, is on its own insufficient 
for the purposes of comprehensively explaining the phenomenon. There are clear 
                                                 
42 Much more could be said about what Figure 4.3 reveals about each of the remaining 
state legislative chambers that were not discussed in this section of the chapter. This 
discussion would be rather redundant, however, and largely tangential to the overall point 
of the figure as well.   
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indications of this in Figure 4.3. For example, much like the chambers that were 
discussed earlier, the Illinois House experiences a fairly substantial decline in the number 
of Democratic legislators from small city and country districts between 1999-2000 and 
2011-2012. But, as we saw in the previous section of the chapter, polarization levels in 
the Illinois House actually decline a bit between these two legislative sessions. This is 
despite the fact that some of the same trends discussed in reference to the Alabama and 
Michigan Houses (i.e., the movement of legislators from urban black districts closer to 
the mean ideal point value in their caucuses) are evident in the plots for Figure 4.3 
Illinois House as well. It is not clear what explains this discrepancy. 
 Providing a comprehensive account of state legislative polarization would 
necessarily entail combining constituency variables such as the one promoted in this 
dissertation with institutional variables, a complicated task given that each state 
legislature has its own unique set of rules and procedures affecting roll-call voting. Such 
an account would also need to be based upon analyses of roll-call votes from more than 
just two time periods, as was done in this chapter.  However, comprehensively explaining 
state legislative polarization is not the objective of this chapter. Instead, the objective has 
been to ascertain the link (if any) between geographical sorting and legislative 
polarization. As I have conclusively shown, that link lies in a number of areas, but most 
crucially, it lies in the electoral realignment that small city and country and deep rural 




 The analyses of this chapter have resulted in a fairly eclectic (and, in some cases, 
unexpected) set of results. These results can be condensed into four basic observations. 
First, with a few exceptions, significant ideological heterogeneity across district 
categories is present primarily within Democratic state legislative caucuses; in 
Republican caucuses, geography simply does not do much of the work. Second, across 
nearly all of the chambers in the sample, the ideological orderings of Democratic 
legislators from different district categories are remarkably similar. Legislators from 
urban black districts and yuppie districts are consistently the most liberal in their 
caucuses, followed by legislators from the other urban district categories. Conversely, 
legislators from small city and country and deep rural districts are consistently the most 
conservative in their caucuses, followed by legislators from the suburban district 
categories. Third, while caution is warranted in drawing inferences based on ideal point 
estimates that are not in the same ideological space, the statistics measuring the 
ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans strongly suggest that most 
legislative chambers in the analyses were more polarized in 2011-2012 than they were in 
1999-2000. Lastly, a comparison of the 1999-2000 and 2011-2012 results suggests one 
clear causal mechanism behind the apparent polarization of state legislative chambers – 




Chapter Five: Toward a Policy-Based Understanding of State 
Legislative Roll-Call Voting: Geographical Cleavages, Policy Conflicts, 
and Legislative Alignments 
 Chapter Four provided strong evidence that intra-party geographical patterns in 
roll-call voting are remarkably similar across states. While cross-state differences do exist 
in the extent of ideological variation found within legislative party caucuses, these 
differences owe primarily to the kinds of microgeographical settings found within 
individual states rather than to macro-regional differences. Despite their undeniable 
complexity, the ideological distributions of contemporary state legislatures are to a 
significant degree the result of the interplay between just two factors: the distribution of 
district categories found within states and the patterns of partisan representation of these 
district categories. Contemporary trends of partisan polarization can, in turn, be partly 
understood as a consequence of the growing tendency of districts from different 
geographical categories to be represented by legislators from one political party. 
 These results beget many additional questions about the role of geography in 
producing alignments within contemporary state legislatures. In particular, the results of 
Chapter Four demonstrate that, in chamber after chamber, legislators from each of the 
geographical categories are ideologically positioned in roughly the same order within 
party caucuses.  But what, exactly, are these positions all about? Why do Democratic 
legislators from small city and country districts so consistently exhibit mean ideologies 
that are far closer to those of most Republicans than are those of their co-partisans from 
urban black or yuppie districts? Conversely, why do Republicans legislators from middle-
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class suburban districts tend to exhibit mean ideologies that are somewhat closer to those 
of most Democrats than are those of their co-partisans from deep rural districts?  
 In this chapter of the dissertation, I examine these questions by analyzing how the 
roll-call voting alignments of state legislators from different geographical categories vary 
depending on the policies on which the legislators are voting. More specifically, I point to 
a set of intra-party geographical alignment patterns that are likely to be evident in state 
legislative roll-call outcomes. Each of these geographical alignment patterns is related to 
one of a number of social cleavages that take on a distinct geographical expression within 
the American states. These cleavages are in turn related to a distinct set of substantive 
policy disputes. Thus, I theorize that conflicts over policy choices will evoke 
geographical cleavages at the societal level, which will then influence the way legislators 
from different geographical categories vote on particular issues. 
 The chapter begins with an extensive theoretical discussion in which I outline five 
different sub-state geographical cleavages, explaining their social origins and specifying 
the roll-call alignment patterns that should be associated with them. I also develop some 
basic hypotheses about the sorts of policy issues that are most likely to cause each type of 
roll-call alignment pattern to manifest itself in the state legislative setting. Following the 
theoretical section, I test my hypotheses using datasets of politically-consequential roll-
call votes recorded between 2006 and 2012 in three state legislative chambers: the Illinois 
House, Pennsylvania House, and Virginia House. Each roll-call vote in the three datasets 
is tested to determine if a statistically significant intra-party geographical alignment 
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exists; votes that evince such alignments are further examined to determine if the 
alignments closely resemble the alignment patterns specified in the theoretical section of 
the chapter.  I then proceed to examine the policy content of roll-call votes in order to 
determine if the hypothesized connection between policy content and voting alignment 
patterns exists.  
 The results of my initial analyses are mixed. While some hypotheses are 
confirmed, the overall thrust of the findings is that the empirical realities operating in 
contemporary state legislatures are more complex than my hypotheses might suggest. In 
order to better understand how my original hypotheses might be improved by a more 
nuanced understanding of the policymaking process in contemporary state legislatures, I 
examine several of the surprising findings of the chapter in greater depth. I conclude the 
chapter by summarizing how its results shed light on the findings of Chapter Four and 
suggesting ways in which the key concepts and ideas advanced in this chapter might be 
refined in future research.  
SUB-STATE GEOGRAPHICAL CLEAVAGES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED ROLL-CALL 
ALIGNMENT PATTERNS 
 
In this early section of the chapter, I lay out some hypotheses concerning five 
types of geographical cleavages that may manifest themselves in particular roll-call 
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alignment patterns inside modern state legislatures.43 Each of the geographical cleavages 
to which I point is related to a social conflict in contemporary American politics that is 
expressed spatially and is thus reflected in the district categories at the center of this 
study. Some of these cleavages are explicitly spatial, whereas others are more 
fundamentally demographic but nonetheless happen to be expressed spatially. 
Additionally, some of these geographical cleavages are nationally significant and will 
therefore be recognizable to all who follow national politics; others are cleavages that 
only emerge at the state level and may be less familiar to those who do not closely follow 
state politics in the U.S.  
The Core-Periphery Cleavage 
 It is a well-known fact that many states are the sites of intense competition 
between sub-state regions. Such competition can take several forms, one of which is the 
intense divide that exists in highly-populated states between large metropolitan areas and 
outlying hinterlands. I call this cleavage the core-periphery cleavage.44 In his magisterial 
American State Politics (1956), V.O. Key, Jr. discussed sub-state core-periphery divides 
extensively, pointing to the polarity of such divides as the key factor determining their 
                                                 
43 Throughout this chapter, the word “cleavages” is used to refer to social conflicts within 
the electorate or the population at large. The word “alignments,” on the other hand, is 
used to refer to the way legislators from particular groups (in this case, district categories) 
vote on particular issues.  
44 I borrow the “core-periphery” term from a variety of excellent studies analyzing the 
roots of geographical voting patterns in the U.S. Congress (Bensel 1984, 1990, 2000; 
Trubowitz 1997; Sanders 1999). The dynamics to which these studies point are similar to 
the ones I discuss, though it is important to bear in mind that the term does take on a 
somewhat different meaning at the state level.  
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influence on a state’s politics. According to Key, states with a single, economically-
dominant metropolitan area (which he called “unimetropolitan states”) produce the most 
pronounced core-periphery conflicts precisely because such conflicts in these states are 
bipolar in nature (i.e., they take the form of a single metropolitan area competing against 
the rest of the state).45 This basic insight has been the starting point for a small number of 
subsequent studies of regionalism in state politics (Palmer 1972; Nardulli 1989; Atack 
1989; Nowlan, Gove, and Winkel 2010; Pecorella and Stonecash 2012). 
Importantly, while politicians from outlying territories in unimetropolitan states 
(e.g., downstate Illinois or upstate New York) will frequently characterize regional 
disagreements in their states as matters of regional identity or pride, the core political 
issues that evoke such divisions in state legislatures tend to be economic rather than 
cultural. Stated succinctly, metropolitan regions and outlying territories fight over limited 
state funds, particularly in the areas of education and transportation. Thus, it is reasonable 
to expect that these basic fiscal matters will be the core areas of dispute in roll-call votes 
exhibiting the core-periphery alignment pattern. 
Within the categorical framework of this dissertation, there are five district 
categories that tend to be located in large metropolitan areas: urban black districts, urban 
Hispanic districts, urban ethnic matrix districts, yuppie districts, and upscale suburban 
districts. There are also three district categories that tend to be associated with small 
metropolitan areas or non-metropolitan areas: middle-class suburban districts, small city 
                                                 
45 The two best examples of “unimetropolitan states” are Illinois and New York.  
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and country districts, and deep rural districts.46 Thus, when the core-periphery cleavage 
makes itself felt in roll-call voting outcomes, it should manifest itself with legislators 
from the first five categories arrayed against legislators from the last three ones. This 
basic alignment of district categories is shown in Figure 5.1 (below). The final category – 
outer suburban districts – is sometimes associated with large metropolitan areas and 
sometimes not. It is therefore placed along the line separating the metropolitan and non-
metropolitan categories.  






The City-Suburb Cleavage 
In states with large metropolitan areas, regional economic conflict can sometimes 
take a second form – conflict between central cities and suburban areas. Though they are 
in the same metropolitan network, central cities and their suburbs often have very 
different needs and populations. Moreover, since suburbs on the whole tend to be 
wealthier than central cities, state budgets frequently have the effect of redistributing 
                                                 
46 Recall that middle-class suburban districts tend to exhibit higher urbanization scores, 
but lower metropolitanization scores, than outer suburban districts. This is because most 




funds from the former to the latter,  much to the displeasure of suburban constituencies 
(Orfield 2002). Thus, the same basic economic struggles that can take place between 
large metropolitan areas and outlying territories in state legislatures can also take place 
between cities and suburbs in the same metropolitan area. Naturally, the city-suburb 
cleavage will emerge in state legislative politics when urban legislators are pitted against 
suburban legislators. This alignment is demonstrated in Figure 5.2 (small city and country 
and deep rural districts are placed along the dividing line because their legislators would 










                                                 
47 Importantly, the existence of a strong core/periphery divide within a state’s politics 
does not preclude the existence of a strong urban/suburban divide as well. In fact, the two 
frequently coexist and their intersection occasionally makes for very complicated 
political scenarios. In Illinois, for example, school funding disputes have frequently 
served to unite legislators from relatively poor districts in inner-city Chicago and 
downstate Illinois against legislators from the wealthier Chicago suburbs (Nowlan, Gove, 
and Winkel 2010). For more complicated reasons, disputes over the funding of teacher 
pensions have usually resulted in a completely different alignment, one pitting legislators 
from downstate Illinois and the Chicago suburbs against legislators from the City of 
Chicago. Political conflict over transportation issues have usually comported with the 
ideal-typical core/periphery divide, though not always. Despite this complexity, however, 
legislative roll-call votes are not likely evoke the core/periphery cleavage and the 
city/suburb cleavage simultaneously. This is because roll-call votes are yes-or-no 
propositions, and bills pertaining to budget matters are likely to have been negotiated 




Figure 5.2: Roll-Call Alignment Pattern Indicative of City-suburb Cleavage 
 
 
The Urban-Rural Cleavage  
Like the core-periphery and city-suburb cleavages, urban-rural cleavages are 
explicitly spatial, in that they concern differences between geographically-defined 
communities. Unlike the first two cleavages, however, urban-rural cleavages are not 
related to differences between economic regions and tend not to involve economic policy 
issues. Instead, urban-rural cleavages concern genuine cultural differences between 
people who live in urban and rural areas. In recent years, a number of important studies 
of American politics have emphasized the fairly obvious and yet frequently-overlooked 
point that rural Americans have different lifestyles and different political perspectives 
than urban Americans (Walsh 2012; Gimpel and Karnes 2006; Gimpel and Shuknecht 
2004). State legislatures frequently debate issues related to the regulation of private 
activities that provoke dramatically different reactions in urban and rural America. The 
most well-known example of such an issue is gun control, though there may be other 
such issues as well.  
 Naturally, urban-rural cleavages in roll-call voting patterns will take the form of 
legislators from urban districts voting against legislators from rural districts. As shown in 
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Chapter Two, only two district categories have average percentages of urban residents of 
less than 50%: small city and country districts and deep rural districts. A third category, 
outer suburban districts, evinces a fairly significant non-urban average percentage as 
well. Therefore, the alignment pattern most indicative of an urban-rural cleavage would 
pit small city and country and deep rural districts against most others, with outer 
suburban districts placed along the dividing line. This alignment is shown in Figure 5.3 
(below).  




The Post-Industrial Cleavage 
The post-industrial cleavage is related to a series of societal developments first 
noticed by Bell (1973) in his classic book The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. In the 
book, Bell predicted that the final decades of the twentieth century would witness a 
transition in advanced democracies from economies reliant upon traditional industries to 
economies reliant upon services and information. These economic changes, Bell 
believed, would result in the large-scale growth of a new socioeconomic class in 
advanced societies – well-educated professional workers. As numerous commentators 
and scholars have observed, Bell’s predictions about the impending transformation of the 
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American socioeconomic structure have clearly come true (Brooks 2000; Kotkin 2000; 
Florida 2002). Moreover, in recent years, scholars have noticed that the growth of the 
information economy that Bell predicted has occurred in ways that are highly 
geographically uneven, with information-sector employment and levels of human capital 
diverging across places (Moretti 2012; Berry and Glaeser 2005). 
 The growth and geographical concentration of the post-industrial economy has 
redounded in an important new geographical cleavage in contemporary American 
politics, one between places that have become embedded in the post-industrial economy 
(i.e., places exhibiting high levels of information-sector employment and human capital) 
and places that have not. There are at least two types of state policy areas that seem 
especially likely to evoke post-industrial divides in state legislatures –
energy/environmental policy and morality policy. With respect to environmental/energy 
policy, because post-industrial economies are far less reliant upon energy consumption 
than are traditional industries, it seems likely that legislators from places defined by post-
industrialism would take a kinder view toward strict environmental regulations than 
would legislators from places in which the post-industrial economy is less of a force. 
With respect to morality policy, because the post-industrial economy is intimately linked 
with higher education levels, and higher education levels are in turn closely associated 
with more liberal views on “morality policy” issues (Camobreco and Barnello 2002; 
Brewer and Stonecash 2008), it is reasonable to expect that legislators from post-
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industrial areas will exhibit much more liberal views on these sorts of issues than 
legislators from other areas.  
  In terms of the framework of this dissertation, the district category most closely 
associated with the post-industrial economy is the yuppie category. Human capital levels 
in the yuppie category are far higher than in any of the other nine categories. The one 
category that comes close to reaching the yuppie category in this regard is the upscale 
suburban category, but it is best regarded as intermediate between the yuppie category 
and all others in terms of post-industrial influence. Additionally, urban ethnic matrix 
districts are frequently composed of many diverse neighborhoods, some of which include 
large populations of well-educated professionals. Thus, the alignment most indicative of 
a post-industrial cleavage would pit yuppie districts against most others, with upscale 
suburban districts and urban ethnic matrix districts placed along the dividing line. 




The Racial Cleavage 
 
 Few would disagree with the claim that race has been an extremely significant (if 
not the most significant) social cleavage throughout American history. In its cursory 
treatment of racial issues, this dissertation has emphasized an admittedly unoriginal point 
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– one of the chief reasons that race continues to play such a dominant role in American 
politics is because the distribution of racial populations across the United States is so 
geographically uneven. High rates of racial segregation in the United States amplify the 
salience of race in perceptions of American communities, likely among most Americans 
but almost certainly among most politicians.  
 As discussed in the introductory chapter, high rates of racial segregation render 
racial representation and place-based representation indistinguishable in many cases. 
When legislators representing majority-black or majority-Hispanic districts sponsor bills 
designed to help racial minorities at large, they are effectively representing their 
geographical constituencies as well. Thus, we should expect racial cleavages in society to 
manifest themselves in geographically-defined roll-call voting alignments when the 
policy issues at hand bear two characteristics: 1) they are of particular importance to 
racial and ethnic minority groups; 2) they evoke significant differences of opinion 
between minority groups and white Americans. 
 There is no shortage of issues that meet these two criteria to some degree. With 
respect to African-Americans, important examples include highly racialized policy areas 
such as social welfare policy and criminal justice policy. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated the extent to which policy disputes over social welfare and criminal justice 
issues are linked to the status of African-Americans in American society, both because of 
the ways in which stereotypes of African-Americans shape public opinion in these areas 
as well as because of the degree to which African-American communities are 
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disproportionately affected by policy changes in them (Gilens 2000; Alexander 2010).It 
thus seems likely that pieces of legislation pertaining to social welfare and criminal 
justice policy will occasionally produce roll-call divisions within Democratic caucuses in 
which legislators from district categories defined by large black populations (i.e., urban 
black districts) will be pitted against legislators from other district categories. With 
respect to Hispanic communities, similar issues might include immigration policy and 
language policy.  
 There is no reason to assume that legislators from urban black districts and urban 
Hispanic districts will necessarily align on issues of importance to their respective racial 
communities. While this may occur at times, research has shown that Black and Hispanic 
communities are sometimes in conflict as well (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; 
Vaca 2004; Kaufmann 2004). Thus, there are two roll-call alignments indicative of racial 
cleavages: one in which legislators from urban black districts are the sole district 
category in the minority voting bloc and one in which urban Hispanic districts have that 
position. In both cases, the other district category is placed along the dividing line along 

















DATA AND METHODS 
 
 Having developed some hypotheses concerning the ways in which five types of 
geographical cleavages may manifest themselves in particular roll-call alignment 
patterns, I now move to testing the validity of these hypotheses using roll-call data from 
three state legislative chambers from 2006 to 2012.  
The roll-call data used for the analyses of this chapter were retrieved from the 
website of Project Vote Smart, a non-profit dedicated to informing American citizens 
about the records of their elected officials. Project Vote Smart’s Key Votes Program 
selects roll-call votes that have been determined by a set of experts (usually political 
scientists or political journalists working in a state) to have met a set of criteria indicating 
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political significance.48 Using the roll-call votes selected by Project Vote Smart (as 
opposed to the much larger datasets that were analyzed in Chapter Four) has advantages 
and disadvantages, but on the whole the former outweigh the latter for the purposes of 
this chapter. While analyzing larger datasets would provide a far greater sample of roll-
call votes, many of these would be procedural or amendatory votes that have little 
substantive policy significance. Going through all of the roll-call votes to determine 
policy significance would be an excruciatingly time-consuming process. The roll-call 
votes selected by Project Vote Smart’s staff, on the other hand, are much more likely to 
be related to important policy disputes. Since policy content is an essential component of 
this chapter, I choose to foresake a greater n value so as to hopefully garner more 
meaningful findings. 
 The three state legislative chambers I examine for this chapter are the Illinois 
House, Pennsylvania House, and Virginia House. These states were chosen because they 
are geographically diverse: in all three states, at least eight of the nine geographical 
categories can be found. Moreover, each includes all or parts of a large metropolitan area 
as well as substantial rural territory. Additionally, as seen in Chapter Four, the Illinois 
House and Virginia House exhibit rather low levels of party polarization, so the chances 
that geographical differences in roll-call voting patterns will be found within them are 
higher. 
                                                 




My strategy for determining whether individual roll-call votes exhibit significant 
geographical alignments is to search for such alignments within party caucuses. I choose 
this strategy because, as the results of Chapter Four clearly showed, party has become the 
dominant influence on roll-call voting in contemporary state legislatures and the role of 
geography, while certainly important, is secondary nonetheless. Thus, to the extent that 
the geographical constituency plays an independent role in shaping voting decisions on a 
particular roll-call vote, that role is most easily detected within rather than across party 
lines.   
PARTY-LINE VOTES, GEOGRAPHICAL VOTES, AND GEOGRAPHICAL ALIGNMENT 
PATTERNS 
 An important first step in isolating roll-call votes evincing significant intra-party 
geographical alignments is to separate out those roll-call votes for which party is the 
overwhelming influence and to subject the remainder of the votes to tests measuring the 
intra-party association between geography and vote choice. Accordingly, party difference 
scores – scores measuring the difference between the percentage of Democrats and 
percentage of Republicans who vote “yes” on a particular bill – were calculated for all 
votes in the three datasets. Votes exhibiting party difference scores of greater than 90% 
manifest a sharply partisan alignment and were therefore not examined for intra-party 
geographical variation.  
 For those roll-call votes that exhibited party difference scores of less than 90%, 
the within-party relationship between geography and vote choice was examined via the 
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Fisher’s Exact Test. The Fisher’s Exact Test is a statistical test of association between 
categorical variables that is similar to the more well-known Chi Square Test but is 
preferred when sample sizes are small. It tests the null hypothesis that no relationship 
exists between the rows and columns of a contingency table (in this case, the rows 
indicate the category of the districts that legislators represent and the columns indicate 
whether the legislators voted yes or no on a given roll-call vote). For each roll-call vote, 
the sample was split by party affiliation and two separate Fisher’s Exact Tests were 
conducted. Each test yielded a p-value indicating the statistical significance of the within-
party relationship between geographical category and vote choice.  
Table 5.1 (next page) classifies each roll-call vote in the dataset according to its 
party difference score and the results of the Fisher’s Exact Tests. “Strict party-line votes” 
are those votes that exhibit party difference scores of greater than 90%. Votes that do not 
reach the 90% threshold for being considered a “strict party-line vote,” but that do evince 
a statistically-significant (p<.05) within-party association between district category and 
vote choice as per the Fisher’s Exact Test, are considered “geographical votes.” In some 
cases, the statistically-significant within-party association only occurs among Democrats, 
while in other cases it only occurs among Republicans; in a few cases it occurs within 
both party caucuses. The party caucus(es) within which the geographical alignments are 
statistically significant are indicated in columns three through five. Finally, roll-call votes 
that do not meet the criteria for being considered “strict party-line votes” and also do not 
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exhibit statistically-significant within-party geographical alignments are classified as 
“other” (column six). 
Table 5.1: Classification of Roll-Call Votes in Three Chambers Based on the 
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 In assessing the results of this table, one finds a variety of patterns across the three 
chambers. In the Illinois and Virginia Houses, there are many more roll-call votes 
evincing a significant geographical alignment inside the Democratic Caucuses than inside 
the Republican Caucuses. In the Pennsylvania House, on the other hand, the percentage 
of geographical votes inside the Republican caucus is slightly higher (recall from Chapter 
Four that the Pennsylvania House is one of a few chambers – along with the Illinois 
House – that exhibits ideological heterogeneity across district categories inside its 
Republican caucus). Additionally, the Pennsylvania House exhibits a higher percentage 
of strict party-line votes than the other two chambers. This is not surprising given that it 
is a much more polarized chamber (as also shown in Chapter Four). Finally, in all three 
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chambers, a large number of votes are neither strictly party-line nor geographical, but 
rather are classified as “other.” Part of the reason for why such a large number of roll-call 
votes are classified as “other” is because the criteria used to delineate partisan votes (and, 
to a lesser extent, geographical votes) are quite difficult to meet.  
 From this point forward, I focus on the 121 geographical votes in the three roll-
call datasets. Table 5.2 (next page) classifies each of these votes according to which roll-
call alignment pattern it most resembles. Measuring how closely roll-call votes 
approximate ideal-typical alignment patterns was accomplished by calculating Pearson’s 
correlation values between the votes in the datasets and hypothetical votes in which every 
legislator voted according to his district category’s alignment in each of the five 
alignment patterns.49 Roll-call votes were then classified as being most closely associated 
with the alignment pattern producing the highest correlation value. In cases where no 
alignment pattern yielded a correlation value of greater than 0.4, the votes were classified 




                                                 
49 Correlations were not calculated for roll-call votes in which there was not a sufficiently 
large (n>2) number of legislators from a consequential category. For example, 
correlations measuring how closely votes approximate the post-industrial alignment 
weren’t calculated for Republican caucuses because none of the chambers in the dataset 




Table 5.2: Alignment Patterns of Geographical Votes in Ilinois, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia Houses, 2006-2012 
 
Examining this table, we find that the core-periphery alignment pattern is easily 
the most common alignment pattern that emerges across all three legislative chambers. 
The urban-rural alignment pattern is the second most common, but it is only half as 
common as the core-periphery pattern. The frequency of the core-periphery and urban-
rural alignment patterns is partly the result of the fact that these are the only two 
alignment patterns that can usually be found within both Democratic and Republican 
caucuses. If Democratic caucuses were considered alone, the core-periphery alignment 
would still easily be the most frequent alignment, though the urban-rural alignment 
would fall to third place after the racial alignment. 
















































 The results for the remaining three alignment patterns are surprising in that each 
is exclusively (or primarily) found in only one of the three legislative chambers. Most 
significantly, the racial alignment is very common in the Illinois House, nearly tying with 
the core-periphery alignment for being the most common. However, it appears to be non-
existent in the Pennsylvania and Virginia Houses. Also present in the Illinois House 
(though to a much smaller degree) and not present in the other two chambers is the city-
suburb alignment. Similarly, the post-industrial alignment is a clear presence in the 
Virginia House, but its existence in the other two chambers is scant at best. Possible 
explanations for the large differences in the prevalence of these three alignment patterns 
across the three chambers will be explored later in the chapter.  
BRINGING IN POLICY CONTENT 
 
 Here, I shift gears to examining the relationship between policy content and the 
kinds of alignments evinced by the roll-call votes in the three datasets. In particular, I 
seek to answer two questions: 1) to what extent do the policy areas being voted upon 
determine whether roll-call votes occur along party lines or geographical lines?; 2) 
among votes that cleave the parties geographically, what is the association between the 
policy areas being voted upon and the kinds of geographical alignment patterns that 
emerge?  
To facilitate the policy-based analysis, I carefully examined all of the votes in my 
roll-call datasets and classified them according to their respective policy areas. The 
classification scheme I used was one that I developed specifically for the purpose of the 
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data at hand. While this classification scheme includes some general policy areas that are 
frequently included in state policy typologies (i.e., education, transportation, health care, 
etc.), it also includes more specific policy areas that made unusually frequent appearances 
in my roll-call datasets. For example, gun control, tobacco control, and gambling 
regulation were the sources of an unusually large number of roll-call votes despite being 
fairly specific policy topics (probably because states were legislating heavily in these 
topics during the time period at hand); as a result, they were given their own categories. 
 Table 5.3 (next page) shows the number of number of strict party-line votes, 
geographical votes, and “other” votes (classified in the same way as Table 5.1) in each of 
the policy areas in my policy typology. The policy areas are ordered from most numerous 
to least numerous, with the residual category (“other”) at the end of the table. The sorts of 
issues encompassed within most of the policy areas included in the table are fairly self-
evident, with the possible exception of “morality policy,” a term increasingly used in the 
public policy field to refer to a set of policy issues with a fairly distinctive set of 
attributes (Mooney 2001; Mooney and Schuldt 2008). For a roll-call vote to be classified 
as pertaining to morality policy, it needed to be directly and explicitly linked to societal 
conflict over “first principles” – deeply-held values over which no societal agreement 
exists (Mooney 2001). The two issues that constituted the majority of morality policy 
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roll-call votes concerned abortion and gay marriage, though a smaller number also 
concerned stem cell research and the role of religion in education.50 
Table 5.3: Party-Line Votes, Geographical Votes, and Policy Content 
 
                                                 
50 Capital punishment is sometimes considered a morality policy issue and sometimes not 
(Mooney and Lee 1999). However, because of its association with racial cleavages in 
American society, I have chosen to classify it as an example of criminal justice policy. 
Similarly, gambling policy is sometimes classified as a morality policy, but an admittedly 
cursory examination of state legislative debates over gambling policy suggests that such 




















Budget/fiscal 8 4 4 0 13 29 
Morality 0 10 2 5 10 27 
Criminal justice 0 7 2 0 8 17 
Transportation 2 2 2 4 6 16 
Education 0 6 2 0 7 15 
Elections/voting 6 4 0 0 5 15 
Gun control 0 4 0 9 1 14 
Environment/energy 0 3 6 0 4 13 
Health care 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Gambling Regulation 0 6 1 1 2 10 
Government operations 1 1 0 3 5 10 
Immigration 0 5 0 1 3 9 
Tobacco control 0 2 1 1 3 7 
Social welfare 0 3 0 0 2 5 
Labor/employment 0 1 1 0 2 4 
Lawsuit reform 1 0 0 0 2 3 
Other 1 5 5 2 16 29 
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 Scanning the table, we find intriguing differences across the policy areas in the 
ratio of the number of strict party-line votes they produce to the number of geographical 
votes they produce. The two areas that are most likely to produce strict party-line votes 
are budget/fiscal policy and elections/voting policy. Interestingly, in both of these policy 
areas, the overall percentage of strict party-line votes is not overwhelming and a 
significant number of geographical votes are also recorded. Indeed, it is somewhat 
surprising that a policy area with partisan consequences as large as elections/voting 
policy produces as many intra-party geographical votes as it does.  
 In contrast to budget/fiscal policy and elections/voting policy, there are a set of 
policy areas that produce no strict party-line votes and in which geographical votes are 
substantially more common. The two most prominent of these areas are morality policy 
and gun control, which produce a larger total number of geographical votes than the other 
categories. The breakdown for gun control votes is particularly impressive: of the 
fourteen gun control votes in the dataset, nine produce statistically-significant intra-party 
geographical alignments for both party caucuses and an additional four produce such 
alignments only among Democrats. The results for morality policy votes are only slightly 
less striking: of the 27 morality policy votes, seventeen are geographical votes of some 
kind.  
Additionally, many other policy areas account for a smaller number of roll-call 
votes than morality policy or gun control policy, but nonetheless appear to evoke roll-call 
votes that are frequently geographical.  These include education, health care, 
168 
 
transportation, environment/energy, gambling regulation, immigration, and tobacco 
control. However, a close examination of these votes reveals a fairly surprising finding – 
most of these votes have little to do with conflicts over the regional distribution of 
resources. For example, geographical votes over education policy often concern topics 
such as school bullying or truancy, as opposed to issues with significant fiscal impacts. 
Similarly, geographical votes over health care policy primarily concern the regulation of 
pharmaceutical products or health-related activities, not the state Medicaid budget or 
similar topics. Geographical votes over transportation policy and gambling policy, on the 
other hand, are plainly related to geographically-based economic competition. But these 
votes are fairly uncommon in comparison with the number of geographical votes over 
morality policy and gun control.  
 The next question is, what kind of geographical alignments are each of the policy 
areas most likely to produce? Table 5.4 (p. 170) cross-tabulates the geographical 
alignment patterns of each of the geographical roll-call votes against their policy content. 
The table provides mixed results for the hypotheses that were laid out at the beginning of 
the chapter. The general assumption that there would be a clear link between the policy 
content of roll-call votes and the kind of alignment patterns they produce is not perfectly 
borne out. To be sure, there are some clear trends that emerge. For example, criminal 
justice policy and social welfare policy are two of the most frequent policy areas that 
evoke a racial alignment, and morality policy and environmental policy are the topics of 
several roll-call votes producing a post-industrial alignment, much as was predicted. Still, 
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a glance at the columns for the core-periphery and urban-rural alignments suggests that 
they are associated with many policy areas
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  1       1   1  2 3 
Morality 6 2    5 2 2  1  1 3 
Criminal Justice 2      1 1  2  2 1 
Transportation 1 1 1   1 4      3 1 
Education 2           3   1 2 
Environment/ 
Energy 
1 4       1      1 1 
Elections/Voting 1          1   2   
Gun Control 12 4         1    5 
Health care 3 2      1       1       1 
Gambling          1      6 3 
Government 
Operations 
1 2     1       3   
Immigration 4   1 1     1        
Tobacco Control 2     1  1       1 1 
Lawsuit reform                       
Social Welfare            2   1   
Labor/ 
Employment 
   1 1            1 
Other 2  1   1 7   1   2   
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The results for the core-periphery alignment pattern are particularly confounding. 
I originally hypothesized that the core-periphery alignment pattern would manifest itself 
on issues concerning regional economic conflict, but the table shows that, of the many 
policy areas that produce a core-periphery alignment, the most common one by far is gun 
control.  Indeed, it is quite striking that the only alignment pattern within Democratic 
caucuses caused by gun control votes is the core-periphery alignment pattern. This is in 
contrast to my hypothesis that roll-call votes over gun control issues would produce 
urban-rural alignment patterns, not a core-periphery alignment patterns.  It appears that, 
contrary to much reporting in the news media, gun control is not best described as an 
issue that provokes conflict between urban and rural areas (at least not at the elite level). 
Instead, it is better described as an issue that provokes conflict between large 
metropolitan areas and all other areas. This is indeed a subtle distinction, but it is an 
important one nonetheless.  
 Many of the surprising results described above call for greater consideration and 
explanation. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine a few of the questions raised by 
these results. First, I examine why such a large disparity exists across the three chambers 
in the prevalence of votes exhibiting racial and post-industrial alignment patterns. Then, I 
consider why so few of the geographical votes in the datasets concern regional economic 
conflict, as I suspected would be the case.  
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WHY DOES THE RACIAL ALIGNMENT PATTERN ONLY EMERGE IN THE ILLINOIS 
HOUSE? 
 The question of why twelve votes exhibiting the racial alignment pattern can be 
found in the Illinois House, while none are found in the other two chambers, is indeed 
intriguing. All three states in which these chambers are located are very racially diverse, 
with large African-American populations in particular. While Illinois does have a much 
larger Hispanic population than either Pennsylvania or Virginia, none of the roll-call 
votes in the Illinois House exhibit an alignment in which legislators from urban Hispanic 
districts vote differently from legislators from all other categories. Thus, state 
demographics cannot serve as a good explanation for why the racial alignment pattern is 
only found in one of the three chambers.  
 I offer two possible reasons for why the racial alignment pattern is much more 
prevalent in the Illinois House than in the Pennsylvania or Virginia Houses, though there 
are likely to be others. First, similar policy issues seem to provoke a starker racial divide 
within the Democratic caucus of the Illinois House than within the Democratic caucuses 
of the other two chambers. A fairly good example of this phenomenon can be seen in 
Figure 5.6 (next page). It shows voting alignments within the Democratic caucuses of the 
Illinois House and Pennsylvania House on  two social welfare policy questions with clear 
racial overtones.51 In the Illinois House, the roll-call vote in question concerns a proposal 
to begin the process of creating a photo ID for beneficiaries of Illinois’ Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP ). In the Pennsylvania House, the roll-call vote in 
                                                 
51 Recall that I hypothesized that conflict over social welfare policy would provoke the 
racial cleavage the early sections of this chapter.   
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question was a fairly comprehensive welfare reform bill, which included (among other 
things) the implementation of a new income eligibility tracking system and random drug 
tests for beneficiaries who had previously been convicted of drug-related offenses. Thus, 
the long-term goal of both of these bills was to cut costs to state welfare programs by 
removing certain people from welfare rolls. 
Figure 5.6: Outcomes among Democrats for Votes on Social Welfare Policy in the 
Illinois and Pennsylvania Houses, 2011 
 
 
 In comparing the two plots in Figure 5.6, we find that the Illinois vote more 
closely approximates the racial alignment pattern than the Pennsylvania vote. While 
legislators from urban black districts in both chambers are overwhelmingly opposed to 
the respective bills, support among many of the other categories is higher in the Illinois 
House than it is in the Pennsylvania House. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
correlation analysis detected the vote in the Illinois House, but not in the Pennsylvania 
House,  as most closely associated with a  racial alignment pattern. It bears reiterating 
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that the Pennsylvania House is more polarized than the Illinois House, so Democrats tend 
to be more united on controversial issues like changes to public assistance benefits, 
thereby diminishing the likelihood that intra-party geographical alignments will emerge. 
To be sure, this is a fairly technical explanation that provokes a more difficult question – 
given that they pertain to a similar policy issue, why did these two roll-call votes not 
produce near-identical alignments among Democrats in the two chambers? Answering 
this question would require an in-depth examination of the politics of social welfare 
policy in Illinois and Pennsylvania, something that is beyond the scope of this chapter.52  
 Thus, part of the explanation for differences in the frequency of votes exhibiting 
the racial alignment pattern across the three chambers is that similar policy issues evoke 
stronger geographical alignment patterns in the Illinois House than in the other two 
chambers. A second possible reason for why such votes have been more frequent in the 
Illinois House is that, in the time period at hand, the sorts of policy proposals most likely 
to evoke the racial alignment pattern within Democratic caucuses (e.g., proposals to 
shrink public assistance benefits) appear to have been much more common in Illinois 
than in the other two states. This may initially seem surprising, given the fact that Illinois 
state government has been consistently controlled by Democrats throughout the time 
period at hand while divided government has been the norm in Pennsylvania and 
                                                 
52 An important caveat to this interpretation is that, while these two bills are in the same 
general policy area, they are not identical. In particular, the Pennsylvania bill is a more 
far-reaching bill than the Illinois bill. Thus, an alternative explanation for why support for 
the Illinois bill is higher among Democrats representing most geographical categories is 




Virginia. However, it makes more sense when one considers the budget challenges facing 
each of these states. While nearly all American states (including Pennsylvania and 
Virginia) have faced large budget deficits since the 2008 financial downturn, the 
problems in most states have paled in comparison to those of Illinois. With annual unpaid 
bills regularly exceeding $8 billion and a $100 billion pension liability, Illinois has been 
considered to be “in a a league of its own” in terms of its fiscal problems, according to a 
report by J.P. Morgan (Barro 2011).  
 Illinois’ massive fiscal crisis has forced its leaders to push through policies that 
would have once been unthinkable for Democrats to pursue, including substantial cuts to 
education and health care. These cuts have drawn strong opposition from legislators from 
urban black districts, and have consequently prompted a number of roll-call votes 
exhibiting strong racial alignments inside the Illinois House’s Democratic Caucus. The 
most significant of these votes was a comprehensive bill in 2012 designed to slash $1.6 
billion from the state’s annual Medicaid expenses. The bill included many cuts to basic 
health services for the poor, including prescription drug payments, dental care, vision 
care, and medical equipment repair. Legislators from urban black districts passionately 
argued against the bill, contending that the state had options for eliminating its debt aside 
from cutting health services for the poor. “There’s lots of things, ladies and gentlemen, 
we can do rather than putting senior citizens and disabled people out on the street without 
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having access to their health care,” said one Democrat from an urban black district in 
Chicago’s South Side during the floor debate on the bill.53 
Figure 5.7 (next page) displays the roll-call voting results for the Illinois Medicaid 
Bill by geographical category within the Democratic caucus of the Illinois House. This 
vote more closely approximates an ideal-typical racial alignment pattern than nearly any 
other vote in the dataset for all three states. As can be seen, legislators from district 
categories that often align with legislators from urban black districts (e.g., urban ethnic 
matrix districts, yuppie districts) parted company with legislators from urban black 
districts on this particular vote and supported the large cuts to Medicaid. These results 
show how, in times of fiscal scarcity, the only legislators who are likely to vote against 
substantial cuts to social services are those who believe such cuts will yield 
disproportionately negative consequences for their geographical constituencies. The 









                                                 
53 This quote originally appeared in Dunn 2012.  
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WHY DOES THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ALIGNMENT PATTERN DISPROPORTIONATELY 
EMERGE IN THE VIRGINIA HOUSE? 
 
 As shown earlier in this chapter, the post-industrial alignment pattern appears to 
make fairly regular appearances in the roll-call votes of the Virginia House, but not in 
those of the Illinois and Pennsylvania Houses. This disparity has everything to do with 
how the increasingly-dominant metropolitan region in Virginia --  the southern section of 
the Washington, D.C. area that is known locally as “NoVa” (northern Virginia)  – differs 
from the dominant metropolitan regions of Illinois and Pennsylvania. Unlike Chicago, 
Philadelphia, or Pittsburgh, NoVa is a region that is overwhelmingly defined by post-
industrialism. Anchored by employment in the federal government and numerous high-
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tech start-up firms, and with a workforce exhibiting exceptionally high educational 
attainment levels, NoVa is an area in which the information economy is dominant. 
Indeed, a recent study concludes that the Washington, D.C. area has by far the highest 
ratio of economic services produced to economic goods produced in the country (Florida 
2013). Thus, a very reasonable case can be made that NoVa is a part of America’s most 
post-industrial metropolitan area.  
 NoVa’s strongly post-industrial nature is reflected in the fact that yuppie districts 
constitute a larger percentage of districts in the Virginia House than they do in the Illinois 
and Pennsylvania Houses. Additionally, it appears that the divide on morality policy in 
the Virginia House is more likely to take on a post-industrial dimension than it is 
elsewhere. This is because, in the Virginia House, Democratic legislators from urban 
black districts tend to be quite conservative on morality policy, thereby causing them to 
side with their co-partisans from middle-class suburban and small city and country 
districts over their co-partisans from yuppie and upscale suburban districts on such 
issues.  
 A good example of this is the 2006 vote in the Virginia House of Delegate to 
amend the Virginia Constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman. 
Figure 5.8 (next page) shows the alignments of Democratic legislators from different 
geographical categories on this issue. These results demonstrate fairly clearly the way in 
which the post-industrial alignment pattern often emerges in Virginia. Stated simply, 
Democratic legislators from the yuppie districts and upscale suburban districts of NoVa 
are more ideologically isolated than are legislators from the same categories in other 
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states; as a result, the post-industrial alignment is more pronounced in Virginia than it is 
in other places. 
Figure 5.8 : Proposal to Amend Virginia Constitution to Define Marriage as 















REGIONAL ECONOMIC CONFLICT: WHERE IS IT IN THE ROLL-CALL DATA? 
 As discussed earlier, one of the more surprising results of this chapter is that, 
contra my hypotheses, regional economic conflict is not a common cause of roll-call 
votes exhibiting statistically significant intra-party geographical alignments. While a 
sizeable number of geographical roll-call votes are in policy areas that account for a large 
share of state budgets (i.e., health care and education), these particular votes tend to 
concern topics that have few fiscal or economic ramifications. And while the 
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geographical votes over transportation and gambling policy in the sample are clearly 
related to regional economic conflicts, these votes are not particularly common when 
compared to the much larger number of geographical votes concerning abortion, gay 
marriage, school prayer, gun control, and other such hot-button issues. The fact that 
conflicts over the regional distribution of resources account for only a small share of roll-
call votes in the sample is not easily reconciled with extant scholarship that has 
emphasized the primacy of regional economic competition in American state politics. 
How are we to explain the relative absence of roll-call votes that reflect this competition? 
 While it is not clear why this disparity exists, one likely reason is that there 
simply aren’t that many roll-call votes over regional economic issues in contemporary 
state legislatures. Unlike roll-call votes over abortion or gay marriage, comprehensive 
funding packages for transportation or education are usually voted upon only a handful of 
times in a single state legislative session. Moreover, when regional conflicts over 
education or transportation funding occur, deals are frequently hashed out in the 
backrooms of statehouses long before any roll-call vote is cast. By the time such bills are 
called for a vote by the entire legislative body, the vast majority of legislators have 
already agreed to get behind them. This stands in stark contrast to votes on an issue such 
as abortion, which many legislators are more than happy to vote upon frequently as a way 
of burnishing their in-district reputations as supporters of freedom of choice or protecting 
life (depending on the kind of district they come from).  
 If the explanation described above is true, then regional economic conflicts are 
alive and well inside the American states, but roll-call votes are the wrong places to look 
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for them. Examining such conflicts appropriately would likely entail engaging in a far 
more qualitative study in which interviews are utilized to learn about the process by 
which regional differences over funding issues get resolved behind closed doors. Such an 
inquiry would be very worthwhile, but it is also well beyond the scope of this project.  
 CONCLUSION 
The first and foremost goal of Chapter Five has been to shed light on a key 
finding of Chapter Four, viz that the within-party ideological order of legislators from 
different geographical categories is remarkably similar across legislative chambers 
(particularly among Democratic caucuses). Through examining roll-call alignments on 
individual votes and linking them to geographical cleavages over substantive policy 
disputes, Chapter Five has sought to show in considerable detail what lies behind the 
sequences exhibited in Chapter Four. Here, I evaluate the extent to which Chapter Five 
has been successful in that regard.  
 First, the results of Chapter Five strongly suggest that the fact that Democratic 
legislators from rural or suburban categories consistently register more conservative 
mean ideal-point values than Democratic legislators from rural categories is not primarily 
related to disagreement over the bread-and-butter issues of state government. In 
particular, the chapter’s results show that budget and tax policy issues tend to produce 
party-line votes rather than strong intra-party geographical alignments, and that regional 
disputes over the distribution of state budgets account for only a small percentage of 
geographical votes. Rather than being related to basic budgetary matters, roll-call votes 
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exhibiting a statistically significant urban-rural or core-periphery alignment are 
disproportionately concerned with hot-button issues such morality policy or gun control. 
It appears that these are the sorts of issues at the heart of the clearest split within most 
Democratic caucuses that was found in Chapter Four, that between legislators from the 
four urban categories and legislators from suburban or rural categories. 
 This observation is not sufficient for the purposes of explaining the patterns found 
in Figures 4.2 and 4.4, however. In addition to revealing the foregoing split, those figures 
show substantial differences among the urban categories as well. Specifically, they show 
that Democratic legislators from urban black districts and yuppie districts tend to be more 
liberal than Democratic legislators from urban Hispanic districts and urban ethnic matrix 
districts. The results of Chapter Five provide some indications of the policy issues that 
might be responsible for these differences. In particular, they show that roll-call votes 
that split legislators from urban black districts from most others are often related to social 
welfare policy and criminal justice policy, while roll-call votes that split yuppie 
legislators from most others are often related to environmental policy or morality policy. 
In sum, the translation of the geographical cleavages outlined at the beginning of Chapter 
Five into the legislative arena appears to have some influence on the ideological positions 
of legislators from different district categories that were described in Chapter Four.  
 These conclusions need to be accompanied by several caveats. To begin with, it is 
crucial to bear in mind that the roll-call votes upon which the analyses of Chapter Five 
were based are not the same as the ones upon which the analyses of Chapter Four were 
based. Whereas Chapter Four analyses relied upon datasets incorporating all roll-call 
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votes from 1999-2000 and 2011-2012 within the 17 legislative chambers, Chapter Five 
relied upon a much smaller number of politically-consequential roll-call votes from 
between 2006 and 2012, and for only three chambers. Given various constraints (most 
importantly, the fact that I am only one researcher and cannot possibly examine the 
policy content of the nearly 23,000 roll-call votes that were part of the analyses of 
Chapter Four), this was a necessary switch. It does, however, raise questions about 
whether highly distilled sets of roll-call votes such as were analyzed in Chapter Five can 
be legitimately used for the purpose of drawing conclusions about the full quantity of 
such votes, such as were analyzed in Chapter Four.  It is possible, for example, that a 
policy-based analysis of voting alignments for the entire corpus of roll-call votes in the 
three chambers under examination in Chapter Five would reveal a much larger number of 
alignment patterns based upon a different set of policy issues. It is also possible that 
examining many of the fourteen additional chambers included in the dissertation would 
reveal more complex alignment patterns or different relationships between policy content 
and roll-call outcomes. It is furthermore necessary to keep in mind that, unlike the rest of 
the dissertation, the results of Chapter Five are based on data for a single (albeit rather 
long) time period. We do not know, therefore, how the changes in the geographical bases 
of state legislative parties that are the focus of much of the rest of the dissertation may 
have affected the tendency for different intra-party alignment patterns to emerge or even 
the basic relationships between policy content and roll-call alignments.  
 These are all important qualifications, and the extent to which the results of 
Chapter Five can be linked to those of Chapter Four is certainly curtailed because of 
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them. Still, the sorts of roll-call alignments found in Chapter Five resemble the overall 
patterns in roll-call ideology described in Chapter Four fairly closely. For example, the 
percentage of geographical roll-call votes in all three chambers exhibiting alignments in 
which Democratic legislators from small city and country and deep rural districts are 
arrayed against Democratic legislators from the urban district categories is quite high. 
Thus, it appears that the data used in Chapter Five point to the same basic legislative 
realities as those used in Chapter Four. Though we certainly cannot say that the 
alignment patterns in Chapter Five explain all of the intra-party variation in roll-call 
ideology found in Chapter Four, we can say with a reasonable degree of certainty that it 
explains a good deal of it.  
 The results of Chapter Five also suggest that, while the links between policy areas 
and alignment patterns that I specified at its beginning are real, the ways in which these 
links are expressed in contemporary state legislative politics are considerably more 
complex than the hypotheses suggest. A more complete account of the process by which 
policy areas evoke geographical cleavages which are then translated into the legislative 
arena would need to incorporate several additional factors I did not initially consider.  
 The first of these factors is the on-the-ground reality operating within individual 
states. As we have seen, particular circumstances in individual states are a key reason 
behind why certain alignment patterns emerge within some states and not others. For 
example, Illinois’ enormous fiscal problems have been a central cause of the large 
number of votes exhibiting a racial alignment pattern in the Democratic caucus of the 
Illinois House, and the growing dominance of NoVa in Virginia politics is crucial to 
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understanding the large number of votes exhibiting a post-industrial alignment in the 
Virginia House. Circumstances such as these are often highly contextual and cannot be 
easily modeled. They are nonetheless essential if we are to get a clear picture of the way 
geographical cleavages manifest themselves in contemporary state politics. 
 Second, comprehensively understanding the link between policy areas and 
geographical conflict in state legislatures almost certainly entails going beyond 
quantitative studies of roll-call voting outcomes. Regional conflict over complicated 
policy areas such as education, health care, or transportation funding cannot be 
appropriately studied by exclusively examining the final votes that are cast in these areas. 
In order to understand the true nature of geographical conflict over these policies, it is 
necessary to peek into how the proverbial sausage is made rather than simply observing 
the final product. 
 Third, the results of the chapter suggest that the difference between the core-
periphery cleavage and the urban-rural cleavage is scant at best. Contrary to my 
hypotheses, alignment patterns associated with these two cleavages emerged with respect 
to similar policy areas. In particular, both alignment patterns emerged among many roll-
call votes concerning morality policy. On the other hand, gun control votes almost 
exclusively produced the core-periphery alignment pattern, suggesting that there may be 
something distinctive about these two patterns after all. On the whole, however, the 
results suggest that it may be best to consider the core-periphery and urban-rural 
cleavages as one and the same. Given that they together account for the vast majority of 
roll-call votes exhibiting statistically significant intra-party geographical alignments, 
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disentangling the difference between them (if any exists) is an important topic for future 
research.  
 Lastly, the findings clearly show that, while morality policy produces a very high 
number of geographical roll-call votes, the particular alignment patterns produced by 
morality policy votes are fairly multifarious. Urban-rural, core-periphery, and post-
industrial alignments are all manifested fairly frequently in votes pertaining to morality 
policy. A fuller account of the relationship between policy areas and roll-call alignments 
would need to specify the conditions under which morality policy results in each of these 




Chapter Six: The Geographical Sorting of State Legislative Party Bases: 
Causes, Consequences, and Implications 
 
 This dissertation has been motivated by two overarching goals: first, to develop a 
new approach to modeling the geographical constituency; second, to use that approach as 
a framework for understanding the evolution of state legislative politics over the past two 
decades. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the study’s core findings and then 
proceed to examine several larger issues that emerge from a sweeping view of the study 
as a whole. First, I consider the significance of the dissertation’s findings for political 
scientists’ understanding of the relationship between legislators and their geographical 
constituencies. Second, I emphasize the  profound importance of partisan change in two 
of the nine district categories – small city and country and deep rural districts – for the 
developments recounted in this dissertation, and suggest that the study’s results 
underscore the need for political scientists to pay far greater attention to politics in 
America’s “peripheral” (i.e., non-metropolitan) areas. Lastly, I examine the study’s 
results within the context of an ominous trend that has garnered considerable attention in 
recent years – the growing divergence in policymaking between Democrat-controlled and 
Republican-controlled states.  
CORE FINDINGS 
 In a manner that is perhaps unusual for most studies of political science, the first 
empirical chapter of this dissertation (Chapter Two) also served as an effort to exposit a 
framework to guide the rest of the project. Through a Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) of a 
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large amount of district-level demographic and geographical data, I unearthed nine latent 
categories of geographical constituencies represented by state legislators in the seventeen 
legislative chambers included in my study – urban black, urban Hispanic, urban ethnic 
matrix, yuppie, middle-class suburban, outer suburban, upscale suburban, small city and 
country, and deep rural. My analyses revealed that the nine-category solution fits the data 
very strongly and that each of the categories is fairly distinct in terms of the relevant 
demographic interactions that exist within it. 
 In Chapter Three of the dissertation, I examined changes in partisan 
representation among the nine district categories, with a focus on two distinct causes: 
demographic changes that alter the relative prevalence of the district categories inside 
state legislative chambers, and electoral changes that affect the tendency of district 
categories to be represented by Democrats and Republicans. My findings showed that 
demographic changes between 1990 and 2000 had the effect of substantially increasing 
the number of urban Hispanic, urban ethnic matrix, and upscale suburban districts among 
the chambers in my study, largely to the benefit of Democrats. But these changes paled in 
comparison to electoral developments, the most notable of which were strong increases in 
Republican representation among small city and country and deep rural districts. 
Republican ascendance in these two categories was particularly marked in the Rust Belt 
and Southern regions, areas where Republicans appear to have established fairly durable 
state legislative majorities. Thus, over the relatively short period of time in focus in this 
dissertation, political developments have outweighed demographic changes as influences 
on outcomes related to partisan representation and control in state legislatures. 
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 Chapter Four deployed sophisticated ideal-point estimation procedures to examine 
how party and geographical constituency (expressed as the district categories) interact to 
affect the distribution of roll-call ideology in state legislative chambers. I found that, 
within party caucuses (especially Democratic Party caucuses), the order of legislators 
from each of the district categories in ideological space is highly consistent across 
legislative chambers. Across nearly all of the chambers in my sample, legislators from 
urban black or yuppie districts consistently held the most liberal positions and legislators 
from small city and country or deep rural districts consistently held the most conservative 
positions. In comparing my ideal-point results from 1999-2000 and 2011-2012, I found 
substantial evidence that most state legislative chambers had become more polarized and  
pointed to the large numerical decline of Democratic legislators from small city and 
country and deep rural districts between these two time periods as an important cause of 
increased polarization. 
 In Chapter Five, I sought to provide a fuller understanding of the ideological 
patterns uncovered in Chapter Four by investigating their policy-based origins. More 
specifically, I proposed and tested a series of hypotheses concerning the ways in which 
policy conflicts evoke particular geographical cleavages, which are then expressed as 
roll-call alignment patterns in state legislative chambers. Key findings of this chapter 
were that the core-periphery and urban-rural alignment patterns were especially common 
in state legislatures, and that cultural issues pertaining to morality policy and gun control 
were some of the most common topics of roll-call votes exhibiting statistically-significant 
intra-party geographical alignments. I also found less significant evidence that other types 
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of roll-call alignment patterns (in particular, racial and post-industrial alignment patterns) 
are present in certain legislative chambers and tend to emerge when particular policy 
issues are being voted upon.  
MODELING THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCY: CONTRIBUTIONS AND LESSONS FOR 
THE FUTURE  
 
 A key innovation of this dissertation has been its new approach to understanding 
and analyzing the geographical constituency. In the introductory chapter of the 
dissertation, I explained why such an approach is necessary and suggested that scholars 
should read my dissertation and then decide for themselves how valuable my efforts to 
develop it have been. Here, I make the final case for my efforts in this area, arguing that 
they represent an important step forward in the study of the constituency-legislator 
relationship and that they have yielded valuable new insights about state legislative 
politics. At the same time, I do not shy away from acknowledging problems with my 
model and research design and discuss possible ways in which future research projects 
might build upon the work I have done.  
 From a purely theoretical standpoint, the most important contribution of my study 
has been to exposit a way to model the geographical constituency that comes closer to 
approximating the reality of legislator perceptions. Because it incorporates a wide variety 
of demographic variables as well as some explicitly geographical ones, the LPA results in 
a categorization scheme that is reflective of legislative districts’ socioeconomic milieus 
as well as their broader geographical locations. In this way, it marks an important step 
forward in the efforts of political scientists to more accurately represent how legislators 
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understand their geographical constituencies. While a significant gap surely remains 
between the LPA-based categorization scheme and the true nature of legislator 
perceptions, this gap is not quite as large as it once was.   
 All this would be for naught, however, if this new approach could not yield 
important and interesting insights about how the geographical constituency affects the 
conduct and course of state legislative politics (and, more broadly, of legislative politics 
in general).  Thankfully, the analyses of this dissertation resulted in a large set of new or 
underappreciated findings in this regard. For example, few scholars have explicitly 
examined the question of how the interaction between demographic change and electoral 
change has affected the geographical bases of legislative parties, a research goal that the 
approach that was developed for this dissertation helped to facilitate. Additionally, no 
study has (to this author’s knowledge) uncovered a systematic way of explaining 
variations in legislator roll-call ideology on the basis of constituency characteristics, 
something that the district categories were essential in revealing. Finally, whereas most 
studies of constituency influences have focused exclusively upon the extent to which 
social cleavages are expressed in legislative party bases, the approach that was developed 
in this dissertation enabled a detailed exploration of how different policy issues result in 
different geographically-based alignments among legislators from the same party. Each 
of these contributions was largely made possible by the approach to modeling the 
geographical constituency that is the basis of this dissertation.  
 Despite its virtues, the LPA-based research design at the heart of this dissertation 
is not perfect. Some of the problems with it owe primarily to issues of data availability 
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and reliability (discussed extensively in Chapter Two) that proved too cumbersome to 
rectify for this dissertation, but that should nonetheless be improved upon in similar 
future studies, should they occur. For example, the inability to include more state 
legislative chambers from the New England, Intermountain West, and Southern regions 
of the country does to some degree limit the generalizability of this study’s results. 
Moreover, while I did make very substantial efforts to incorporate a wide array of 
demographic and geographical data into the LPA analysis (including using fairly 
intensive procedures to ensure comparability between 1990 and 2000 Census data), there 
is probably more than could be done in this area so as to add district-level variables 
related to economic sectors and religious adherence that were conspicuously absent from 
it.54  
 Perhaps more problematic than the absence of observations from additional 
chambers or more demographic variables within the LPA analysis is an inadequate 
amount of attention to the ways in which the contextual and geographical realities inside 
districts (those qualities that were modeled by the LPA) interact with other district 
characteristics that might affect legislative representation. For examples, district 
characteristics such as constituency size (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Mooney 1995; Bowen 
2010), compactness (Pildes and Niemi 1993; Bowen 2010), and heterogeneity (Gerber 
and Lewis 2004) have been shown to impact legislative behavior in various ways. A truly 
                                                 
54 One possibility that comes to mind is that emerging statistical procedures (most 
importantly, multi-level regression and post-stratification [MRP]) could be used to 
develop estimates of the religious compositions of state legislative districts (because the 




comprehensive consideration of the geographical constituency would need to consider 
how legislators’ understandings of their districts are mediated by these additional factors. 
Time and space considerations prevented me from examining these issues more fully, but 
in the future, I hope to be able to incorporate them into this research agenda.  
THE NEGLECTED POLITICS OF “PERIPHERAL AMERICA”  
 
 A key finding of this dissertation, emphasized and re-emphasized at various 
points throughout the previous chapters, is that the single most consequential change 
affecting state legislative politics over the past twenty years has been the electoral 
realignment of small city and country districts and deep rural districts. While many other 
changes have affected a subset of state legislative chambers in the sample, the dramatic 
shift in partisan representation among these two district categories is a near-universal 
trend, likewise evident in the Mid-Atlantic and West Coast States as in the Central, 
Southern, and Rust Belt States in the sample.  
 The significance of the changes wrought by the gradual disappearance of 
Democratic legislators from small city and country and deep rural districts cannot be 
overstated. To begin with, it is this trend that, more than any other, has allowed 
Republicans to come to power in numerous state legislatures across the country. Lest any 
doubt about this proposition remain in the minds of readers, the results in Table 6.1 (next 
page) should dispel them. In it, the seventeen legislative chambers are ordered according 
to the percentage of small city and country and deep rural districts within them in the 
2003-2012 period, with the right-hand column indicating partisan control of the chambers 
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in 2011-2012. As can be seen, there is a crystal-clear relationship between the prevalence 
of these two district categories within a state legislative chamber and whether that 
chamber was controlled by Democrats or Republicans at the end of the time period 
covered by this study. It appears that, once small city and country and deep rural districts 
constitute more than one-quarter of districts within a chamber, it becomes far more likely 
to be controlled by Republicans (at least in contemporary times). 55  
Table 6.1:  The Prevalence of Small City and Country/Deep Rural Districts and 
Partisan Control in State Legislative Chambers, 2011-2012  
 
 Percentage of Districts in 
Chamber that are Small 
City and Country or Deep 
Rural Districts, 2003-2012 
Party in Control of 
Chamber in 2011-2012 
Iowa House 55% Republican 
Alabama House 50% Republican 
Missouri House 42% Republican 
Wisconsin Assembly 42% Republican 
Indiana House 39% Republican 
Oregon House 39% Split Control 
Minnesota House 36% Republican 
Michigan House 32% Republican 
Ohio House 29% Republican 
Pennsylvania House 29% Republican 
Virginia House 27% Republican 
Washington House 22% Democratic 
Illinois House 19% Democratic 
New York Assembly 16% Democratic 
Nevada Assembly 12% Democratic 
California Assembly 5% Democratic 
New Jersey Assembly 0% Democratic 
  
                                                 
55 Of the chambers controlled by Republicans in 2011, the Minnesota House was the only 
chamber that switched to Democratic control in 2013 (after the 2012 elections).  
Additionally, the Oregon House (with a 30-30 tie in 2011-2012) was taken over by 
Democrats as well. All of the other chambers continue to be controlled by Republicans.  
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The effects of the electoral decline of Democrats from small city and country and 
deep rural districts have not been limited to changes in partisan control, however. As 
Chapter Four clearly demonstrated, the trend has also been responsible for large changes 
in ideological patterns inside state legislatures. In particular, gradual disappearance of 
Democratic legislators from small city and country and deep rural districts over the 
course of the 1990s and 2000s caused Democratic caucuses to lose their most 
conservative voices and consequently to become more ideologically homogeneous. But, 
as the colorful figures in Chapter Four reveal, while Democratic legislators from small 
city and country districts and deep rural districts have on average been more conservative 
than other Democrats, they have also been far less conservative than Republican 
legislators. While data limitations prevented me from directly testing the hypothesis that 
the Republicans who replaced Democrats as representatives of many small city and 
country and deep rural districts were far more conservative than their predecessors, 
circumstantial evidence strongly suggests this to be the case. Thus, a strong argument can 
be made that the fading away of Democratic legislators from small city and country and 
deep rural districts has substantially contributed to the polarization of state legislative 
parties.  
Given its central role in altering the course of state legislative politics over the 
past twenty years, interpreting the phenomenon of partisan change among small city and 
country and deep rural districts is a matter of some importance. There are a variety of 
analytical perspectives through which this political development might be considered. 
For example, one can juxtapose it with the geographical scheme adopted by Richard 
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Bensel (1984, 1990, 2010) in his studies of American political-economic history. In 
Bensel’s studies, focused largely on the late 19
th
 century but extending all the way until 
the 1980s, Republicans are the party associated with the country’s economically dynamic 
metropolitan zones and Democrats are the party associated with its agrarian hinterlands.  
When considered from this vantage point, the results of this study appear to show that the 
country’s political geography has been flipped on its head. Today, it is Democrats who 
overwhelmingly represent the metropolis and Republicans who overwhelmingly 
represent the hinterlands in statehouses across every region of the country. 
One can also consider partisan change in small city and country and deep rural 
districts by reference to a longstanding interpretation of contemporary American politics, 
fostered primarily by journalists and the non-academic political cognoscenti, about the 
role of morality policy and similar cultural issues in shaping contemporary American 
party conflict. Political commentators have for many years made assumptions about the 
influence of “sexy” issues such as abortion, gay marriage, or gun control on the political 
orientations of rural Americans. These  assumptions appear to be shared by national 
Democratic leaders like Howard Dean, who famously bemoaned the success of 
Republicans in turning American politics into a struggle over “guns, God, and gays,” and 
even by President Obama, who earned much unfavorable media attention when he 
observed in 2008 that small-town Pennsylvanians are “bitter” and consequently “cling to 
guns or religion”  They have also been trumpeted by national Republican leaders like 
Rick Santorum, who, in reference to Obama’s earlier comments, proudly shouted 
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“You’re damn right, we [cling]!” to a raucous crowd of rural Pennsylvanians at a 
campaign rally in 2012.  
The results of this study suggest that national politicians like Dean, Obama, and 
Santorum may not be the only ones who believe that rural and small-town Americans are 
disproportionately focused upon such issues. As we learned in Chapter Five, the 
remaining Democrats who represent small city and country and deep rural districts in 
state legislatures are more than happy to part company with their co-partisans from large 
metropolitan areas when roll-call votes over gun control, gay marriage, or school prayer 
are on the docket. Given the difficult electoral situations in which these legislators are 
likely to find themselves every two years, it is reasonable to assume they believe that 
voting against their party on these issues is crucial to their long-term political viability. 
What is striking about the two foregoing interpretations of the phenomenon at 
hand is how little contemporary political science research has had to say about any of 
them. While a number of provocative studies have effectively evaluated elements of the 
claims made by Dean and Obama – in particular, their close resemblance to the well-
known argument of historian/journalist Thomas Frank (2004) that “the white working 
class” has abandoned the Democratic Party over morality issues – these studies have 
almost exclusively done so by use of national survey data and by a focus on a small set of 
aspatial demographic variables, most notably race, income, and education.56  In other 
words, the inherently contextual nature of electoral change that this dissertation has 
                                                 
56 The most notable of these works have been an essay by Bartels (2006) and a reaction 
from Abramowitz and Teixeira (2008).  
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zeroed in on as essential to our understanding of developments in state legislative politics 
(and likely in other arenas as well) over the past twenty years has largely been ignored. 
Put another way, the key question that this dissertation suggests is critical for 
understanding contemporary American politics is not whether or how a decontextualized 
demographic category such as the “white working class” has abandoned the Democratic 
Party. Rather, it is why voters in particular places – more specifically, small cities and 
rural areas – have moved away from the Democratic Party (the question of whether these 
voters have moved away from the Democratic Party is just about settled; the results of 
Chapter Three, along with countless election returns, show fairly clearly that they have).  
To be sure, a small number of political scientists have recognized what is missing 
in large-n studies of voting behavior that decontextualize individuals, and have thus 
begun to adopt research designs that seek to understand how individuals’ political 
orientations are shaped by places, especially rural places. In a fascinating recent APSR 
article, Katherine Cramer Walsh (2012) uses ethnographic observations in rural 
communities in Wisconsin to argue that many rural Americans understand politics 
through a distinct place-based perspective that she terms “rural consciousness.” This 
perspective, she contends, views “rural deprivation as the fault of (urban) political elites” 
and has caused rural Americans to support limited government, despite the fact that “such 
a stance might seem contradictory to their economic self-interest” (518). Importantly, in 
all of the political conversations that Walsh observes, she does not recall a single 
individual mentioning the subject of abortion, which to some extent belies the widespread 
stereotype that rural Americans are obsessed with morality issues. 
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Walsh’s important contribution notwithstanding, there is still much work that 
needs to be done to better understand the political perspectives of rural Americans. For 
one thing, Walsh’s study focuses on rural communities in one state, so the 
generalizability of her findings is unclear (as she herself concedes). Moreover, one 
wonders how Walsh’s insights can be reconciled with the common view of the national 
media and the political class about the importance of morality and gun issues to rural 
Americans. While it is quite possible (perhaps even quite likely) that politicians like 
Obama, Santorum, and even state legislators are to some degree misguided in their 
understandings of rural America, the sheer ubiquity of their views suggests that they 
cannot be entirely off-base. Political scientists need to further explore how the 
perceptions of politically-induced deprivation about which Walsh writes become 
intertwined with views on cultural issues, thereby shaping the overall political 
orientations of those who live in America’s hinterlands.  
MICROGEOGRAPHICAL CLEAVAGES AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF STATE 
LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT 
Since 2010, when divided government returned to Washington, D.C., the national 
government has not produced a single major policy achievement.  Efforts to legislate 
large policy reforms in such areas as immigration, economic development, entitlement 
reform, and climate change have repeatedly failed, victims of the intense partisan 
gridlock that has become a defining feature of national politics. This seemingly perpetual 
paralysis stands in marked contrast to events taking place in statehouses across the 
country, where governors and legislatures have been implementing unusually ambitious 
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policy programs. What is particularly interesting about contemporary state policymaking, 
however, is the extent to which states controlled by Democrats and states controlled by 
Republicans have been moving in opposite directions. Over the past three years, 
Republican-controlled states have regularly slashed income tax rates, passed 
controversial abortion restrictions, adopted punitive illegal immigration measures, 
expanded school voucher programs, cut unemployment benefits, eliminated collective 
bargaining rights for public employees, and implemented strict voter identification laws, 
to name just a few important examples. For their part, Democrat-controlled states have 
(among others things) sharply raised income tax rates, created greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade regimes, legalized gay marriage, abolished capital punishment, given 
undocumented immigrants in-state higher education benefits, and passed laws making it 
easier for people to vote.  
The stark differences between the policies of Democrat-controlled and 
Republican-controlled states is a new phenomenon in state politics, where the 
relationship between party control and policy output has historically been much weaker 
than in the national political arena (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1989). Perhaps because 
it can be easily linked to the famous “red state-blue state” divide that has become a 
mainstay of presidential election interpretations, the trend has caught the attention of 
many national political commentators.57 When considered in unison, the collective 
message of these columnists is that “red-state America” and “blue-state America” are no 
                                                 
57 A few good examples include Brownstein and Bland 2011, Keller 2013, McLaughlin 




longer merely useful shorthand ways of describing the geography of national electoral 
politics. Rather, they have become valuable terms for describing the increasingly distinct 
bundles of policies that different states are enacting.  
The growing policy divergence between “red states” and “blue states” is an 
intriguing trend to consider in light of what this dissertation has had to say about state 
legislative politics. To begin with, given this dissertation’s claim that sub-state 
geographical cleavages are a driving force behind American politics at all levels, some 
may wonder why the difference in productivity between Congress and state legislatures 
exists at all? After all, if sub-state geographical cleavages are acting upon each, the net 
result in each should be the same. But though the geographical divisions that were 
examined in this study exist at the sub-state level, no state exhibits a political topography 
as complex as that of the entire country. While numerous states have claimed at various 
points to be “microcosms of the country” in terms of their social or geographical profiles, 
the reality is that, in spite of all the internal diversity described in this dissertation, every 
state is quite a bit more homogenous than the country as a whole.58  
                                                 
58 There are many additional reasons for why gridlock has become commonplace in the 
national government but not in the states. Perhaps most importantly, the unique 
institutional arrangements of the federal government (i.e., a malapportioned U.S. Senate, 
long and staggered terms for Senators, the filibuster, etc.) are not fully replicated in any 
state. Their combined effect is to make it far more difficult to garner the majorities 
necessary to pass comprehensive laws at the federal level than at the state level. It also 
seems likely that because the states, unlike the federal government, have balanced-budget 
requirements, it is much more difficult for them to kick the proverbial can down the road 
amidst difficult fiscal circumstances. Thus, state budget problems inevitably lead to 





Far from being inconsistent with the new red-blue divide in state policymaking, 
the results of this dissertation point toward a fairly important reason for why this divide 
has only emerged in recent years, over a decade after the red-blue divide in presidential 
elections first gained attention. Until recently, partisan representation in state legislatures 
did not align perfectly with the dominant geographical cleavages of national politics. 
Historical traditions of party allegiance, particularly in the South and in non-metropolitan 
areas, had managed to persist in state elections such that state-level partisan divisions did 
not neatly coincide with national ones.59 As this study has shown, such historical 
allegiances have eroded substantially over the past twelve years. In many ways, the 2010 
elections marked the end of a long period in which state party systems enjoyed 
considerable autonomy from national politics. Today, the geographical alignments that 
define the politics of most states are largely the same as those that define the politics of 
the entire country.   
While the nationalization of state party cleavages is surely not the only factor that 
has influenced the policy divergence of Republican-controlled and Democrat-controlled 
states, it is almost certainly an important part of the story. This is the case for two 
reasons, the first of which is that it has caused the geographical bases of state legislative 
parties to more closely resemble those of the congressional parties. Being in charge of 
caucuses whose members hail from constituencies that support the goals of their national 
parties has given state legislative party leaders a far greater incentive to pursue an 
                                                 
59 Gimpel (1996) provides an excellent (if quite dated) examination of what he calls 
“electoral incongruence” between state and national party systems.  
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unapologetically national agenda. After all, doing so no longer puts vulnerable members 
whose districts are increasingly voting for the other party in national elections in much 
risk.   
Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that incoming Republican state legislators 
who defeat longtime incumbents in historically-Democratic small city and country and 
deep rural districts often arrive at statehouses with distinctly national agendas. A cursory 
examination of state legislative campaigns in which such legislators were elected reveals 
a fairly regular  pattern in which the struggling Democratic incumbent engages in a futile 
attempt to distinguish between developments in Washington, D.C., and his work for the 
district in the state capital, while the Republican challenger incessantly discusses national 
issues, national political developments, and national political figures, as if he were 
running for the U.S. Congress instead of the state legislature. While the rhetoric 
employed by both candidates is obviously part of a campaign strategy, it is reasonable to 
believe that the successful, nationally-oriented campaign that the Republican challenger 
has run plays a significant role in shaping the decisions he makes, the alliances he forms, 
and the issues he promotes once he becomes a state legislator.  
These developments point to a fascinating paradox that has not yet received 
scholarly attention.  On the one hand, there is little doubt that American party politics has 
become more nationalized, as the microgeographical cleavages that define national 
politics have permeated state politics and state party systems have consequently lost the 
autonomy they once enjoyed. But on the other hand, the ever-present dysfunction in the 
federal government, coupled with the infusion of partisan ideology into state politics, has 
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redounded in a situation in which states have become the primary venues in which 
controversial national policy is made. To a significant degree, therefore, state politics in 
the second decade of the 21
st
 century is national politics.   
Whether this new trend endures remains to be seen. If history is any guide, the 
national government will eventually get its act together and enact comprehensive policies 
to address pressing national problems. But one cannot dismiss the possibility that the 
national government will remain paralyzed, that the states will continue to make national 
policy in its place, and that the policies enacted by the states will continue to diverge. 
Two things seem relatively certain, however. First, whatever happens will have its roots 
in the geographical bases of the American political parties. Second, any consequential 
changes to the geography of the American party system will take place, at least in part, at 
the microgeographical level. Thus, as we watch the future of state and national politics 
unfold, it behooves us to be mindful of what is happening inside states in addition to what 





Appendix One: A Brief Overview of Latent Profile Analysis 
 Latent profile analysis (LPA) is a model-based approach to cluster analysis, in 
which an unobserved (or latent) categorical variable is assumed to account for 
covariations among a large number of observed (or manifest) continuous variables. LPA 
is closely related to Latent Class Analysis (LCA), wherein the observed variables are 
categorical instead of continuous. Both LPA and LCA belong to a set of modeling 
techniques known as “finite mixture models” (Muthen 2001; Pastor et al. 2007; Masyn 
2013). The key feature of finite mixture models is that the distributions of one or more 
observed variables are understood to be constituted of a mixture of unobserved 
component distributions (Muthen 2001; Masyn 2013). To say that the components are 
unobserved is to signify that their “number, proportion, and form” are not known (Masyn 
2013, 552). The goal of finite mixture models, therefore, is to estimate these properties of 
the components.  
 To use the example motivating this dissertation, when a researcher considers the 
distributions of various politically-relevant demographic variables across political 
jurisdictions, he might want to bring into his analysis the knowledge that the jurisdictions 
are located in distinct types of places, and that some of these types of places tend to have 
very different distributions of the demographic variables than others. These types of 
places are unobserved or latent because the researcher does not have direct data 
concerning how many types of places there are, which types are more or less common, or 
precisely how each type of place is distinguishable from the others. Finite mixture 
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modeling (and, in this particular case, latent profile analysis) provides the researcher with 
a way of estimating each of these aspects of the various place types.  
 In psychology, a field in which finite mixture modeling is commonly employed, it 
is sometimes said that finite mixture modeling is a “person-centered approach” to latent 
variable modeling while factor analytic modeling is a “variable-centered approach” to 
latent variable modeling (Marsh et al. 2009). The distinction between these two 
approaches is that person-centered approaches are “predicated on the assumption that the 
population is heterogeneous with respect to the relationships between variables,” and thus 
seek to explain such heterogeneity through the development of person-centered 
categories, while variable-centered approaches “are predicated on the assumption that the 
population is homogeneous with respect to variable relationships,” and thus seek to 
explain relationships among variables through the development of variable-centered 
factors (Masyn 2013, 553). To be sure, this basic distinction is not especially significant 
from a data analysis perspective, since person-centered categories can usually be 
represented via variable-centered factors, and vice versa (Horn 2000; Masyn 2013). 
Nonetheless, choosing the right approach is important because studies are on firmer 
ground in terms of the testing of hypotheses and interpretations of results when the 
methodological techniques that are selected are conceptually appropriate.  
 In the LPA analysis of this project, the observations are not persons but rather 
geographical entities. Thus, the conceptual distinction referenced by psychologists can be 
slightly altered to distinguish between “entity-centered approaches” and “variable-
centered approaches.” It is clear, however, that the conceptually appropriate latent 
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modeling approach is the finite mixture model rather than the factor analytic model. This 
is because the fundamental goal of the analysis is to explain heterogeneity in the 
relationships between variables among the observations in my sample (i.e., the 3,504 
legislative districts) rather than to simplify the set of variables for which I have collected 
data. 
 The formal specification of the LPA model has been detailed in many other works 
(see, e.g., Muthen 2001) and need not detain us here. Several important aspects of the 
LPA model and its estimation are worth noting, however. First, as discussed above and in 
Chapter Two, LPA is a model-based approach to quantitative categorization. In LPA (as 
in other finite mixture models), there are actually two components to the model that is 
estimated: a measurement model that expresses the relationships between the observed 
variables and the latent variable (i.e., the distributions of observed variables for each 
latent category), and a structural model indicating the proportions of each latent category 
(Masyn 2013). While each latent category is estimated using the same model, the 
parameters expressing the relationships between observed variables and endorsement of a 
particular category take on different values (Muthen 2001). In more complicated forms of 
finite mixture modeling, individual latent categories can be estimated using different 
models, but such an approach was not attempted in this study.  
 Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Two, LPA in its classical form is premised 
on the notion that the latent variable accounts for all of the associations between the 
observed variables, an assumption known as conditional independence (Muthen 2001). In 
other words, it is assumed that there are no systematic relationships between any of the 
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observed variables within the categories that emerge from the LPA. While researchers 
can relax this assumption and should do so under particular circumstances, this is not 
generally recommended (Marsh et al. 2009). In this study, I have chosen to maintain the 
conditional independence assumption.  
Finally, LPA is estimated by an iterative maximum-likelihood estimation 
procedure using the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Muthen 2001; Vermunt 
and Magidson 2002; Pastor 2007; Masyn 2013). Different sets of model parameters 
estimates are considered and the ones that yield the largest log-likelihood value are 
chosen. Because of the problem of local maxima (i.e., the range of log-likelihood values 
may have local peaks that are lower than the highest peak), it is recommended that 
scholars employ multiple random starting values. In testing different class solutions, I 
employed 1000 multiple random starting values and ten iterations. Additionally, I 
reproduced the final (nine-class) solution upon which I settled using 1000 random 










Appendix Two: Supplementary Information on Data Collection for 
Latent Profile Analysis  
 
 Prior to conducting the Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) of 3,504 state legislative 
districts in the 1990s and 2000s, a large number of technical decisions needed to be made 
regarding the estimation of raw data for state legislative districts in the 1990s, the 
adjustment of data to ensure comparability across Censuses, and the calculation of the 
METRO variable. In the interest of full disclosure, I provide this appendix, which 
includes some additional information about various aspects of the data collection process. 
ASCERTAINING THE RELIABILITY OF DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES PRODUCED BY 
SPATIAL JOINING 
 
 Chapter Two provided basic details about the spatial joining procedures used to 
estimate demographic data for 1993-2002 state legislative districts. While it is difficult to 
precisely know the accuracy of the estimates produced by this procedure, several 
inspections suggest that the estimates are generally quite reliable. To begin with, final 
data on the percentage of black and Hispanic residents were compared with data from 
Lilley, DeFranco, and Bernstein (1998), who wrote the premiere reference manual on 
state legislative districts in the 1990s. The comparison reveals that my estimates align 
closely with theirs.  
 Another way of checking the reliability of the spatial joining procedure is by 
comparing the estimates of total population of each legislative district in a legislative 
chamber. Given that legislative districts in a single chamber have roughly equal 
populations, the process of aggregating population data from Census block group 
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centroids to the legislative districts that geographically encompass them should result in 
district population estimates that are fairly similar. If the spatial joining procedure is 
found to yield within-chamber district population estimates that vary widely, this would 
constitute evidence that the process of aggregating data from centroid to district is not 
producing reliable estimates.  
Table A2.1 (next page) presents data on 1990s district population estimates 
generated by the spatial joining procedure for each of the seventeen chambers in the 
sample. In particular, the second, third, and fourth columns present the mean district 
population, the standard deviation (sd), and the coefficient of variation (cv) for each 
chamber. As can be seen, the coefficients of variation are generally quite low, suggesting 
that the spatial joining procedure has yielded fairly reliable estimates. It is important to 
point out that the U.S. Supreme Court has permitted small levels of population inequality 
across districts in state legislative redistricting plans (Levitt 2010), so the variation that 
does exist in the within-chamber population estimates is not entirely due to estimation 
error. At the same time, one also notices that the coefficients of variation are clearly 
smaller among the chambers whose districts have larger populations (e.g., the California 
Assembly, New Jersey Assembly, and New York Assembly) and larger among the 
chambers whose districts have smaller populations (e.g., the Minnesota House, Missouri 
House, and Nevada Assembly). Thus, it appears that the decision not to include 




Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics on Spatial Joining Estimates of Total Population 
for 1993-2002 State Legislative Districts 
 
 District Population –  
Spatial Joining Estimates 
District Population –  
1990 State 
Population Divided 
by Number of 
Districts 
 mean sd cv  
Alabama House 38563 2938 0.076 38482 
California Assembly 371789 2808 0.008 372000 
Iowa House 27767 2058 0.074 27768 
Illinois House 96999 3081 0.032 96870 
Indiana House 55447 2730 0.049 55442 
Michigan House 84505 4216 0.050 84503 
Minnesota House 32660 2417 0.074 32650 
Missouri House 31405 2256 0.072 31393 
Nevada Assembly 28774 3574 0.124 28615 
New Jersey Assembly 193490 3110 0.016 193255 
New York Assembly 120040 4473 0.037 119936 
Ohio House 109607 4403 0.040 109567 
Oregon House 47397 2079 0.044 47372 
Pennsylvania House 58596 1708 0.029 58530 
Virginia House 61560 4332 0.070 61874 
Washington House 98355 3992 0.041 99320 
Wisconsin Assembly 49415 3490 0.071 49412 
 
Finally, the last (fifth) column of the table shows the 1990 district population for 
each chamber as calculated by dividing the 1990 state population by the number of 
districts in the chamber. As can be seen, the results for this column are very similar to 
those of the first column (mean district population calculated by the spatial joining 
procedure). This provides further evidence that the spatial joining procedure is effective 




ENSURING DATA COMPARABILITY 
Of the twelve observed variables incorporated into the LPA, eleven were 
calculated directly from Census data. Nine of the variables calculated from Census data 
were confirmed to be perfectly comparable across Censuses. These nine variables were 
HISP, UNDER18, OVER65, MAR, ENG, FAM, BA, PRIVSEC, SELFEMP. For the 
most part, the comparability of these variables is self-evident (it is hard to change how to 
measure the percentage of people under age 18), but for FAM, see Ruggles and Brower 
2003; for PRIVSEC and SELFEMP, see U.S. Census Bureau 2005.  
 In the case of BLACK (percentage of people who are Black/African-American 
within a legislative district), comparability was slightly complicated because of the option 
of selecting more than one race in the 2000 Census, but not in the 1990 Census. The 
percentage of Americans who opted to select more than one race in the 2000 Census was 
quite small, however. For 2003-2012 state legislative districts, BLACK is calculated as 
the percentage who choose “Black/African-American” to describe themselves, either as 
their only selection or as one among others.   
 The variable URBAN posed the most significant problems in terms of ensuring 
comparability due to highly technical changes in the standards used by the U.S. Census 
Bureau to determine whether places should be considered urban or rural between 1990 
and 2000. Stated very succinctly, these changes were largely based on the introduction of 
the “urban cluster” concept, designed to capture densely-populated clusters of under 
50,000 people and include them as a type of urban area, as well as the decision to adopt a 
purely density-based approach to measuring urbanity (i.e., without taking jurisdictional 
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boundaries into account) (Ratliffe 2006). On the whole, these changes affected 
urban/rural delineation among an extremely small percentage of the U.S. population. Due 
to differences in laws governing municipal incorporation and other factors, however, 
some states were far more affected than others.  
 To remedy potential measurement errors caused by this problem, I obtained a data 
file (graciously provided by Michael Ratliffe of the U.S. Census Bureau) that applied 
Census 2000 urban area criteria to Census 1990 data at the county level. These data 
include the exact number of people within each county of the U.S. who are reclassified 
from rural to urban (or, in some cases, from urban to rural) when 2000 Census criteria are 
used to classify 1990 observations instead of 1990 criteria. The county level is the 
smallest areal unit for which such data were available. Using ArcGIS spatial joining 
techniques, I associated counties with 1993-2002 state legislative districts in each of my 
seventeen chambers and estimated the percentage of the population of each state 
legislative district that lives in a given county. I then developed a measure of the 
urban/rural reclassifications of state legislative districts on the basis of county data. For 
example, if 95% of residents of state legislative district A lived in County 1, whose urban 
population increased by 3% using 2000 Census criteria, and the other 5% lived in County 
2, whose urban population increased by 1%, then the urban population change for the 
district was estimated as: (.95*.03) + (.05*.01) = .029, or 2.9%. Thus, 2.9% was added to 
state legislative district A’s 1990 urban population. In this way, the data for all 1990 state 
legislative districts on URBAN were adjusted to comport with 2000 Census criteria. 
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Thus, data on URBAN for all 3,504 districts in my dataset were based on the same 
(Census 2000) criteria.  
CALCULATING THE METRO VARIABLE 
The final variable included in the LPA was the district metropolitanization index 
(METRO).  Unlike the eleven other observed variables, METRO was calculated not from 
individual-level Census data but instead from the OMB’s 2003 Urban-Rural Continuum 
Codes, which classify counties according to their association with metropolitan areas. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the OMB’s urban-rural continuum codes are fundamentally 
distinct from the data used to create the URBAN variable, in part because they are based 
on the principle of “rural integration” instead of “rural separation” (Isserman 2005).  
OMB codes range from 1 (“Counties in metro areas with 1 million population or more’) 
to 9 (“Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to metro 
area”).60  
In an ideal world, 1993 OMB urban-rural continuum codes would have been used 
to measure METRO for 1993-2002 state legislative districts and 2003 OMB codes would 
have been used to measure METRO for 2003-2012 districts. Unfortunately, the standards 
by which OMB calculated its continuum codes changed substantially between decades, 
rendering the use of codes from separate decades problematic. Because continuum code 
measurement is based on highly intricate data (i.e., transportation and employment 
                                                 





patterns, etc.), no reasonable conversion factors or adjustment techniques exist to align 
1993 codes with 2003 codes. However, it is crucial to bear in mind that the correlation 
between 1993 and 2003 codes is a very high 0.84. Thus, even with the changes in 
continuum code measurements, counties are grouped into largely the same categories 
across decades. It was therefore decided that little violence would be done to the data by 
applying 2003 codes to 1993-2002 state legislative districts.  
 Because the chief value of the OMB codes for my dissertation lies in measuring 
metropolitanization, not urban/rural populations (which are already included in my LPA 
via URBAN), I recoded all of the non-metro codes in the OMB scheme into a single, 
non-metropolitan category. The recoded categories were given values ranging from 100 
(metro, greater than 1,000,000) to 0 (non-metro). As with URBAN, I next used ArcGIS 
spatial joining techniques to associate county populations with state legislative districts 
and developed a summary measure of the metropolitanization of a state legislative district 
on the basis of county data. For example, if 95% of residents of state legislative district A 
lived in County 1, located in a metro area of greater than 1,000,000, and the other 5% 
lived in County 2, located in a non-metro area, then the metropolitanization index value 
of the state legislative district was calculated as (.95 * 100) + (.05 * 0) = 95. Conversely, 
if a state legislative district was composed of five non-metro counties, each composing 
20% of the district’s population, the metropolitanization index value for it was calculated 
as (0 * .2) +  (0 * .2) +  (0 * .2) + (0 * .2) +  (0 * .2) = 0. In this way, state legislative 
district metropolitanization index scores were tabulated to range from 0 to 100.   
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Appendix Three: Testing the Robustness of the Nine-Category Latent 
Profile Analysis Solution 
 Here, I address concerns about whether (and to what extent) the classification 
scheme that emerged from the LPA would be reproduced if the sample of legislative 
districts or modeling instructions were somewhat different. First, if the sample of districts 
were split by decade and 1990s and 2000s districts were modeled separately, would the 
same set of district categories emerge? Given demographic changes that occurred 
between 1990 and 2000, the distribution of observed values for the 1990s and 2000s 
districts is certainly not the same. It is therefore reasonable to expect slightly different 
solutions for LPA analyses based on districts from only one decade. However, a key 
premise of this dissertation is that the nine district categories represent distinct 
geographical contexts that existed throughout both decades. Thus, if splitting the sample 
results in two classification schemes that differ markedly, the validity of the study is (to 
some extent) called into question. 
To consider this question, I ran separate nine-class models for the 1,752 districts 
from the 1990s and for the 1,752 districts from the 2000s. Examining the data, I found 
that categories with the same essential features were produced, though with slight (and 
expected) differences in parametric estimations and mean values for the observed 
variables. A fairly simple and straightforward way to compare the solutions that emerged 
from the split-sample LPA models and the model used for the dissertation is to cross-
tabulate the categorical classifications of the districts from the 1990s-only and 2000s-
only LPAs with their classifications in the pooled model. The two tables below present 
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these cross-tabulations, with the top table exhibiting results for the 1990s districts and the 
bottom table exhibiting results for the 2000s districts. In both tables, the rows are the 
classifications from the pooled sample that was used from the dissertation and the 
columns are the classifications for the split-sample LPAs. The categories for the split-
sample models were given the same names (based on their profiles) as the categories in 
the pooled model.  
Table A3.1: Cross-Tabulation of Pooled Model Classifications by Split-Sample 























150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Hispanic 




0 2 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 




0 0 6 3 375 0 4 0 0 
Outer 
Suburbs 
0 0 6 0 9 281 11 0 0 
Upscale 
Suburbs 




0 0 1 0 4 5 0 441 0 
Deep 
Rural 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 118 
Note: Rows = Classification of 1990s districts Based on Pooled LPA (Used in Dissertation);  









Table A3.2: Cross-Tabulation of Pooled Model Classifications by Split-Sample 






















Black 146 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 
Urban 
Hispanic 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Urban 
Ethnic 
Matrix 0 0 148 0 3 0 2 0 0 
Yuppie 1 0 1 49 6 0 2 0 0 
Middle-
Class 
Suburbs 0 0 0 0 332 2 0 9 0 
Outer 
Suburbs 0 0 0 0 0 236 0 12 0 
Upscale 
Suburbs 0 0 0 0 13 17 166 1 0 
Small 
City and 
Country 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 385 78 
Deep 
Rural 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 
Note: Rows = Classification of 2000s districts Based on Pooled LPA (Used in Dissertation);  
Columns = Classification of 2000s districts Based on LPA Run Exclusively with 1990s Districts. 
 
As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of observations fall along the diagonal 
lines in both tables. These, of course, are the observations that were classified similarly in 
both the split-sample and pooled-sample models. There is only one significant 
discrepancy, which can be seen at the bottom-right corner of the Table A1.2. Many 2000s 
districts that were classified within the small city and country category in the pooled 
model are classified within the deep rural category in the pooled model. This can be 
explained as a result of the fact that 2000s legislative districts exhibit higher values for 
the percent-urban and metropolitanization variables than do the 1990s legislative 
districts. Consequently, the parametric estimations for these two variables for the deep 
rural category are larger in the 2000s-only model than in the pooled model, yielding a 
higher cut-off for districts to be placed in this category. Besides this discrepancy, 
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however, the classifications of the 1990s-only and 2000s-only models are nearly identical 
to those of the pooled model. Thus, across all three models, the profiles of the nine 
categories that emerge are largely the same.  
A similar concern about the robustness of the LPA model used in this dissertation 
has to do with the effect of including districts from legislative chambers of different 
sizes. This issue is discussed in some detail in Chapter 2, where I justify my use of an 
LPA model that treats all districts in the sample equally, irrespective of the chamber to 
which they belong. While an unweighted LPA model is in my view the best approach to 
the research question of this dissertation, it is nonetheless worthwhile to consider whether 
the classification scheme that emerged from the LPA model that was used in this study 
would be different if observations were weighted based on their chamber. To this end, I 
ran a nine-category LPA model in which the 3,504 districts were weighted by chamber 
such that all seventeen chambers were equally represented  in the sample (i.e., districts 
from chambers with a larger-than-average number of districts were weighted down and 
districts from chambers with a lower-than-average number of districts were weighted up). 
Table A3.3 (below) presents the cross-tabulation of district classification for the 
unweighted model used in the dissertation (rows) by the weighted model (columns). As 
can be seen, the classifications of the unweighted and weighted models are nearly 
identical. Thus, using a weighted LPA model to classify the districts in the sample into 





Table A3.3: Cross-Tabulation of Unweighted Pooled Model Classifications by 






















Black 301 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Urban 
Hispanic 0 90 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Urban 
Ethnic 
Matrix 0 0 220 6 3 0 6 0 0 
Yuppie 0 0 0 120 0 0 0 0 0 
Middle-
Class 
Suburbs 0 0 1 7 698 15 7 3 0 
Outer 
Suburbs 0 0 0 0 0 553 2 0 0 
Upscale 
Suburbs 0 0 0 1 1 1 328 1 0 
Small 
City and 
Country 2 0 0 0 1 9 0 896 6 
Deep 
Rural 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 224 
Note: Rows = Classification of 1990s and 2000s districts Based on Unweighted Pooled LPA (Used in 
Dissertation);  
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